Preliminary Notes on Provisional Agenda by Evatt CANBERRA, August 1947
TOP SECRET
1. PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS.
(a) Countries to Participate in Pacific Peace Conference
1. For the Pacific settlement, treaty making should not be limited to a few major Powers. There should be a democratic procedure on the principle that such matters should be settled by discussion among all States which made direct contributions to defeating the aggressor nations, and which are directly concerned in the actual terms of the settlement. This principle was recognised, in relation to the policies governing the occupation of Japan, with the establishment of the Far Eastern Commission.
2. The Australian Government advocates the drafting and conclusion of the settlement with Japan by a representative conference with membership corresponding substantially to that of the Far Eastern Commission.
(b) Level of Representation
3. The Australian Government believes that, at the initial proceedings of the conference, such as that suggested by the United States Government on 11 July, each Government should be free to determine its representation. For its part the Australian Government could not contemplate the establishment of an expert or deputy committee system until the basic directives had been previously decided at the highest level.
(c) Method of Reaching Decisions
4. The practice and principle of veto should not be admitted in international conferences.
5. Final decisions in the peace conference for Japan must be as nearly as possible unanimous. Committee decisions should be reached either by majority vote or, preferably, two-thirds vote, always remembering that the objective is unanimity. Committee decisions should be subject to confirmation in Plenary Conference.
(d) Time of Peace Conference
6. In view of the obvious tendency to unilateral decisions affecting the whole future of Japan (and indeed the Pacific area as a whole) and the related tendency to piece-meal settlement, and in view of the fact that the present phase of military occupation has completed its primary task of disarmament and demilitarization, the Australian Government has been and is impressed with the urgency of international action to draw up the final settlement with Japan.
7. Dates are now being considered and the Australian Government has expressed the view that the conference should be immediately before or after the meeting of the United Nations Assembly.
(e) Venue
8. A Pacific location would be most suitable. There is a strong case for a United States location. San Francisco or Pearl Harbour seem preferable to Washington.
9. Australia would oppose any suggestion that the treaty be made or signed in Japanese territory.
(f) Single Instrument or more (Final settlement or settlement by stages?).
10. The matters for consideration include:
(i) Interim settlement providing for continuance of existing supervision, with some modifications, followed in about five years by a general settlement.
(ii) Four-power treaty, limited to disarmament and demilitarization of Japan as suggested by former U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, in June, 1946, to be followed later by a general settlement.
(iii) Alternatively to (ii) a regional Pacific draft treaty within United Nations framework providing for action against an aggressor subject to the provisions of the United Nations Charter.
(iv) It is understood that in some circles it is thought that settlement might be effected by two instruments:
a. Agreement between Allied powers for supervision, both economic and military of Japan.
b. Peace treaty to be negotiated separately to which Japan would be a party.
(v) Single instrument providing for all questions including disarmament and territorial provisions, and envisaging the continuance of supervision by an inter-Allied body, with gradual relaxation of the supervision.
(g) Adherence of other countries which declared war on Japan
11. It will be necessary to provide for adherence of countries which declared war on Japan but which did not actively participate in the Pacific War or which are not members of the F.E.C. group.
These countries will wish formally to bring to an end the state of war with Japan when the Treaty is concluded.
The United States Government, in an aide-memoire to other F.E.C.
countries on 11thJuly, 1947, Proposed a conference of the eleven F.E.C. countries to discuss a peace treaty for Japan, and that ‘after the draft has reached a sufficiently advanced stage, it should be considered by a general conference of all the States at war with Japan’.
(h) Obligations of Neutral Countries in Relation to Certain Parts of the Treaty
12. The Japanese Government should be obligated not to enter into commercial or other relations with former neutral countries, except in accordance with the principles of the Treaty and, where appropriate, with the consent of the Supervisory Commission.
2. BASIC OBJECTIVES OF THE ALLIED POWERS 13. (a) In the Potsdam Declaration of 26th July, 1945, it was laid down, inter alia, that there must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest;
that until there is convincing proof that Japan’s warmaking power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory, to be designated by the Allies, must be occupied;
that the Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of the democratic tendencies among the Japanese people;
and that Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind but not those which would enable her to re-arm for war.
