Dar es Salaam, 28 October 1975
O.DS1444 CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY
Timor
In a half-hour conversation this morning, President Nyerere informed me that a Fretilin delegation yesterday had talked to him along the lines on which Vieira had spoken to me earlier (O.DS14371): that Machel2 had told him Tanzania accepted Fretilin’s position: and that he understood that Fretilin wanted the Tanzanians to persuade the Portuguese to recognise Fretilin as the Government of Timor.
- Nyerere had ftrst indicated that he saw no reason not to accept Fretilin’s argument but after hearing me speak, at his request, along the lines of O.CH283399,3 and listening intently, indicated that except for his need to take account of Mozambican views the issue was an academic one for him. He considered that UN members should satisfy themselves on the position on the island and suggested that Australia should encourage the Committee of 24 to visit it.
- An alleged statement by the Indonesian Deputy Foreign Minister that Indonesia would not accept a left-wing government in Timor seems clearly to have provoked the Tanzanians.
- My impression is that Nyerere has not yet taken a ftrm position and that if there were some movement generated from the region he would stay his hand regarding Fretilin’s appeal. At the same time he appeared not to be over-concerned that there should be clearly recognisable self-determination or with Indonesia’s susceptibilities, and to be prepared to recognise Fretilin if he were satisfted that it had effective control. This assessment may need to be varied after I have seen the Indonesian Ambassador who was summoned to see Malecela4 this morning on the same subject.
TRUELOVE
[NAA: Al0463, 801/13/11/1, xv]
- 1 19 October. It reported that Vieira, Director of the Cabinet of the President of Mozambique, then visiting Tanzania, sought a meeting with Truelove in order to discuss Portuguese Timor. During the discussion Vieira expressed appreciation for Australia’s refusal to become involved in the joint authority proposal, which Mozambique considered a cover for an Indonesian takeover, and for the ‘positive’ attitude of trade unions and other ‘democratic forces’ towards the possible use of force by Indonesia. Mozambique recognised Fretilin as the de facto power, and saw establishment of that control as constituting an act of self-determination. (He noted in passing that Frelimo knew of the UDT ‘show of force’ two weeks before it occurred.) Mozambique would oppose UN involvement unless initiated by Fretilin and was seeking consultations with Australia as an ‘anti-colonialist neighbour’ of Timor, and Australian assistance in Mozambique’s provision of a small amount of aid to Timor. Canberra instructed Truelove to be ‘firmly discouraging’ of the view that Fretilin could be regarded as the sole representative of the people of Portuguese Timor, of aid proposals aimed at underpinning Fretilin, and of Vieira’s suggestion that a delegation from Mozambique should visit Australia. Australia did not wish to be manoeuvred into a position of apparent hostility to Indonesia, even by implication.Truelove was instructed to inform the Indonesian Ambassador in Dar es Salaam of Vieira’s approach and Canberra’s reply (Cablegram CH280446).
- 2 President Samora Machel of Mozambique.
- 3 28 October. It replied to a request for urgent instructions (Nyerere had requested a meeting at short notice) by referring first to Cablegram CH280446 (see note 1), then adding a more general brief on Australian policy, particularly its commitment to self-determination. Fretilin’s ‘military victory over UDT’ could not be accepted as self-determination: all parties should be involved in talks and a return to the Macao program. It emphasised that, in contrast to the long-standing politically mature independence movements in Portugal’s African colonies, there had been little interest in politics in Timor before April 1974.
- 4 J. W. S. Malecela, Tanzanian Foreign Minister.