Jakarta, 9 December 1975
SECRET
EXTRACT
Portuguese Timor; Laos; Cambodia; Detainees
Timor
[matter omitted]
- We asked Sunarso how he saw the situation in the immediate future working out in Portuguese Timor. What arrangements would be made to administer the territory? What form would the act of self-determination, the Indonesian Government was publicly committed to, take? Sunarso replied that leading members of the pro-Indonesia forces would be given prominent administrative functions. Nevertheless the Indonesians would need to play a considerable role in the administration. A United Nations-supervised referendum might be conducted in two to three months’ time. United Nations intervention might be requested by both the pro-Indonesia leaders and by Indonesia itself. Those Indonesians who took part in the administration of Portuguese Timor would be ‘volunteers’ as would Indonesian security forces operating in Portuguese Timor. Indonesia was acutely aware of the need to ensure that the eventual integration of East Timor was done ‘properly’ and ‘legally’.
- Sunarso admitted that the Indonesians faced a number of real problems over the next few months. In particular this involved the low level of administrative ability of the pro-Indonesia groups, and the financial drain which Indonesian involvement in Portuguese Timor was placing on Indonesia.
- Sunarso admitted that the Indonesians faced a number of real problems over the next few months. In particular this involved the low level of administrative ability of the pro-Indonesia groups, and the financial drain which Indonesian involvement in Portuguese Timor was placing on Indonesia.
[NAA: Al0463, 801/13/11/1, xvii]