Canberra, 22 January 1964
Secret
Effect on Australia of French Recognition of Communist China
We now know officially of France’s intention to establish diplomatic relations with Peking at the Ambassadorial level, at an early date. This paper examines how this affects those considerations which principally have determined, until now, Australia’s position on recognition.
Position of Formosa
2. France claims to have made no commitments with Peking over relations with Taipeh, which France continues to regard as ‘a reality as Formosa with 11 million inhabitants entitled to self-determination, but not as the Government of China’. The French say they are quite prepared to continue in relations with Formosa.
3. The U.S. has expressed the hope that France does not intend to break relations with Formosa and it seems clear that the U.S. will urge the Nationalists not to break with France.
4. We do not know the final position of either Taipeh or Peking. It would be a major step for either, or both of them, to condone a situation where France maintained diplomatic representation with both Peking and Taipeh; it would be a long step towards their acceptance of a ‘two Chinas’ situation.
5. Taipeh will no doubt be strongly inclined to break with France, both as an assertion of her continued claims to the mainland, and in the hope of inhibiting other countries from following France’s lead. As against this, the Nationalists will have to weigh the fact that, if they take the initiative in breaking relations, both Peking and Paris would be freed of a problem; and Formosa would be left without the acknowledgment (which France is at present apparently prepared to give) that Formosa and its 11 million inhabitants has a right to self–determination. Despite the direness of their threats, Nationalist leaders in the past have shown a keen nose for self-survival (for example over admitting Mongolia to the United Nations), and it is therefore possible that they might tolerate continued relations with France, a course to which the U.S. undoubtedly would urge them.
6. Peking’s attitude is hard to gauge. Recognition by France, representing as it does a major break–through for Peking, especially at this time when Peking is very aware of its international isolation, is perhaps sufficient of a prize in itself to induce the Chinese leaders not to seek cut and dried pre-conditions about France’s relations with Formosa. One school of thought holds that the omission of any reference to Formosa in an arrangement between Peking and Paris would not conflict with Peking’s assertion that the Formosa question is a domestic affair (and that France should not be involved in it).
7. Perhaps the issue of Formosa has remained hazy at this stage, with both Paris and Peking prepared to leave it that way in the interest of proceeding to recognition. A point to bear in mind is that once France has taken the plunge of announcing its recognition of Peking, Peking will be in a relatively strong position (for example by making difficulties over an Ambassador) to tighten the screws on issues left unresolved or blurred in the initial arrangement. It seems unlikely that Paris would hold out too strongly, especially if in addition to pressure from Peking, the Nationalists were being importunate.
8. We cannot therefore predict how the Formosa situation will turn out. If France were able to maintain diplomatic relations with both Peking and Taipeh it would be a major concession by both those capitals to the idea of ‘two Chinas’—an issue on which so far neither has shown any flexibility. New ground would have been broken and we could re-examine where we stood on this very important aspect, so far as recognition is concerned. But it is too early for that.
Situation in the United Nations
9. It is not possible to estimate how many countries will follow France’s lead or how quickly. An important consideration will be the exact conditions of recognition (including position of Formosa mentioned above). Another important factor will be the extent to which the U.S.A. campaigns against emulation of France’s action. The former French African States will clearly be among those most susceptible to the French lead, but they are less tied in foreign policy matters now than a year or so ago. Also, Nationalist China has been working hard among them in recent years and not without success. At present 19 African countries recognize Formosa (including 14 former French colonies) and 14 recognize Peking.
10. Apart from the unpredictable position of the French Africans, there seems no reason for any immediate landslide to follow France. Countries may well wait to see how France gets on in Peking.
11. The resolution in 1963 on the seating of Communist China in the United Nations was defeated by a vote of 41–57–12. The negative vote leaned heavily on 19 Latin Americans, 12 French Africans, and to a lesser extent 9 Europeans. Even a swing by the French Africans (plus France) and the two new African States (Kenya and Zanzibar) would still not give Communist China at the 1964 Assembly the 2/3rds majority required under the ‘important question’ decision. There is therefore no inevitability about Peking being admitted into the United Nations this year as a result of the French action.
12. Presumably France would be obliged to support Peking’s admission to the U.N.; but we do not know France’s attitude to Peking’s claim to the permanent seat on the Security Council.
Attitude of the United States
13. The Administration and Congress can be expected bitterly to criticize France. We have received a U.S. paper (probably circulated to all posts) taking a sharp line against the French action. It remains to be seen how vigorously the U.S. will canvass other nations not to follow the French lead, and whether they will ask us to assist them. In any event this seems likely to be a hot and emotional issue in the United States, and it would not ser-ve our interests to add momentum to any Peking recognition movement. Canadian statements suggest she may serve to act as some sort of a chopping block.
Trade
14. There is no present reason to believe that recognition by France (and those who might follow in the near future) will result in discrimination against Australia by China. This position might change if many countries recognized, leaving us in a small non-recognizing group, but this situation still seems some distance away.
Attitude of China’s Neighbours and of Overseas Chinese Communities
15. It continues to be important that we should not join in actions which would unsettle countries such as Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines, or the Chinese communities therein.
Australian Attitude
16. It is suggested that public comment, as needed, should be along the following lines:
(a) The fact that France is the first major Western power to have recognized Peking since the Korean war clearly makes the move of some importance.
(b) France’s action could influence some other countries towards recognition, although there is no reason for a landslide.
(c) It therefore does not follow that Peking will have the votes for acceptance into the United Nations, for example this year.
(d) Australia will examine with interest the conditions under which recognition by France has been agreed. On the basis of what is at present understood to be Peking’s attitude on a number of crucial issues, it is not considered that any immediate change in Australia’s policy in respect of recognition is called for or desirable.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/33/l/1, ix]
1 Patrick Shaw, First Assistant Secretary, Division II (Geographic Regions), Department of External Affairs.
2 Barwick, Australian Attorney-General, had held the additional portfolio of External Affairs since 22 December 1961.