14 (b) ‘Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan’, adopted by the Far Eastern Commission on 19th June, 1947, states the following ultimate objectives:
15. The ultimate objectives in relation to Japan, to which policies for the post-surrender period for Japan should conform are:
a. To insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the peace and security of the world.
b. To bring about the earliest possible establishment of a democratic and peaceful government which will carry out its international responsibilities, respect the rights of other states, and support the objectives of the United Nations. Such government in Japan should be established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.
16. These objectives will be achieved by the following principal means:
a. Japan’s sovereignty will be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Skikoku and such minor outlying islands as may be determined.
b. Japan will be completely disarmed and demilitarised. The authority of the militarists and the influence of militarism will be totally eliminated. All institutions expressive of the spirit of militarism and aggression will be vigorously suppressed.
c. The Japanese people shall be encouraged to develop a desire for individual liberties and respect for fundamental human rights, particularly the freedom of religion, assembly and association, speech and the press. They shall be encouraged to form democratic and representative organizations.
d. Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to re-arm for war. To this end access to, as distinguished from control, raw materials should be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations will be permitted.
17. At the time of adoption of this paper the following Australian statement was placed on record with F.E.C.:
‘The policies laid down in this paper are subject to and without prejudice to discussions which will take place during the negotiation of the Peace Treaty with Japan and the provisions of the Peace Treaty with Japan.’ The Australian representative at the meeting said Australia adopted the paper on this understanding.
18. (c) The Australian Minister for External Affairs stated on 26th February, 1947:
‘Japan must never again be permitted to develop the means of waging aggressive war. First and foremost therefore, … we have placed security … secondly, we believe that a country which has a genuinely democratic form of government is unlikely to embark on a policy of aggression and is more likely to pursue means of adjusting its interests to those of other countries … Allied aims for Japan fall into three main classes, namely military, political and economic.’
19. The Australian Minister for External Affairs stated further on 6th June 1947:
‘It is plain that the future control and supervision of Japan will be the most important question for the peace conference to decide.
By no pretext should Japan be permitted to imitate the example of Germany after World War I and again emerge as a menace to the security of the Pacific or South East Asia …
‘But a merely negative policy towards Japan would be quite inadequate. There is no reason why the Japanese people, provided always that there is adequate control, should not gradually develop into a peaceful democratic state. Constructive reform of Japan’s social, political and economic pattern is equally important, and particular stress is being laid on the formulation of provisions to deal with the review of the Japanese constitution and the gradual democratisation of that country, including the continued encouragement of trade unions, progressive reform of the educational system and a more drastic reform of the system of land tenure than that already instituted.’
3. CONTROL OR SUPERVISION OF JAPAN
(Machinery for securing achievement of basic objectives of the Allied Powers).
(a) Supervisory Commission for Japan
20. For the purpose of securing the carrying out of the basic objectives of the Allied Powers and the specific undertakings given by Japan in the Treaty, there should be a Supervisory Commission for Japan. This Commission should consist of representatives of selected Governments of the States signatory to the Treaty.
(b) Functions of Supervisory Body
21. The Commission would supervise the implementation of the terms of the Treaty.
22. Where the Commission was satisfied that the Japanese Government had failed to comply with any provision of the Treaty, it should instruct the Japanese Government to take action in accordance with its obligations under the Treaty.
23. Where the Commission decided that the Japanese Government had evaded or failed to comply with its instructions in respect of breaches of the Provisions of this Treaty, it should decide what consequential directives should be issued.
24. The Commission could determine from time to time in respect of particular provisions of the Treaty that the Japanese Government had fulfilled these provisions and that supervision in respect of these provisions was therefore no longer necessary.
25. The Commission would also determine from time to time of which international bodies, agencies, etc., the Japanese Government should apply for membership and at what date.
26. If the Supervisory Commission considered that the Japanese Government was failing to fulfil satisfactorily its economic obligations under the Peace Treaty it would consult with the Japanese Government on possible modifications of policy, and, if necessary, instruct the Japanese Government on economic policy.
27. The Commission should be empowered to establish the machinery of supervision and inspection necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes and functions.
28. The Commission’s inspectorial staffs and secretariat should be international in character and recruited from nationals of members of the Supervisory Commission.
29. Costs of the secretariat, inspectorial staff, and military occupation force should be borne by the Japanese Government, salaries and allowances of representatives on the Commission by member Governments appointing them.
(c) Voting
30.Decisions of the Commission should be taken by simple majority or two-thirds vote.
