Jakarta, 5 February 1976
SECRET AUSTEO
EXTRACT
Timor
I noted that the Antara report of 3 February on the PGET’s attitude to the Winspeare mission’s proposed visit to FRETILIN-held areas and the note from the Indonesian Embassy to Winspeare on 4 February, were confusing in their contradiction.1 Apparently Winspeare too had been confused by them. Tjan said the Antara report had been based on a Radio Dili broadcast several days before. The broadcast was intended for internal consumption to inspire the pro-Indonesian forces. At that time also several of the areas Horta hoped to get Winspeare to were not in PGET’s hands. By yesterday, however, the situation on the ground had changed, and there was nowhere FRETILIN would meet Winspeare. Thus the PGET could take a more accommodating line towards the visit.2
- Winspeare’s visit had led to a change of military tactics, Tjan said. Moerdani had wanted to force FRETILIN to surrender with the minimum of bloodshed. But the possibility of Winspeare’s visit to FRETILIN-held areas had meant that, instead of forcing some towns to surrender, they had to be taken by military means. This had not proved a problem, he said.
- Tjan said that Sani had been reprimanded for informing the Secretary-General some time ago that Indonesia would have no objections to Winspeare’s visit to East Timor. What Sani should have said, according to Tjan, was that it would be necessary for the Secretary-General to check with the PGET about the visit and if the PGET had no objections, then Indonesia would do all it could to assist the visit.3
- I told Tjan that the Australian Government was serious in its policy which called for cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of Indonesian troops when law and order could otherwise be maintained, and a genuine act of self-determination.
[NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1. xx]
- 1 Antara had reported a PGET instruction to shoot at any aircraft and warships approaching East Timor ‘in order to maintain security in the newly liberated areas’. The PGET could not guarantee the safety of Winspeare Guicciardi if he visited ‘areas described as still being occupied by Fretilin’. Cablegram CH316281 (4 February) communicated the text of a note passed from the Indonesian Embassy in Canberra to Winspeare in Darwin. The note stated that the PGET had no objection to Winspeare’s mission landing on the south coast of East Timor provided that the Portuguese vessel transporting the mission came no closer to the coast than four nautical miles, that the crew ferrying the party ashore did not carry arms, and their boat flew the UN flag.
- 2 Cablegram JA4675 (5 February) emphasised that, in spite of the apparent change of approach, the Embassy in Jakarta believed the Indonesian Government to be strongly opposed to a visit to Fretilin-held areas. It noted a report that the Indonesian Government had at one stage considered mining places where Winspeare might attempt to land.
- 3 Cablegram CH317271 (6 February) reported that Horta had received a radio message from Fretilin to the effect that Winspeare could proceed by air to East Timor, landing at one of four places: Lautem, Viqueque, Suai or Same. Having requested from the Indonesian Government an assessment of the security status of those places, Winspeare was informed (Cablegram CH318358, 9 February) that a visit could be arranged under the auspices of the PGET. Winspeare, however, had departed from Australia for Geneva on the previous day, 8 February.