Letter BATAVIA, 7 May 1949
Since the commencement of the current talks in Batavia, I have had little time for letter-writing. However, my telegrams (Nos K.298 to K. 309 [1]) give a full account of the exchanges between the parties since the commencement of the talks on 14 April, and you will have received by bag copies of all relevant Commission documents including the Republican working paper (document No.
S/AC.10/CONF.3/W.1, see K.299 [2]) and the Netherlands reply (document No. S/AC.10/CONF.3/W.4, see K. 301 [3]).
2. The last formal exchange was the presentation of the Republican working paper on 21 April. Since then the parties have been negotiat[ing] underground with Cochran exerting a direct and significant pressure (particularly on the Republicans) when the going became tough.
3. To make your record complete I attach a copy of the letter [4] of the Republican delegation which was drafted in answer to the Netherlands working paper and as a comprehensive statement of the Republican position. This letter was designed to force an early show down so that advantage could be taken of the influence of the General Assembly. You will recall that it had been held up at Cochran’s instigation (K.302 [5], paragraph 2).
4. Herremens and I have been excluded from the recent informal talks. In fact, however, I have kept in closest touch with their progress through the Republican delegation which has consulted me on all points.
5. In my talks with the Republicans I have stressed the importance of their stating their position and their demands as clearly and early as possible. It has also been necessary to assist with the drafting. For example I have pointed out the importance of the Republic not surrendering its position under paragraphs 3 and 4 of the 28 January resolution [6], by accepting unconditionally the Netherlands invitation to a conference at The Hague as Cochran’s draft meant. I have also stressed the importance of insisting on an unambiguous paragraph 7 in the Netherlands statement (see K.
306 [7]).
6. At the same time it has been evident since Hatta’s visit to Batavia that he would be prepared to make concessions. This is based on:
(a) the belie[f] that Van Royen’s sincerity should be given the benefit of the doubt and that he should be assisted to overcome political difficulties at Batavia and The Hague.
(b) the conviction that the Security Council will not impose sanctions and that there is little prospect of additional material help for the Republic from the outside.
(c) the fear that the Republic’s position may be weakened by growing communist influence. Apart from ideological issues Republican guerillas may be growing short of arms and ammunition while only the communists have sources abroad. There is already evidence of increased Chinese communist activity.
(d) a tendency to depend on and trust unduly State Department influence, while underestimating the opportunities of influencing American public opinion.
(e) a belief that Federalist Indonesian support can be won over and that the Dutch can be forced to compromise at a conference at The Hague where it is hoped the old colonial influence may be weaker.
(f) the desire to encourage the Republican people by tangible evidence of the Republic’s vitality as would be afforded by the restoration of the Republican Government in the residency of Jogjakarta.
7. The probable result will be that the Republicans will go to The Hague without obtaining all the safeguards that would be desirable. Specifically Hatta’s attitude has meant that the Republican Delegation was not prepared to take my advice and insist on a specific Netherlands commitment regarding trade (see point (vii) paragraph 7, K.302) and has not insisted on a clear statement that the Netherlands Government would not create new States or Negaras on territory under Republican control prior to December 19, 1948. On this latter point I had suggested that appropriate wording might be ‘on the understanding that any final agreement between the parties will include the right of self- determination of the Indonesian peoples as recognized by the Linggadjati and Renville Principles [8], the Netherlands Government will refrain from the establishment or recognition of Negaras and Daerahs on territory under Republican control prior to December 19, 1948 and from the expansion of Negaras and Daerahs affecting the said territory’. I know Koets has exerted considerable influence in obtaining rejection by the Netherlands Delegation of such unambiguous wording. I am afraid that some sections of the Netherlands Delegation have not given up the idea of forming new States which they would explain away as based on the freely expressed will of the people.
8. In any event, Hatta is sailing close to the wind. As I explained in my K.307 [9], there is criticism in some Republican circles of the policy of the Delegation so far and of its failure to take an early and decisive initiative.
9. As also explained in my K.307, the immediate issue on which preliminary agreement depends is whether the Dutch will agree to the restoration of the Republican Government in the whole of the residency of Jogjakarta. I expect conditions regarding Maguwo airfield, but it is impossible to say how important such conditions would be before we receive a Netherlands response which is expected some time today (7 May).
10. In explaining in K.307 the reasons behind the apparent change of attitude by the Netherlands I forgot to mention that the Republican reaction to the first Netherlands draft statements undoubtedly shook Cochran and Van Royen. Roem and other members of the Delegation went to Cochran with a request for the use of the Commission’s plane so they could return their mandate as a delegation to Hatta.
11. I am also attaching the following papers which may be of interest:-
Attachment ‘B’ [10]: ‘The Leimena Plan’. This has been presented to the Netherlands delegation by the Republican delegation during the informal talks. It has not been seriously considered to date but may form the basis for further discussions on the actual implementation of the return to Jogjakarta if there is agreement on principle.
Attachment ‘C’ [11]: ‘Questions in connection with the proposed Round Table Conference.’ This document has not been submitted but has formed the basis of a series of questions informally addressed to Van Royen by Hatta (see my K.307).
Attachment ‘D’: Schedule comparing exports from Indonesia for the years 1938, 1939 and 1948.
Attachment ‘E’: Schedule showing development of exports from Indonesia during 1948.
Attachment ‘F’ : Article from ‘Warta Berita’, Medan, ‘Ali Budiardjo, strong man among the guerillas’. You will remember that I have previously referred to Ali Budiardjo’s importance (see letter [12] to McIntyre dated 22nd March, page 1A.) Attachment ‘G’ : ‘Dutch and Opium’ by Quentin Pope.
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1 Document 363 and 385.
2 See Document 365 and note 1 thereto.
3 See Document 369 and note 3 thereto.
4 This letter dated 26 April from the Netherlands Delegation to Van Roijen protested against the Netherlands Delegation seeking to make the return of the Republican Government to Djokjakarta upon binding undertakings on the part of the Republican Government.
5 Document 372.
6 Document 168.
7 Document 376.
8 See Appendix I in Volume XI and Documents 22, 23 and 24 Volume XIII.
9 Document 381.
10 Leimena’s undated ‘Plan for the Gradual Adjustment to a Return to the Government of the Republican Areas under the Renville Agreement at Present under Netherlands Occupation, after Issuance of the Cease Fire Order’.
11 None of the remaining Attachments to this letter is published.
12 Document 305.
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[AA : A1838, 401/2/6, i]