(d) Means of Enforcement
31. An Allied force of some character should be associated with the Supervisory Commission. These forces should be under undivided command. Their composition should be agreed at the time of the settlement. The Supervisory Commission should have power to impose certain defined economic restrictions.
(e) Extent of Military Occupation
32. Alternatives after the signing of the treaty, appear to include:
(i) Japan to be occupied by forces of the Allied countries until the Supervisory Commission decided these forces should:
i) be limited to certain points in Japan, or ii) be evacuated altogether.
Meanwhile the occupying forces not to be restricted to any specified areas. These forces could at the discretion of the Supervisory Commission, be supplemented by forces garrisoning adjacent island bases.
OR
(ii) Small garrisons of the Supervisory Commission for Japan might be placed at certain designated areas in Japan. These forces might be supplemented by forces garrisoning adjacent island bases.
OR
(iii) All Allied troops to be withdrawn from the main Japanese Islands. Garrison forces under the control of the Supervisory Commission to be stationed in adjacent island bases. The Supervisory Commission for Japan to have the right to land forces in Japan for the purpose of preserving order or ensuring compliance by the Japanese Government with the terms of the Treaty; and full rights to patrol Japanese waters and the air above Japan with its naval and air forces.
4. TERRITORIAL PROVISIONS
(a) Boundaries of Japan-Main Islands
33. As provided in the Potsdam Declaration, Japan’s sovereignty to be limited to Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu and Shikoku and inner adjacent islands thereto, including Tsushima.
34. Any suggestions by the Japanese for plebiscites in territories of their former Empire should be rejected, except possibly in the case of islands which lie very close to the four main islands, and which are not strategically important.
35. Japan to renounce all rights in and to Korea, Manchuria, China, the island of Sakhalin (Karafuto), the Kuriles (Chishima Islands), Formosa (Taiwan), the Pescadores Islands, the Ryuku (Loochoo) Islands, the Bonin Islands, the Volcano Islands, Marcus Island, Quelpart (Saishu) Island, the Marshall Islands, Caroline Islands and the Mariana Islands, the Spratley Islands, the Falkland Islands dependencies, and Antarctica.
(b) Manchuria including Dairen and Port Arthur
36. (i) Japan to recognize the restoration of Manchuria to China.
Equal treatment in Manchuria for the commerce, and subjects or citizens of all member states of the United Nations to be guaranteed.
(ii) Dairen 37. The commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalised, as provided for in Clause 2(b) of the Yalta Agreement. Dairen should be a free port, open to the shipping and unrestricted commerce of all nations. The administering authorities should guarantee to provide just and adequate access to wharves and warehouses in the port.
(iii) Port Arthur 38. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of 14th August, 1945, concerning agreement on Port Arthur provides for the joint use of Port Arthur as a Naval Base by the U.S.S.R. and China. The terms of this use are provided for in Articles II-IX of the above agreement, and in the Appendices to the Agreement.
(c) Korea (Chosen)
39. The terms of the Moscow Agreement of December, 1945, should be implemented.
Quelpart Island should be recognised as part of Korea.
(d) Southern Sakhalin and Kuriles
40. Southern Sakhalin should be restored to the U.S.S.R., and the Kuriles ceded to U.S.S.R. in accordance with the Yalta Agreement.
(e) Formosa and Pescadores
41. These should be restored to China in accordance with the Cairo Declaration.
(f) Marshalls, Carolines and Marianas
42. The trusteeship of the U.S.A. over these islands, approved by the United Nations in 1947, should be recognized.
(g) Ryukyus, Bonin, Volcano and Marcus
43. United States sovereignty or control of Japanese islands outside the four main islands should be favoured. The islands might be held under trusteeship under the ‘strategic area’ provisions of the Charter.
44. Civil rights should be granted to nationals of members of the United Nations and Japanese nationals in the territories taken from Japan. If so, procedure for enforcement of rights should be established.
45. The Japanese should, in view of their dependence on fishing for their national economy and food, be granted fishing rights and the right to shelter in the territorial waters of adjacent islands and territories, subject to conditions and restrictions to be imposed by the Supervisory Commission.
5. DISARMAMENT AND DEMILITARISATION
(a) Military, Naval and Air
46. Japan should remain completely disarmed and demilitarised.
Internal disorders should be prevented by a nonmilitary police force. This force should be prohibited from setting up ‘special’ branches or agencies that might take in the functions of political police. Careful inspection should be exercised by the Supervisory Commission for Japan.
