Jakarta, 13 November 1975
O.JA3058 SECRET AUSTEO ROUTINE
Portuguese Timor
Ref 0.CH2863351
Should the Indonesian campaign in Portuguese Timor run into serious difficulties or even fail completely we do not believe the Armed Forces would blame President Soeharto and turn against him.
- While there was initial disappointment among some senior military advisers, notably General Moerdani, that the President would not authorise overt intervention in Portuguese Timor, it is evident that these same officers now strongly support the Indonesian covert military operation. Moreover, Soeharto’s firm decision—he did not ‘hesitate’ at any stage—not to intervene openly was we believe supported by at least two key ABRI figures, Defence Minister Panggabean and Air Marshal Sudharmono. Soeharto’s cautious approach has also been backed from the beginning by General Ali Murtopo.
[NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xvi]
- 1 5 November. The Embassy in Jakarta was asked to ascertain whether President Soeharto was in political danger as a result of his hesitation in intervening by military means in Portuguese Timor after Fretilin had gained the ascendancy. Quick intervention by military means had been favoured by ABRI and it was speculated that if the current Portuguese Timor campaign had difficulties then ABRI might blame the President.