497

Pritchett to Critchley and Department of External Affairs

Cablegrams The Hague 8, K342 BATAVIA, 27 September 1949

Wongsonegoro reported agreement in Pasundan on (a) Dutch supply to the TNI, (b) withdrawal of TNI administrative units and (c) the establishment of a Republican Commissariat in Bandung to review in conjunction with the Negara the position of the Republican administration. Wongsonegoro required authority from Jogja in respect of (c) but expected to secure agreement for the withdrawal of some officials and the transfer of others to the Negara.

2. However, on Monday Van Diffelen, Lovink’s representative in Pasundan, refused to allow supply to the TNI to proceed. He claimed that the Sultan had promised s’Jacob that the Republican civil administration would be withdrawn and until this was effected he would permit no other arrangements to go through. The Dutch military began to arrest Republican officials in the Cheribon area. It was agreed that Rubiono, Republican military representative on the Local Joint Committee, should proceed to Jogja for instructions and that in the meantime no further arrests should be made. The Sultan firmly denied to Dow that he had even discussed civil administration with s’Jacob and pointed out that in any case such matters were for Cabinet decision.

3. In the meantime supplies, particularly rations, are urgently needed by the TNI and Rubiono is concerned over the growing unrest among his men. The Milob at Bandung will request the Dutch to arrange at least some token deliveries at once, regardless of political issues.

4. The Dutch have announced the abolition of the Province of East Java preparatory to the transfer of powers to the Negara and their policy of Republican withdrawals from the Negaras has now become very firm. The Republicans are still confident that they could reach an understanding with the Negaras and would have done so already, had the Dutch not intervened. They fear that the Dutch are engineering a crisis between the Republic and the Negaras in Indonesia in order to split the Indonesians at The Hague.

Part II Secret 5. My No.7 (K.341 [1]). I have now seen the Dutch proposals and the following is a corrected version. The proposals relate only to Java and provide for- (1) the establishment of ‘areas of action’ to be no larger than residencies, in which the military commanders of both parties shall be jointly responsible for law and order and shall in mutual consultation act against ‘unsocial elements’;

(2) early military concentrations in the areas of action in places agreed upon by the local Commanders;

(3) the transfer of the responsibility for law and order to the civil administration as soon as orderly conditions have been established by the military;

(4) the joint administration of the Semarang Recomba and the Central Java Renville territories until the end of the RTC when the Renville area shall be transferred to Republican administration. Future arrangements for the Semarang Recomba will depend upon RTC decisions and ‘a further Inter-Indonesian Conference’;

(5) the exclusion of all Federal services from (4), these remaining the care of the Federal Government;

(6) the withdrawal of the Republican administrations from the Negaras or the transfer of Republican officials to the Negaras.

Special proposals will be later submitted for Bantam. Dutch troop withdrawals are not mentioned, but Wongsonegoro stated that s’Jacob made verbal proposals as reported in my No. 7 (K.341).

6. Republicans in Batavia are inclined to accept the Dutch proposals as a basis but think that the Cabinet will probably delay substantive discussions until satisfactory progress is reported from The Hague. (For Critchley only). However, there are indi-cations that the present situation has reached its peak and that the inherent military and administrative instability might lead to a breakdown of the Cease-Hostilities in some areas.

Rationing of the TNI, for example, has become particularly urgent in Pasundan and East Java if uncontrolled troop movements are to be avoided. I feel then, that discussions should start no later than next week and any news which might help to ease the present tension at Jogja will be welcome.

7. Please see Romanos’s cable [2] to de Brito SCTHB 25 of September 26. It is most important that this request be withdrawn and that the principle that Milex reports are confidential and for the UNCI only be emphatically re-affirmed.

8. Your deviezen has been granted.

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1 Document 494.

2 Not found.

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[AA : A4357/2, 252, ii]