Canberra, 17 October 1975, 8.51 p.m.
O.CH280023 CONFIDENTIAL ROUTINE
Timor—Access to Darwin by Portuguese Ships
Ref O.LB3981
The Portuguese Embassy has formally sought diplomatic clearance for a call at Darwin by the Joao Roby on 18 November. They have confirmed this date with Lisbon and say they now have the information we require to consider the request at a technical level. Although the later arrival takes some of the urgency out of the issue their wish to use Darwin as a regular re-supply base places us in a difficult position.
We take the point in para. 7 of your LB403 as we had earlier taken the points in your LB366.2 But the Portuguese really expect too much of us; in return they show little awareness of the sensitivity of our relations with Indonesia. When the Portuguese Timor crisis is over and done with, the Portuguese will have withdrawn to Europe, whereas Australia will have to continue to live with Indonesia as its largest and closest neighbour. We should be disappointed if the Portuguese could not see this point and accept that, rather than create problems for us in our relations with Indonesia, they should suffer the minor logistical inconvenience of using ports other than Darwin. If their ships cannot go to Indonesian ports, then why not Manila or Macau?
We should like you to speak to Cruz in these terms. You might say that, while we wish to be helpful we do not wish to push our support for them to the point where it might lead to suspicions in Indonesia that we are somehow conniving with ‘white’ Portugal against Indonesia. You will of course be aware of the racial undertones which have been evident in some of the remarks by Indonesian leaders to Woolcott.3
[NAA: A1838, 49/2/1/1, viii]
- 1 15 October 1975. It pursued an earlier request for resupply facilities at Darwin for a second Portuguese vessel. The Afonso Cerqueira had arrived in Darwin on I October to serve as a reinforcement of Portuguese sovereignty over Timor. It proceeded directly to Atauro where it operated as the Government of Timor’s radio contact, a morale booster for the Portuguese troops, and as a symbol of Portugal’s continued presence in and commitment to the colony. Canberra had agreed, with some reluctance, to allow Afonso Cerqueira use of resupply and communications facilities in Darwin. That agreement was given partly for fear that Australian access to NATO ‘material’ might be put at risk if the Portuguese request were denied (Cablegram CH274603, 3 October). Following the second request Cooper was instructed (Cablegram CH278463, 15 October) to suggest that the Portuguese should rotate their vessels between other ports in the area. Cablegram LB398 noted that the second vessel would merely replace Afonso Cerqueira, and that the presence in the area of a Portuguese vessel was important for the morale of the administration on Atauro. Alternative ports were either too far away, or politically difficult in that they were in Indonesian territory or involved passage through Indonesian waters
- 2 In Cablegram LB403 (15 October) Cooper reported a meeting with Crespo, who had thanked him for Australia’s help, and added (‘significantly’, thought Cooper) that Portugal would not be able to maintain a presence in Atauro without logistic support from Australia. Cablegram LB366 (2 October) had warned that the Portuguese might be even more disposed to opt out of Timor if assistance was not given to the Afonso Cerqueira.
- 3 Document 270 provoked a heated response from at least one officer in Canberra. A marginal comment reads: ‘If we say it is Portuguese responsibility and that they must/should accept responsibility for what is happening in Timor-why not provide assistance in this small way, para.3 is rubbish’.