Jakarta, 31 August 1975
Joint Statement
O.JA1547 SECRET AUSTEO IMMEDIATE
Portuguese Timor
I have just seen your O.CH261139 and O.CH261140. 1
- I think you should keep in mind that barring some dramatic new development Indonesia will not repeat not intervene without a Portuguese request to do so. I suspect Santos believes that if Portugal holds off for long enough Indonesia will do so. I tried to disabuse him of this view here. But if he does still hold it, then I believe he is misjudging a major aspect of the situation. From my 90 minutes talk with him here I would generally share Gouveia’s opinion of Santos’ approach to the issue as given to Ms Boyd. However, Dan, Taylor, and I all detected some movement in Santos’ attitude as our discussion progressed.
- While it remains Indonesian policy to incorporate Portuguese Timor for all the reasons with which you are familiar and while most would now agree that in present circumstances this is the most logical solution to the question of Portuguese Timor’s future, the President does not want to appear to be taking advantage of the present unexpected situation to achieve what was a long term goal, hopefully to be secured by a combination of covert pressures and internationally acceptable political action. In the present situation the President still has in mind the possibility of an anti-Indonesian guerrilla operation in Portuguese Timor and he is still concerned about the additional drain Timor, in its present condition, will be on Indonesia’s financial resources and about Indonesia’s international standing.
- It is for these reasons that he wants the Portuguese to ask Indonesia to intervene, that he wants as much regional and international understanding and cover for Indonesian action as possible and that he wants the Portuguese to pay the costs of such an operation or at least the major share.
WOOLCOTT
[NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xiii]
- 1 31 August. They reported the return of Santos’s advance party from Atauro to Darwin late on 30 August. Gouveia, the Portuguese Consul-General in Sydney, asked Susan Boyd to inform DFA, for very limited distribution, that the opinion and wish of Pires and the three members of the mission was that Portugal should withdraw from Timor and Indonesia take over. Immediate withdrawal was prevented only by the fact that 50 Portugese soldiers were held by Fretilin at Maubisse and Ailheu. Gouveia admitted that he would have difficulty in persuading Santos to accept the proposition: he was ‘emotionally impressed by the “Portugalidade” of Timor’ and the mystical allegiance of the Timorese to the flag, not realising it was only allegiance to a symbol, not to Portugal itself. Gouveia nevertheless hoped to persuade him to accept the proposal. Boyd commented that there seemed no reason why Fretilin should surrender the Portugese hostages; Canberra suggested that consideration might be given to suggesting the Indonesians offer to rescue them as part of arrangements for intervention.