(b) Atomic Energy
47. A policy decision by F.E.C. prohibits all Japanese research and activity in atomic energy. Supervision should be exercised by the Supervisory Commission for Japan.
(c) Chemical and Bacteriological Warfare
48. The Supervisory Commission for Japan should ensure that preparations are not being made, or stocks built up, for chemical and bacteriological warfare.
(d) Manufacture
49. All armament manufacture should be forbidden. The Supervisory Commission for Japan should undertake constant inspection, and supervision should be exercised over heavy industries to ensure the performance of such limitations as [may] be imposed in the Economic Provisions ([7] below).
(e) Naval Shipbuilding
50. Japan should be prohibited from building any kind of naval vessel.
Super-vision of this provision should be exercised by the Supervisory Commission for Japan.
6. POLITICAL PROVISIONS A. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND DEMOCRATIZATION
(a) Review of the Constitution
51.. The Japanese Government should undertake to maintain the principles of the Constitution of 3 May 1947, as defined in the F.E.C. policies of 2 July 1946 and 25 September 1946.
52. The constitution should be reviewed by the Diet not sooner than one year and not later than two years from 3 May 1947, in accordance with the principles of the F.E.C. decision of 17 October 1946. The Supervisory Commission should also review the constitution within the same period, and may require a referendum or some other appropriate procedure for ascertaining Japanese opinion with respect to the constitution.
(b) The Purge
53. Japan should undertake to exclude from public office all those persons who have already been so excluded because of their ultra- nationalistic or militaristic affiliations.
54. The Japanese Government should however have the right to submit to the Supervisory Commission for Japan the names of purged individuals who, in its opinion, should, subject to the approval of the Supervisory Commission, be permitted to resume public office.
55. The Supervisory Commission should also have power to order the exclusion of any person deemed unfit for public office because of his nationalistic or militaristic activities.
(c) Public Service
56. There should be no discrimination in recruitment to and promotion in the Public Service.
(d) Education
57. Japan should undertake to implement the F.E.C. policy decision on education.
(e) Ultra-Nationalistic Societies
58. Japanese should undertake that secret and other ultra- nationalistic societies shall remain disbanded, and new ones prevented. The Supervisory Commission for Japan should secure compliance with this.
(f) Special Police and Para-Militaty Organisations
59. The Japanese Government should undertake not to re-establish any special police and para-military organisations, and this undertaking should be supervised by the Supervisory Commission for Japan.
(g) State Shintoism
60. The Japanese Government should not re-adopt the system of providing State subsidies for Shinto shrines, clergy, or organisations, nor should there be other financial connections, direct or indirect, between Shintoism and the Japanese State.
(h) Protection of Civil Rights
61. Provision should be made for the protection and enforcement of civil rights within Japan.
B. TREATIES, ETC.
(a) Japanese Rights and Interests Outside Japan
62. Japan should renounce all rights and interests, both public and private, located outside Japan. These to be expropriated by the local administrations.
63. Government and private assets should be set off against Reparations claims.
(b) Treaties
(i) Bilateral 64. Each Power signatory to the treaty to inform Japan, within six months of the Treaty coming into force, which of the pre-war bilateral treaties it desires to keep in force or revive.
(ii) Multilateral 65. With the approval or at the direction of the Supervisory Commission, Japan should be re-instated as a signatory of such agreements as the Madrid Convention on Telecommunications of 1932, health conventions, etc., after examination of the individual agreements.
66. With the approval or at the direction of the Supervisory Commission, Japan should also subscribe to agreements to which she was not a party (such as the Convention of Copyright of 1928).
67. Such instruments as the Declaration of Human Rights should be adhered to by Japan.
(iii)Peace Treaties 68. Japan should recognise the peace treaties already signed and yet to be signed between the Allies and their enemies (European, Siam, etc.).
(iv) Other Treaties 69. Japan also to recognise in the peace treaty such other existing treaties as may be considered desirable (e.g. Sino-Soviet Treaty of 14 August 1945).
(c) Recognition of Occupation Acts
70. Full legal validity should be given to acts of the occupying authorities, whether before or after the coming into force of the peace treaty. Full legal validity should similarly be given to all acts of Japanese nationals done in accordance with directions or policies of the occupying authorities.
C. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
71. Japan should be permitted to enter into diplomatic and commercial relations with foreign countries, subject to approval in each case by the Supervisory Commission.
72. Japan should be allowed to seek membership of the United Nations and the International Court when permitted by the Supervisory Commission.
73. Japan should also be allowed to seek membership, when permitted by the Supervisory Commission, in international economic organisations such as F.A.O., I.L.O., etc., and in such international organisations as U.N.E.S.C.O.
74. The Supervisory Commission should in any case have power to require Japan to observe duties and obligations placed on members of the organisations and to take appropriate action to further the aims of the organisations, and in particular to provide such information as is required by international economic organisations.
75. While Japan must not maintain any armed forces, she should make available bases and general facilities to the United Nations, for security purposes.
7. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PROVISIONS
(a) Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations
76. Every encouragement should be given to the development of Trade Unions in accordance with the F.E.C. policy decision of December 6, 1946. There should be complete freedom of working groups to form associations, improve their occupational status, hours, wages, and conditions of work. There should also be complete freedom of these associations to take industrial action to achieve their objectives and take constitutional political action and to form political parties for similar purposes.
77. Manufacturers and trade associations, aimed at protecting the interests and independence of employers, should also be encouraged but they should not be allowed to adopt excessive restrictive practices.
(b) Land Reform
78. As a political basis for land reform small rural landholders and tenants should be encouraged to form groups or associations and political parties. The Japanese Government should be required to implement a policy of land reforms such as was proposed by the British Commonwealth Member to the Seventh Meeting of the A.C.J.
[1] Such a policy should provide for an increase in land ownership and improve tenancy conditions. There should also be a policy seeking, as a general goal, the provision of fiscal and financial aid to farmers, the reduction of agricultural operating costs and an increase in agricultural productivity.
(c) Dissolution of the Zaibatsu
79. The Zaibatsu should be dissolved and for the time being all Zaibatsu holdings should be controlled by the State. Key industries, including heavy industries, should be taken over by the State, and control of banking and investment should be concentrated in a central bank. After there has been an opportunity for wider distribution of incomes and savings, consideration should be given to the control of the smaller and lighter industries by co-operatives, small independent entrepreneurs and joint stock companies. Operations of this nature, however, should be subject to agreement between the Japanese Government and the Supervisory Commission for Japan.
80. Consideration should be given to making arrangements for democratically elected local government bodies to take over public utilities.
(d) Economic equality
81. The Japanese Government should promote improved conditions of work, and greater equality in the distribution of wealth. It should, therefore, endeavour to eliminate substandard conditions of labour throughout its jurisdiction and to improve social security standards. It should also encourage co-operative enterprises, particularly in agriculture, and the extension of ownership and production to make full use of Japan’s national resources.
82. In furtherance of these ends, the Japanese Government should adopt, among other things, an appropriate fiscal policy including a system of progressive taxation.
(e) Maintenance of Domestic Employment
83. Japan should act in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter in achieving and maintaining full and productive employment.
(f) Transition controls
84. In order to maintain a stable economy over the transitional period (say until 1950) the Japanese Government should be required to enforce effective control of prices and raw materials and should be required to ration equitably essential consumer goods.
(g) Access to Raw Materials
85. As determined from time to time by the Supervisory Commission, Japan should have access to the raw materials necessary for its peace time needs. For security purposes the Supervisory Commission for Japan should have the power and duty to refuse access to raw materials which it considers are not essential to these needs. In particular the Commission should supervise imports of iron and steel, bauxite and aluminium, and oil. Japan should not be allowed to obtain control of raw materials in other countries.
(h) Commercial Policy
86. The limitation of the volume of export trade by associations, the allocation of export quotas among members of these associations, and the forcing of trade into exclusively Japanese channels by the limitation of the associations’ membership, should be eliminated completely. The Supervisory Commission should have power to declare that the Japanese Government is using discriminatory practices and to instruct it to modify its trade policy.
87. As a safeguard against the development of war potential behind trade barriers, the Japanese Government should not be permitted to impose protective import duties or restrictions on Oil, steel, iron, aluminium, and chemical fertilizers, without the consent of the Supervisory Commission.
