Cablegram UN109 NEW YORK, 10 February 1948, 5.51 p.m.
MOST IMMEDIATE SECRET
Reference U.N. 106. [1]
There is an important omission from paragraph 4. Please add sub- paragraph in the following terms:
‘(4) To have Dutch agree that the words “under observation by” in Item 4 of 6 Principles of 17th January [2] mean “under supervision of “ ‘ (this matter of supervision of plebiscites was raised by the Americans themselves in our conversation).
2. Although no mention was made of the following matters in the conversation at State Department, I think it advisable that the Americans should see that the Dutch refrain from raising in the Security Council contentious issues, e.g. atrocities and the present status of the Republic as regards, inter alia, trade and foreign representation. In that event, of course, Republic would similarly refrain.
3. Forsyth and I had conversation to-day with the Indonesian representatives. We gave them no indication that we had discussed position with the Americans but in the course of conversation it appeared that some arrangement such as the Americans had in mind might be acceptable to them. The conversation, however, showed that there would be difficulty on their part in agreeing to join the present provisional Interim Government (see paragraph 2 last sentence U.N. 106). This, as you know, is composed entirely of representatives of non Republican States but when I was in Batavia the Dutch indicated that seats on this Government would be available to the Republicans who had not given any indication of their attitude. The Indonesians to-day thought it possible that Hatta might accept representation on this Government provided that they would have enough seats and that there was some guarantee against arbitrary use of Dutch Sovereign Rights. They would also want the Council of Good Offices closely associated, for example, by, in the first instance, sponsoring their membership and doing so in such a way as to make it clear that the Republic remained a distinct party to the Indonesian settlement. This would prevent their participation being used to prejudice their continuing status as a party to the dispute before the Security Council.
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1 Document 51.
2 Principle 4 of Document 24.
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[AA:A1838, 854/10/4/2, iv]