Cablegram 187 CANBERRA, 21 July 1947, 2.45 p.m.
MOST IMMEDIATE SECRET
Your 148 [1], D.616 [2], D.617 and 150. [3]
Your comments regarding reference to Security Council are noted.
At the same time, you do not suggest any alternative means of dealing with present situation. The information you gave to the Netherlands Ambassador is noted, but it is apparent from events that the warning has not been heeded. We and you have both offered to both parties good offices and, while it is clear the Republican representatives would welcome such mediation and have actually asked for your intervention (your D.616, paragraph 6), no such willingness has been shown by Dutch.
2. Clearly, we cannot be inactive when military operations a-re in progress in Indonesia. To begin with, the situation immediately raises problems here, as Dutch are still purchasing supplies in Australia. But, apart from immediate problems, it is vital to Australia that the situation be not allowed to deteriorate.
3. Once before, Lord Killearn was able, acting in a personal capacity, to bring the two parties together. The Dutch should now be persuaded to accept mediation, either by third government or by a person such as Lord Killearn.
4. If it is clear that mediation is unacceptable, then there seems little to prevent the matter going to the Security Council either from Indonesians direct to the Secretary-General (Article 99 [4]) or through the medium of another government.
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1 Document 124.
2 Dispatched on 19 July, it conveyed a summary of recent Dutch- Indonesian exchanges; foreshadowed the likelihood of Dutch military action; and advised that the Republican representatives in Batavia had asked the United Kingdom to intervene (i.e. to mediate).
3 See Document 130, note 3.
4 Under Article 99 of the United Nations Charter, the Secretary- General of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.
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[AA:A1838/274, 854/10/4, i]