Canberra, 27 August 1963
AP59. Confidential
Action to Offset the Effect of a Nuclear Detonation by Communist China Estimate of China’s Nuclear Capabilities
Intelligence estimates vary but the possibility is recognised that Communist China will be capable of achieving an initial nuclear detonation between 1963 and 1965. It is believed that a programme to develop nuclear weapons has probably been under way since the early 1950’s, and the Soviet Union is understood to have provided some assistance until about mid–1950. Official Chinese statements proclaim that an active programme is under way to develop nuclear weapons and Peking’s behaviour, especially in relation to the recently signed Test Ban Treaty,1 makes it clear that development of an independent nuclear capability is a primary policy objective.
2. Although an initial detonation may, therefore, be close, development of effective weapons and means of delivery would require some years, even assuming that the Chinese were prepared or able to divert from other needs the considerable resources required to pursue a development programme. Effect of a Chinese Explosion
3. In response to our Savingram of 2nd July2 (not to all posts), a number of posts in Asia and elsewhere have given estimates of the likely local impact of a Chinese nuclear detonation. Some of these make the point that there has already been some public reference in Asian countries to the possibility of a Chinese detonation and that the shock effect will, therefore, be lessened; and that among the more sophisticated elements there is an appreciation of the considerable difference between carrying out a single detonation and achieving an effective operational capability. As against this, other reports assess that in their areas an explosion will have a deep psychological impact, especially on the mass of the people who, unaware of the technicalities, will regard China as having caught up with the other members of the nuclear club. Fear and awe would be mingled with pride that an Asian country had matched an achievement hitherto carried out only by Europeans. Peking’s prestige and authority would rise, perhaps very considerably.
4. As to the response of Governments, several estimates were that a Chinese explosion would tend to consolidate the existing state of affairs, with timid neighbours becoming even more respectful of China, but with countries aligned with the West remaining firm. Other estimates, however, mention the possibility, at least, that governments in places like Thailand and Pakistan might make some reassessment of their positions while there might be increased instability in South Vietnam and South Korea. Action Proposed
5. The Chinese must appreciate, to some extent at least, that they will have a long way to go after an initial explosion before they will acquire significant military advantage from nuclear weapons. The initial advantages they will hope for are mainly political and psychological. Their first goal will be to extract what political and psychological advantage they can, domestically and internationally. In the latter field they presumably hope that their appearance of new strength will increase the effectiveness of their policies. Neighbours are to be impressed,and made more pliant; other countries will have to cope with China’s claim to possess one of the most important symbols of great power status.
6. In considering the line posts should adopt we have had in mind two principal aims. On the one hand we need to ‘re–assure’ the timid that a Chinese nuclear explosion need not cause them to abandon hope and go along with China’s dictates. As against this, and perhaps somewhat counter to it, China’s determination to become a nuclear power (in addition to the huge conventional forces she maintains) can be used to enhance the picture of China as a ‘common enemy’ with dangerous intentions, against whom other countries should make common cause.
7. Posts should keep the above two ideas in mind in making use of the following guidance, emphasizing whichever aspects are most relevant to any particular discussion:—
(a) The scientific significance of a Chinese explosion should not be overrated. The requirements for producing a primitive nuclear detonation are by now widely known and many countries could have carried out a detonation had they chosen to allocate resources to that end. Instead they have directed their efforts to raising the standards of living of their people.
(b) There is a wide gap between a primitive nuclear explosion and an effective nuclear capability consisting of stocks of weapons and an adequate delivery system. A long and expensive road would lie ahead of China after the first explosion.
(c) The Chinese position must be viewed in relationship to overall United States and Free World strength in varied fields. It is now 20 years since the United States and United Kingdom carried out their first nuclear explosion and their progress since that time has drawn on resources which China could not hope to match in the period ahead.
(d) Even were China to assemble stocks of weapons and a means of delivering them to a target, she will not be in a position to undertake increased aggressive actions with impunity. China would remain highly vulnerable to retaliation by Western nuclear powers which would remain quite beyond China’s reach. That is, other nuclear powers will maintain a deterrent over China but China will have no corresponding deterrent over them.
