Cablegram, Wellington, 20 July 1951
132. IMMEDIATE SECRET
I have now consulted Berendsen who is apparently satisfied that Bradley’s[1] remarks have been the subject of misunderstanding and of premature apprehension. The matter he says has been entirely cleared up and there is no intention on the United States side of any questioning of the text.
2. As to the early signature of the pact Berendsen comments[2] as follows I cannot believe it would be wise for us to press for an early signature and whether the Security Pact is or is not an integral part of the Japanese Peace Settlement - which in my opinion in origin it clearly is - I think it very unlikely that we could (and most unwise that we should attempt to) persuade the United States actually to sign the Security Pact substantially before we on our part actually sign the Japanese Peace Treaty. I agree at once that the sooner we get this treaty signed the better and if a suggestion for an early signature came from the United States I should most certainly welcome it but even if it were (and now it seems clearly not to be) a fact that the United States Chiefs of Staff might conceivably still raise objections they would presumably raise them equally - if not more probably - on any suggestion for an earlier signature. Indeed I am not at all sure that even if arrangements could satisfactorily be made for an early signature that this would necessarily be a good thing because as always my mind is on the Senate and I feel far from confident that the Senate - which is so consistently disposed to oppose anything the Administration proposes - would, except in most exceptional circumstances, which at present cannot be seen, approve text of the Security Pact apart from the Japanese Peace Treaty.
Ends.
3. I am now inclined to share Berendsen’s view that it is unlikely the Senate would act before it dealt with the Japanese Peace Treaty, and therefore it might be unwise for us to press for an early signature.
4. As to the place of signature we feel here that the suggestion might best come from the Americans and for the added reason that there might be some value in having the document signed in the United States, as this could have some effect in identifying American interests more closely with the Treaty. I understand that President Truman has already publicly expressed the opinion that The Pact should be signed at San Francisco at approximately the same time or a day or two before the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty. It should however be possible to suggest some place adjacent to San Francisco as a means of affording a separate identity for this Pact.
_1 Cablegram 1245 (16 July) reported that General Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, in giving evidence before the US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, had given the impression that the Defense Department would not object to the inclusion of the Philippines in the Security Treaty.` 2 The full text of Berendsen’s cable of 19 July is given in Robin Kay (ed.), The ANZUS Pact and the Treaty of Peace with Japan, Government Printer, Wellington, 1985, pp. 751-2.
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[NAA : A1838, 250/7/10, i]