Jakarta, 2 February 1976
O.JA4562 SECRET PRIORITY
EXTRACT1
East Timor: Winspeare Mission
- It is for the government to determine Australia’s attitude to Indonesia in Timor and we shall explain and execute that policy as decided as forcefully as we can here. But I consider it my duty to repeat the agreed Embassy view—which is shared by virtually all our colleagues here—that, notwithstanding the matters of principle involved, the realities on which any government now needs to base its policy assumptions are that, despite the difficulties they may encounter, Indonesia is fully committed to the incorporation of Portuguese Timor and it will proceed to secure this objective. It also believes that Fretilin is crumbling despite the activities of its activists outside of East Timor and such international interest and sympathy for Fretilin as there was is weakening, except in Australia.
- I consider we would be doing our government a disservice if we were to suggest that Indonesia would accept or permit, at this stage any other outcome and if we did not emphasise, at this stage, the possible ramifications for our important relationship with Indonesia, if Indonesia were to decide that Australia is supporting Fretilin’s interest (or what remains of Fretilin bearing in mind that a number of former Fretilin leaders and officials within East Timor are now cooperating with the PGET) against Indonesia’s interest.
- In these circumstances it seems from here that realistically the best we can press for is that there will be a reasonably presentable act of self-determination (although even on this score we need to realise that the act will not be held until the Indonesians consider the outcome is assured). If this prognosis is borne out by events-as we are confident it will be-then perhaps we could derive some comfort from the fact that there are ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious ties between the peoples of East and West Timor which may in fact make integration less difficult and, indeed, less unpopular in East Timor than it may now seem in Australia.2
WOOLCOTT
[NAA: Al0463, 801/13/11/1, xx]
- 1 Omitted paragraphs include Woolcott’s discussion with Winspeare Guicciardi and his Special Assistant, Erik Jensen, of Peacock’s 29 January statement (see note I to Document 409); Woolcott’s opinion that the Indonesian Government would not undertake any action, except of a ‘presentational nature, at Australia’s request, which they consider might prejudice the unchanged objective which they are pursuing’; and Woolcott’s preference for the Australian Government to seek the cessation of hostilities in, rather than the withdrawal of Indonesian forces from, East Timor.
- 2 In Cablegram CH315406 (2 February), Renouf reiterated for Woolcott the main points of the Australian Government’s policy on East Timor. These were (a) a cessation of fighting; (b) a withdrawal of Indonesian forces as soon as the need to maintain law and order could be otherwise met; (c) a genuine act of self-determination; (d) an early resumption of international humanitarian aid; (e) a willingness on Australia’s part to give favourable consideration to participating in any UN (or ASEAN) presence in East Timor pending self-determination. Renouf added that the last point had not been stated publicly.