(e) China will be at least partly aware of the limited military significance of its achievement. While she will no doubt seek to exploit to the full her new prestige and appearance of strength, and may become even more vocally belligerent, she can be expected to be aware of her continuing military inferiority and to exercise due caution when it comes time to turn words into deeds. In this connection there is no reason to expect Western commitments to China’s neighbours to be weakened in any way by anything China is likely to achieve in the nuclear field.
(f) A major reason for regret and concern is that a Chinese explosion will increase substantially the difficulty of restraining the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Other countries have denied themselves weapons and China, long a public advocate of nuclear disarmament, should have been prepared to do so also. China’s actions prejudice current hopes that the nuclear threat to mankind can be kept within bounds; they are also a serious warning of China’s future attitude and intentions.
(g) Given China’s vast development needs, she can ill–afford to turn her resources into the development of nuclear weapons: the Chinese people deserve greater consideration. Related Issues
8. A Chinese detonation undoubtedly will increase demands, by China and others, that she should be accorded great power status in world discussions, be given diplomatic recognition and admitted into the United Nations. Related arguments could be that China is justified in not signing the nuclear Test Ban Treaty (or other disarmament measures) on the grounds that she has not participated in them and that she is being discriminated against by the terms of the three-power test ban. Some points relevant to these arguments are:
(a) Existing reasons against recognition and admission to the U.N.—which are largely that China’s own behaviour and attitude (especially towards Taiwan) prevent progress in the problem— would not be changed by a Chinese nuclear explosion. If anything it would mean that an extra unattractive element of threat has been added to the arguments against moving in China’s favour.
(b) Recognition (by the U.S. and others) is not a necessary pre-requisite for Chinese participation in international negotiations; for example, the Communist Chinese took part in the Geneva conference on Laos.
(c) There is no reason to believe China would accept restraints on her nuclear policy merely because of membership of the United Nations, or invitation to participate in disarmament discussions.
(d) Hope of avoiding proliferation of nuclear weapons depends upon self-restraint by the many countries (e.g. Australia) who could develop nuclear weapons. China has no greater claims than these either for representation at the test ban negotiations or other disarmament talks, or for consideration of her national interests. Indeed it could be argued that China with its huge conventional forces had less justification than others in seeking nuclear weapons.
(e) The disarmament plan publicised by China following the three-power test ban agreement is clearly designed for propaganda rather than as a serious proposal. It obscures Chinese unwillingness to agree to the Test Ban Treaty and preserves their right to carry out independent nuclear explosions. (China has said in an official statement on 31st July that the test ban agreement ‘prevents non-nuclear peace-loving countries from testing and manufacturing nuclear weapons’). It is impossible to consider nuclear weapons in isolation from conventional weapons as the Chinese proposal envisages (with obvious good reason from China’s point of view). China clearly sees any agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union as a bad thing in itself. Eloquent comment on the Chinese plan was given in Moscow’s denunciation of it. United States Action
9. The United States has already set in train a programme to minimise the psychological impact of a Chinese Communis.t nuclear detonation. U.S. posts have received a guidance telegram on lines generally similar to this present message. In addition to the State Department instructions, U.S.I.A.3 and the U.S. Department of Defense are instituting educational programmes.
10. U.S.I.A. will place primary emphasis on explaining U.S.–Free World strength, particularly the diversity, flexibility and strength of U.S. deterrent weapons and delivery systems. The U.S.I.A. will also underline ways to prevent war through disarmament, test ban initiatives and other negotiations.
11. The Department of Defense programme covers the basic principles and complexities of nuclear development and includes printed material, visual aids and, where advisable, qualified lecturers.
12. The State Department has said it would welcome working closely with us on the matter and posts should concert with their American colleagues as may be appropriate. Reports
13. We should be glad to have any views posts may have on the guidance in this message and periodic reports on whether they have been able to make effective use of it. We should like to continue to be kept informed of local attitudes to China’s nuclear development.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38, iii]
1Negotiations in Moscow between the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, beginning on 15 July, resulted in the signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty on 25 July. The Treaty banned the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space.
2It predicted that the Chinese would make their first nuclear explosion in 1964, and noted that many Asians would be ‘impressed and indeed intimidated by such a development’. In order to develop plans on how the West could counter a favourable propaganda effect, posts were requested to give current and follow-up appreciations of likely local reactions at a governmental and popular level. Posts were also asked for particular points that ‘we should avoid or treat carefully in our own publicity’.
3 United States Information Agency.