464

Makin to Evatt

Cablegram 388 WASHINGTON, 19 March 1947, 11.11 p.m.

SECRET

JAPANESE MANDATED ISLANDS

Chief of Division of Japanese Affairs [1] asked the Minister to call at the State Department this evening and raised the question of Australia’s views at the Security Council. Allison referred to proceedings on Monday and Tuesday, and said that if our case were that this question was part of final settlement in Pacific and should therefore be decided by all active belligerents United States felt that this was met by presence at Council of virtually all of such powers which, if not actually members, were participating.

The United States, he went on, felt very strongly that all active belligerents in war with Japan and in particular Australia should have equal and full participation in the settlement. It did not of course wholly rest with the United States. Other powers might not take that view, but Australia could be assured of United States support for equal and full participation. State Department had some time ago instructed their Ambassador in Canberra to convey this to you. They wanted us to know that their view on this was quite unchanged.

So far as the United States administration themselves were concerned, Allison continued, they were convinced that Australia meant it when she said she wanted United States in the Japanese islands. But there were others which might misinterpret our present stand, and have doubts as to what we really felt about the United States being in the islands. ‘Here are two of their best friends Australia and United Kingdom opposed to the United States.’ This would be embarrassing.

The State Department, he went on, realised that this is not a ‘life and death’ matter but it was embarrassing them and they would greatly appreciate it if I would convey to you their feeling on the matter. They did not want the question to reach a vote although they had little doubt of the result if it should be pressed. If you could reconsider the matter, he concluded, and find it possible to send instructions to the Australian delegation not to press the question it would help them greatly.

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1 John M. Allison.

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[AA: A1838, 333/4, ii]