Cablegram UN18 NEW YORK, 13 January 1949, 7.20 p.m.
IMMEDIATE
INDONESIA
Your U.N.19. [1] Not clear whether these views were sent in the light of information in our U.N.13. [2] Personally, do not feel that any useful purpose at all would be served by trying to get Council to instruct Dutch to withdraw immediately to demarcation lines. A resolution in this sense would probably have now even less chance of passing than in Paris.
2. It is now accurate to suggest that United States has grown ‘lukewarm’ on the question of withdrawal. Their present attitude as explained by Jessup yesterday [3] was based on solid reasons which there is no reason to suppose are insincere. One of the most import-ant is the consideration that owing to the course of events since the police action, the Republican authorities might prove unable in fact to maintain stable conditions if the Dutch forces withdrew completely and at once from the occupied zone. This would seriously prejudice republic in subsequent negotiations. Palar himself is well aware of the point, and, in fact spontaneously mentioned it to us in the course of discussion today. In the circumstances he is satisfied that progressive withdrawal on the lines of the arrangement referred to in paragraph 2 of our U.N.13 is the best that could be suggested. Actually, the idea of progressive withdrawal on the determination of the United Nations Supervisory Body appears to have derived from Ra[u], it being then adopted by the Americans.
3. In the circumstances, you might think the instructions contained in your telegram 19 could be reconsidered. Please advise.
4. A further point made by Palar today was the necessity of maintaining Security Council supervision over Indonesia until the final transfer of sovereignty. This would seem to be implied in the terms of the American suggestions for the draft resolution but it can well be made explicit.
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1 Document 76.
2 Document 72.
3 See Document 71.
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[AA: A1838, 401/3/1/1, vi]