Cablegram H7[1] , CANBERRA, 2 January 1948, 1.40 a.m.
IMMEDIATE
Your W.14.[2]
1. While I appreciate the arguments put forward by you as to the real significance of the respective roles of I.T.O. and the Fund, I still strongly believe that we should maintain our proposed amendment or one of equivalent effect. I am impressed by the political repercussions that could ensue here if the Geneva Text were maintained.
2. I suggest that you so inform the United States Delegation before bringing the matter out into discussion at the Conference, as they may prefer to suggest some mutually acceptable alternative before taking the drastic step of precipitating a breakdown of the whole of the negotiations.
3. Incidentally we have had no further advice of likely fate of our proposed amendments to Article 21(2)(b)[3] which is closely related to this matter. Would be glad of earliest possible advice of American reaction to our intention to stand fast.
_[1] The original number, F61, has been struck out on the file copy and overwritten with H7. The latter is correct as a new series of cablegram numbers was started for the Havana conference.
[2] Published in Volume 12, Document 148. It reported that US representatives had approached the Australian delegation regarding proposed paragraph 2 of Article 24 (Relationship with the IMF and Exchange Arrangements). Article 24(2) would require the ITO to accept determinations made by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in respect of a member’s monetary reserves. Australia objected to the IMF having such a role in what it regarded as the domain of the ITO and had submitted an amendment allowing the ITO to ‘give special weight to the opinions’ of the IMF. The United States was opposed to the Australian amendment and had indicated that the negotiations could fail if a compromise was not reached.
[3] Article 21 concerned quantitative restrictions for balance of payments reasons.
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[AA : A1068, ER47/1/34]