MESSAGE FROM ATTLEE TO MENZIES

Canberra, 17 December 1949

SECRET

China

You will already have received a message to the effect that my Government reached a decision in principle on 15th December to accord de jure recognition to the Chinese Communist Government. As to the date when the Chinese Government should be notified of this decision, taking into account all the circumstances and the views of the various Governments with whom we have been in consultation, the Foreign Secretary¹ is thinking in terms of the 2nd January, 1950, though he would not wish to be held to that precise date pending the receipt of the views of other Commonwealth and Foreign Governments to whom similar communications are being addressed.

1. I fully realise that it is a great deal to ask that your Government should reach a decision on this important international problem so soon after taking office,² but after careful consideration we have reached the conclusion that recognition cannot be long delayed if we are to avoid consequences which would gravely affect United Kingdom interests not only in China itself but also in Hong Kong, Malaya and Singapore where there are very large Chinese communities. Now that the Chinese Communist Government has gained control over virtually the whole of China, the time may not be far distant when it will seek to put pressure upon the officials and interests of powers who do not recognise it. To accord recognition in response to such pressure would be to lower our prestige throughout the Far East. To withhold it indefinitely as a gesture against pressure, on the other hand, would mean the sacrifice of our interests in China and have serious repercussions in Hong Kong and Malaya.

2. These are the reasons which have led us to decide upon early recognition. In addition we consider that withholding recognition plays straight into the hands of the Soviet Union. In our view the only way to counter Russian influence will be for Communist China to have contacts with the West. The sooner these are established the better.

3. Our recognition will merely acknowledge the inescapable fact that the Chinese Communist Government is in effective control in China. This does not in the least lessen our determination to resist communism in South East Asia and elsewhere. What happens in China is China’s business, but what happens in the territories for which we are responsible is very much our business and we intend to stimulate resistance to communism with all the means at our disposal and hope like-minded countries will do the same.

4. While for obvious reasons we cannot accompany the act of recognition with a statement in public that it does not denote approval of the Chinese Communist Government, this is as you know, the fact. All of us, after all, recognise the Soviet Union and satellite states. We acknowledge the existence of these Governments though we certainly do not approve of them and by recognising the Chinese Communist Government we shall be doing no more than acknowledging a fact, as we have done with the Soviet Union and the satellites.

5. We do not expect to carry the United States with us on this question of recognition, but the Foreign Secretary has sent a personal message to Mr. Dean Acheson.³ While there may be some criticism in the American press, we have reason to believe from the interchanges which have been taking place that the administration understand our position and realise that we have far more immediately at stake than the United States. Though we would naturally wish to concert action with the United States if this were possible, we have to take the views of our Asian friends into account in this primarily Asian problem.

6. We have put our position to you quite frankly and should be grateful to learn as soon as possible whether your Government would feel disposed to take parallel action on or about the date indicated.

[NAA: A1838, TS3107/33/1/1, i]