Jakarta, 1 August 1975
SECRET AUSTEO
EXTRACT
Portuguese Timor: China: Sabah
Portuguese Timor
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I commented that, as Tjan would be aware, the Australian Government might be forced to react quite sharply if Indonesian intervention in Portuguese Timor became too blatant. I recalled what the Prime Minister had told the President, that we hoped the means for integration would be such as not to upset the Australian people. If they did, there could be unfortunate results for Indonesian/Australian relations, which, of course, were of great importance to us.
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Tjan wondered whether the reaction in Australia would be as great as we seemed to consider. Indonesia would not be unduly upset by strong protest from Australia. There were plenty examples of countries disagreeing on certain issues, and maintaining good relations on other issues. Indonesia and Australia could differ on Timor but continue their good relations in other fields. I said that I did not think that it would be so simple, as there was in some quarters in Australia a latent anti-Indonesian feeling which, as Tjan would know, was strong during the period of confrontation. It would be extremely difficult for an Australian Government to isolate differences with Indonesia over an issue like Timor from other contacts between the two countries.
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Tjan asked what could Australia do besides protest? I said that in the hypothetical situation we were talking about, that is if there was a strong reaction in Australia to Indonesia intervention in Timor, the Government could be under pressure to go further than merely protest, and, for instance, cut aid. Tjan would know of the various political pressures within Australia on relations with Indonesia and on Timor. Mr Whitlam had referred to them in his talks in Townsville with President Soeharto. There had, for example, been evidence in February and March of the strong feelings that could be aroused in certain quarters in Australia on the Timor issue. He would know of the importance the Australian Government gave to the need to ascertain the wishes of the Timorese.
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Tjan repeated that he doubted that the reaction would in Australia be as strong as I was suggesting. If Australia had to cut off aid, the President would certainly regret it, but Tjan considered the President would see it as a passing problem which would not last too long. Tjan then said that in any case the Liberal Party would win the next election in Australia which he thought would be held next year. Ideologically the Liberals were closer to the Indonesian Government than was the present Government and would do nothing about Timor. Tjan said, however, that he did not think the situation would arise, and repeated what he had said about Indonesian actions being carried out in a way which would not lead to too much criticism. I emphasised that the situation we were discussing was a hypothetical one. Nevertheless, it was important for us that Timor did not become an issue which could threaten the present good state of Australian/Indonesian relations.1
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3, vii]
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Joseph noted in the margin to Feakes: ‘You will be interested to read, I think, that Mr Taylor has made the points we wished. Let’s hope they have been taken by Tjan despite the bravado of his responses’. ↩