Canberra, 23 October 1964
Secret
China in the United Nations
Attached is a redraft of the submission to the Acting Minister2 on China in the United Nations.
2. You have expressed concern that Australia was committed by Sir Garfield Barwick to the position that Formosa was part of China.3 It is suggested, however, that Sir Garfield’s statement in the United Nations in 1960 has been superseded by his own statement in Parliament on the 11th March, 1964, in which self-determination for Formosa is clearly implied;4 and by the Prime Minister’s more explicit support for self-determination at the Prime Ministers’ Meeting.5 (Both quotations are included in the minute.)6 In view of these statements, the Australian Government’s position cannot be said to be one in which it is argued a priori that Formosa is part of China.
3. If we are challenged on Barwick’s earlier statement, we might be able to explain it away on the grounds that the Australian Government recognized that the legal arguments .in regard to the sovereignty of Formosa were not conclusive and that in any case the overriding consideration was the right of the people of Taiwan to make their own choice.
4. Two important issues have not been developed in the minute, namely:—
(i) the question of whether Formosa should be neutralized; and
(ii) the future of the Offshore Islands.
These subjects were omitted because until the prior question has been settled of whether the Taiwanese are to have self-determination, it is difficult to discuss them except in a highly speculative way.
5. In brief it might be said that if self-determination were accepted it would follow that Taiwan should only be neutralized if it were the wish of the sovereign Taiwanese nation. As far as the Offshore Islands were concerned, there might be a subsequent act of self-determination for the inhabitants of these Islands or perhaps a negotiated agreement for demilitarization.
Attachment
Canberra, [October 1964]
CHINA IN THE UNITED NATIONS
In the General Assembly in 1963 an Albanian resolution which would have removed Chinese Nationalist representatives from all United Nations organs and replaced them by representatives of Communist China was defeated 41 in favour, 57 against with 12 abstentions.
2. As the vote did not give Peking a simple majority it did not call into consideration the resolution passed at the 16th Session of the General Assembly (1961) by a vote of 61-34-7 that any proposal to change the representation of China was an ‘important question’. (Under Article 18 of the Charter ‘important questions’ require a two-thirds majority.)7
3. Since the last Assembly, a number of countries, including France, have recognized Communist China and may be expected to support Peking’s claim to the China seat in the United Nations. Until recently, however, it was thought that there would be sufficient support to carry the Chinese Nationalists through this year’s Assembly.
4. At the end of September, the Central African Republic recognized Peking. Earlier, Senegal broke off diplomatic relations with the Chinese Nationalists and as it already recognizes Peking, may possibly exchange diplomatic representatives with Communist China. There are indications that Dahomey also may be moving towards recognition of Peking. Talks have taken place between Cameroon leaders and a visiting Chinese Communist mission, and are to be continued in Peking in the declared hope that they will lead to an improvement in relations. It is not clear whether these moves foreshadow a general move by African countries to switch from support of the Chinese Nationalists to support of Peking, but even without this our previous assumption that the Chinese Nationalists’ position could be held seems less assured.
5. Our latest statistical analysis is that an Albanian-type resolution is likely to obtain a vote of 49-51-15. This assumes that Senegal and Dahomey abstain. Should they vote in favour, which certainly cannot be discounted, the vote would be 51-51-13. There are of course other factors to be considered-whether a twothirds or simple majority would be required; the tactics to be employed, especially by the United States; and the rulings to be given by the Assembly’s next President (an African). At least, however, the statistics emphasize the uncertainty which confronts us.
6. Several new factors could influence the position in Peking’s favour. First, China’s explosion of an atomic bomb may strengthen the argument long used by advocates of recognition that we cannot ignore Communist China and that in the interests of world peace she must be brought into the community of nations. Second, the recent change of Soviet leadership may possibly lead to an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. The actions taken so far by the new Soviet leadership seem to indicate that Khrushchev’s essential foreign policies will be continued. If this is the case, the prospects for a rapprochement will not improve. On the other hand, it is possible that the new leadership may be anxious to avoid bringing about the final break in Sino-Soviet state and party relations. If so, the Soviet Union, as a conciliatory gesture, might apply greater pressure for China’s membership of the United Nations than was evident last year. Third, the new British Government’s known support for the entry of Communist China might influence some votes.