88. The Commission should investigate tariffs to ensure that they are not being imposed for disguised strategic reasons, and the fact that a tariff supports production which is apparently uneconomic in the long run should be sufficient grounds for undertaking an investigation of it.
(i) Fiscal Policy
89. The Supervisory Commission should be able to supervise public accounts in order to detect expenditure for undesirable ends, such as export subsidies, potential military organisations or unauthorised productive capacity. It should also be able to supervise the taxation system in order to ensure it is equitable and to prevent rapid inflation. To this end the Japanese Government should be required to prepare any report the Commission directs.
(j) Fishing, whaling and sealing
90. There should be a strict control by the Supervisory Commission of Japanese fishing, whaling and sealing, to prevent depletion of resources. In particular Japan should be required to subscribe to the International Whaling Agreement of 1946 and to a renewal of the Convention for the Protection of Fur Seals of 1911.
Consideration should be given to the areas within which Japanese fishing, whaling, and Pearling are permitted. Japanese whaling in the Antarctic should either be prevented or made subject to approval of interested Allied Powers and to conditions laid down.
Japan should not be allowed to whale from factory ships, and should be confined to land bases in Japan.
(k) Pearling
91. Japanese pearling should not be permitted without approval, and, if permitted, should contribute to the revenue of the state in whose waters the pearling is carried on. Pearling should not be permitted south of 10 N.
(l) Shipping
92. Japanese shipping should be limited to vessels not exceeding 5,000 gross registered tons of which all newly constructed or acquired vessels should have a single deck only. The construction of vessels should be limited to those not exceeding a stipulated speed. In general the total merchant shipping tonnage owned by Japan should be limited to a maximum sufficient for satisfactory conduct of trade between Japan’s own islands and such oversea traffic as the Allied and Associated Powers deem necessary.
(m) Heavy Industries
93. The capacity of industries which have a bearing on Japanese war potential should be limited to the amount necessary for Japan’s legitimate peace time needs, with such additional restrictions or limitations as might be necessary in the interests of Allied security.
(n) Civil Aviation
94. Japan should be forbidden to possess or operate aircraft or to have any aviation manufacturing industry, including plant for the manufacture of gliders and lighter than air craft. Internal aviation should be run by an International Corporation and the Supervisory Commission for Japan should consider the question of Japan joining the I.C.A.O.
(o) Property, Rights and Interests
95. The property, rights and interests of the United Nations nationals and United Nations assets frozen in Japan should be restored.
96. The payment of debts owing to United Nations nationals by the Japanese should be enforced by the Japanese Government subject to the supervision of the Commission.
97. The rights of United Nations nationals in copyrights, patents, trade-marks and designs existing at the outbreak of war should be preserved. Similar rights held by Japanese nationals outside Japan at the time of the surrender should be expropriated.
98. Contracts which involve wartime trading with the enemy should be dissolved as from the date at which enemy character became apparent. Periods of prescriptions should be considered as having been suspended during the war. With regard to negotiable instruments no prejudice or invalidity should arise owing to failure to present protests, etc. during the war. Member Governments of the United Nations should have power to examine Japanese judgments including prize court judgments made during the war and the Japanese Government, at the request of member Governments of the United Nations, should ensure cancellation of any judgment not made according to law.
8. REPARATIONS, RESTITUTION, AND COSTS OF OCCUPATION
(a) General Reparations
99. Reparations should be calculated on broad political lines and based on justice, taking into account the relative contribution of each nation to victory and the physical losses and damage sustained.
100. The following categories of Japanese assets might be considered for reparations:
(a) Capital equipment.
(b) Shipping.
(c) Gold, silver, other precious metals, and gems.
(d) External assets.
(e) Current production.
101. Out of its share of reparations from Japan, special provision should be made as far as practicable by each country for compensation for prisoners of war (including internees) and/or their relatives, in cases where war crimes or cruelties, committed in violation of the rules and practices of war and humanity, caused death or permanent injury to the sufferer.
(b) Restitution
102. The Japanese Government should undertake to make full restitution in accordance with F.E.C. decisions to United Nations nationals of all property identified as having been located in an Allied country at the time of occupation of that country, and which was removed by fraud or duress by the Japanese or their agents.
(c) Occupation Costs
103. The Japanese Government should meet the costs of occupation of Japan.
H. V. EVATT.
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1 See note 2 to Document 497.
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[AA : A1068, ER47/31/34, i]