Extract, Washington, 31 May 1951
987. SECRET
Japanese Peace Treaty and Security Pact This afternoon I saw Dulles on above subjects.[1] He stated that no suggestion had been made to him by United Kingdom for any further consultation on the precise terms of the proposed Pact and, whilst reserving any firm view, his tentative view was that, in the light of full consultation which had already taken place between United States, United Kingdom and ourselves, the matter should now be completed solely between United States, Australia and New Zealand. No fundamental textual amendments will be proposed by him.[2] His proposals, the precise terms of which I shall know tomorrow will, I think, be limited to two matters: (a) reference to subsidiary bodies in article 7, (b) strengthening reference to agreement being within framework of United Nations. He stated that Joint Chiefs of Staff were anxious to avoid any suggestion of the setting up of cumbersome machinery such as under NATO. In general he thought the Council could determine its own organisation and that the words ‘subsidiary bodies’ aided[3] little but might create misgivings. Both he and Joint Chiefs of Staff thought that the essential was a really top level Council with authority to take decisions and that it would not be desirable to build up complicated machinery under the Council. He said that United States would like to have a man such as Admiral Radford[4] as United States Representative in Council. Tomorrow morning Berendsen and I will have joint talks with Dulles when he will put forward precise suggestions which United States has in mind concerning text of Pact particularly articles 7 and 8. He hoped that these suggestions would be referred immediately to Governments and that agreement on text would be reached by the time he returned from London on 14th June. He hoped for a consummation of the Security Pact and Japanese Peace Treaty early in August. However due to political overtones of MacArthur affair[5] and the necessity of ratification of Pact by 2/3 of the Senate were operating on a smaller margin of safety than when he was in Canberra. 1952 was presidential election year and Senators were naturally disposed to put politics first. He did not think that Pact or Peace Treaty though signed, could be ratified this year but hoped this would be taken up by Senate when convened in January 1952. He expressed the personal view that no real trouble would be encountered.
2. I put it to Dulles that forthcoming United States - United Kingdom discussions on Peace Treaty should not preclude full consideration of Australian views.[6] Dulles said that he understood our position, that our views had been carefully considered in the past and would be likewise in the future.
_1 Cablegram 970 (28 May) from Washington reported that Dulles had shown the draft security treaty (Document 50) to the Senate Foreign Relations Sub-committee on Far Eastern Affairs which anticipated no difficulty in its ratification by the Senate. It added that talks were proceeding with the US Defence Department concerning Articles 7 and 8 which might possibly be combined. It also reported Allison’s recommended procedure that Dulles ‘would inform Mr. Spender of present United States thinking, ask whether the Australian Government had had any second thoughts on drafting of the pact and on the basis of this exchange of views endeavour to agree on a definitive text for reference to Governments’.
2 i.e. to the treaty drafted in Canberra (see Document 50).
3 The word ‘aided’ should presumably read ‘added’.
4 Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
5 See Document 87.
6 The talks commenced in London on 4 June.
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[NAA : A1838, TS686/1, i]