7. From Australia’s point of view the vital question which will have to be faced, if a resolution is adopted transferring Chinese credentials to Peking, is the future of Taiwan. Very little preparation has been made to deal with this problem, mainly because of the reluctance of the United States to make any move which might create the impression that they are weakening in their determination to uphold the position of the Chinese Nationalists as the government of China. Nevertheless it would be clearly against Western interests to allow a situation to develop in which the United Nations regarded Taiwan as part of Communist China. Even if physical separation were ensured by the presence of United States forces the situation would be essentially unstable, and the possibility could not be ruled out that some elements among the Chinese Nationalists might prefer reunion with Peking rather than permanent separation from the mainland. (There have been reports from time to time of feelers by one side or the other, and there is some evidence to support the view that low-level talks are maintained, possibly with the connivance of some top Nationalist leaders. In particular, Chiang Kai-shek’s son (Chiang Ching-kuo) is said to be involved in such dealings.)
8. Any re-union with the mainland is, on our present evidence, likely to be resisted by the local Taiwanese who comprise 10 million of the 12 million people on the island. It is generally accepted that mutual antipathy exists between the two groups of people and that Nationalist policies tend to perpetuate rather than remove this antipathy. The Taiwanese seem also to have little interest in the Chinese Communists or their late Japanese masters, and would probably much prefer to be independent.
9. Australia has supported the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan as the Government of China for two main reasons. First , the United States is strongly committed to support of the Nationalists and we wish to do nothing to diminish or undermine the American position in Asia or in any way endanger our own relations with the United States. Second , we have committed ourselves publicly to an humanitarian principle that we could not accept any arrangement dealing with the future of Taiwan which ignores the wishes of the people of Taiwan.
10. In the light of recent developments, set out above, it seems important that we should now be considering what action should be taken by ourselves and like minded governments in the event of a vote in the United Nations in favour of Communist China. One important factor is whether we should continue to support the Nationalist Government; irrespective of the outcome of a General Assembly vote; or whether we should insist on the principle of self-determination for Taiwan.
11. Assuming—
(a) that action could and should be initiated in the General Assembly;
(b) that it should take the form of an attempt to prevent Taiwan’s claim to a separate existence being precluded by the terms of a resolution replacing Taiwan by Communist China as the proper occupant of the United Nations China seat;
(c) no strong United States objections;
we should still have to decide on the best tactics. There might be great difficulty in preserving United Nations membership for Taiwan in the event of the adoption of a simple Albanian-type resolution. Taiwan would then have to seek admission as a new member, and it could scarcely hope to succeed, given the fact that a veto could be imposed by either China or the U.S.S.R. in the Security Council. It would be possible to move an amendment to an Albanian-type resolution, designed to detach Taiwan from China, but this would have to be done in a way to avoid indicating prior acceptance of the success of the resolution. Another course might be to introduce a resolution immediately before an anticipated Albanian-type resolution.
12. The type of amendment or resolution which would seem to have the best chance of success would be one which specifically excluded Taiwan from the territory of the member recognized as China, affirmed the right of the people of Taiwan to self-determination, and provided for ascertainment by the United Nations of the wishes of the Taiwanese in this respect. In view of their strong support in the past for the principle of self-determination it would be difficult for the Afro-Asians to oppose such a course.9
13. There is in fact some evidence that quite a number of countries, even some which recognize Peking, accept the fact that Taiwan is entitled to remain a separate entity if it so wished. Representatives of African countries were reported earlier this year to have been talking privately in this sense at the United Nations. It is of some significance that in public statements and communiqués during Chou En-lai’s tour, at the beginning of this year, of 13 African and Asian countries (all but two of which recognize Peking) there was almost complete support for Peking’s right to be admitted to the United Nations but much less apparent support for Peking’s claim to Taiwan. President Ayub Khan10 told Chou En-lai privately that he did not favour the abandonment of Taiwan to Communist China. Japan and Canada are following policies of increasing contacts with Peking short of recognition, and are both concerned to retain an independent Taiwan. (Interpretation of what is meant by an independent Taiwan may of course vary as between countries but we assume here that recognition of the wishes of the people rather than simply the preservation of the Chinese Nationalists would obtain the greater support.)
