Lisbon, 5 February 1975
CONFIDENTIAL
Portuguese Timor
Our memorandum No. 20 of 21 January, 1975 refers.1
- Lieutenant Colonel Alfredo Carneiro suggested recently that I also establish contact with the 2nd Division of the General Staff of the Armed Forces and on 5 February I had a discussion with Commandant Jorge Gamito, Head of the Overseas Territories Branch. Commandant Gamito displayed the more forward position on Timor that I have met in discussions with other military figures in Lisbon. The discussion tended to confirm our view that the military generally see a more rapid pace for decolonisation in Timor and place less significance on economic viability before independence than civilian figures in Lisbon.
- Gamito’s assessment was that the majority of the Timorese accepted the UDT/Fretilin position of independence sooner or later. Apodeti was simply an Indonesian front and had very little support. Indonesia, through the activities of the Indonesian Consul in Dili and Radio Kupang, was trying to create conditions favourable to the integration of Timor into Indonesia.
- In effect, therefore, there were now only two options being considered in Timor- independence or integration. The third option for continuing links with Portugal had, as in Cape Verde, disappeared and this was natural. Gamito thought that, as in the other colonial territories, an act of self-determination would be held this year. He was unspecific about its form. If independence was chosen, then, as in Africa, Portugal would agree with the independence parties on a preparatory period after which independence would be granted. He had no specific comment on the length of such a preparatory period. He said Portugal would not impose any pressure for a short period but thought that the Timorese were watching closely developments in Africa and would not want to be too far behind. At the same time however, he said Portugal could offer little aid to Timor. I raised the question of economic viability and how important he thought that was before independence. Sao Tome, for example, seemed less economically viable than Timor. He agreed that this was possibly so; certainly Timor seemed to have greater long term economic viability. He then described Portugal’s difficult economic situation which prevented her from offering a great deal of assistance to any of her former colonies. The colonies had been a cancerous growth on Portugal. He thought that if they wanted independence, they should have it but at that point Portugal’s responsibility should cease and the new nations become the responsibility of the world community as a whole.
- A copy of this memorandum has been sent to Jakarta.
I. H. COUSINS
First Secretary
[NAA: A1838, 49/211/1, v]
- 1 A full report by Cousins on the Portuguese military force in Timor. Its strength was largely unchanged at one infantry battalion, ‘poorly equipped and poorly trained’, and a small naval force. Morale was said to be low and there seemed to be no possibility of a military response to an Indonesian invasion. Pires was a competent, moderate AFM supporter; Major Mota, head of the political affairs cabinet was the leading AFM figure whose role as a leftist ‘Progressista’ was to balance Pires’ moderation. Little thought had been given in Lisbon to Timor, apart from the appointment of Pires, who had been asked to submit a report on the political and military situation. It had been suggested that, given the lack of guerrilla or external threat, a police force might replace the military. Cousins noted some difference between civilian and military views on decolonisation, the former in line with statements made by Santos, while decolonisation was of much greater interest to the AFM. Military ministers outnumbered Santos and Soares on the decolonisation commission, and it was possible that the military would not accept a long term solution, so that ‘a military inspired negotiated settlement with Indonesia cannot be entirely ruled out’. Colonel Alfredo Carneiro, Head of the President’s military household, had been interested to learn of Australia’s policy. Joseph wrote appreciatively to Cooper of this memorandum on 30 January. It had been read with keen interest in Canberra, and Carneiro was, he thought, the kind of contact Renouf had been hoping for when he made the comments reported in Document 74.