14. The Americans would have to be informed of any consultation which might be initiated, but it may be difficult to establish the genuine opinion of the United States Administration given the domestic political situation in the United States.11 The Administration might not be averse, however, to an initiative from countries such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand directed towards finding a solution of the problem of maintaining the separate existence of Taiwan, especially if conducted for the present in strict secrecy.12
15. Another factor to be borne in mind however is that any preventive move in the direction of self-determination might be considered by some Asian countries (for example South Korea, South Vietnam and Thailand) as desertion of a strongly anti-Communist ally and a weakening of our anti-Communist resolve in the area. In addition it could conceivably precipitate among the Chinese Nationalists a move to seek an accommodation with Peking.
16. The need, however, for some preparatory move to preserve an independent Taiwan appears urgent. Unless there is preparation now, the United States and ourselves could be faced with the prospect of supporting the Nationalists who would no longer be recognized as the government of China or as a member of the United Nations. United States protection of Taiwan security could therefore become difficult, especially if there developed any strong support for a Chinese Communist move in the United Nations for the return of the island.
17. For some months now the Canadian Minister for External Affairs13 has frequently stated his concern to find a means of recognizing Communist China whilst at the same time preserving the integrity of Taiwan. The New Zealanders have recently told us that they are contemplating having discussions with the Americans on this matter.14 It seems essential therefore that Australia should now discuss confidentially with Canada and New Zealand the possibility of some initiative which would preserve an independent Taiwan. At a later stage it might be desirable to consult also with the British and some other European governments. But this might best be done after the matter has been canvassed with Canada and New Zealand, whose interests probably lie closest to our own.
18. It is therefore recommended that we undertake exploratory talks on the above lines with the Canadian and New Zealand governments in the first instance regarding possible courses of action to safeguard our interests in the event of the replacement of the Republic of China in the United Nations, and that the United States be informed of our discussions.15
M.R. Booker
First Assistant Secretary
Division II
[NAA: A1838, 3107/33/1/1, xiii]
1 M.R. Booker, First Assistant Secretary, Division IV, Department of External Affairs.
2 Sir John Gorton.
3 See Document 83.
4 Barwick stated on 11 March 1964: ‘So far as Australia is concerned, it remains our position that the fate and future of the people of Formosa should not be bargained for and disposed of in negotiations and diplomatic manoeuvres in which they play no part. Recognition, on Peking’s terms, would involve just such an action’. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, (House of Representatives) vol. 41, 11 March 1964, p. 474.
5 In July, Menzies had commented to the Prime Ministers that: ‘There were 10-11 million people in Formosa, and he was surprised to hear it suggested that they should be handed over to Peking. It was true that Chiang Kai-shek had said there was only one China, but this was mere bravura and no significant argument could be built on it. But unless Formosa were recognized as under the regime of Peking, Communist China would not welcome recognition. What became of self determination for the people of Formosa? Should we pay lip-service to self-determination when it suited us?’
6 Minute not published.
7 See footnote 4, Document 94.
8 Commenting on this sentence, Tange wrote: ‘Do you mean initiate the downfall of Chiang? This is not real life’.
9 On this sentence, Tange wrote: ‘Don’t assume Africans can be pinned to logic—or, for that matter, to any single promise’.
10 Muhammad Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan.
11 Presidential elections occurred in November 1964.
12 In the margin, Tange asserted: ‘This is a rather vague way to talk about an enormous diplomatic problem’.
13 Paul J. Martin.
14 Here, Tange wrote: ‘I really cannot believe that N.Z. diplomacy is up to this problem’.
15 A handwritten note to Booker from Tange dated 22 October 1964 reads: ‘What this submission lacks is recognition that what you propose would put Australia at the centre of a political storm internationally (& presumably domestically); that the number of countries available to help is very limited; that the issue is serious enough to concern Cabinet (at some stage) & not merely the Acting Minister; that conversations are capable of being carried on discreetly; that departmental officers will not plunge off without reference back to Ministers; that we have, after all, been into this before. You don’t say that Australia is committed to Taiwan being part of China. I have already referred to this’.