Brussels, 30 October 1964
248. CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY
Record of talks held at Soviet Foreign Ministry, Moscow, 28th October 1964
Present
Australia
Minister for External Affairs: The Honourable Paul Hasluck M.P.
First Assistant Secretary, Department of External Affairs, Mr. P. Shaw.
Chargéd’ Affaires, Australian Embassy, Moscow: Mr. J.D. Petherbridge.
First Secretary, Australian Embassy Moscow: Mr. G. Clark.1
Soviet Union
Minister for Foreign Affairs: Mr. A.A. Gromyko.
Deputy Foreign Minister: Mr. V.A. Zorin.
Head Second European Department, M.F.A: Mr.A.A. Roshin.
Interpreter.
Mr. Gromyko said that he was glad to meet the Minister on his non-official visit to the Soviet Union. The Minister replied that it was his first visit as well as being the first visit by an Australian Foreign Minister to the Soviet Union, and he expressed appreciation for his reception. He said that he had come to hear the Russian point of view on world problems and would be happy to acquaint Mr. Gromyko of any aspects of the Australian point of view which were of interest to him. Mr. Gromyko suggested that the tradition be adhered to whereby guest had the first word.
[ matter omitted] ]
Admission of Communist China to United Nations
6. Mr. Hasluck said that the question of the admission of Communist China to the United Nations had been a cause of differences of opinion over many years. Without wishing to revive all the arguments on this question, he was interested to know whether this question would once again be a cause of controversy or whether it was to be by passed at the next Assembly. Mr. Gromyko replied that he heard the day before that Cambodia had officially proposed that the representation of China should be an item on the Assembly’s agenda. The substance of the Soviet position was known and it had not changed. The Soviet Union considered that those who opposed the representation of the Chinese People’s Republic were in fact acting contrary to the UN Charter. The Soviet Union had always insisted and would always insist on the C.P.R. receiving its legal rights in the United Nations. It was not a question of the admission of China to the United Nations but of the representation of China. Chiang Kai-shek should be expelled from the United Nations and all its organs.
7. The Minister replied that this would mean in fact that Formosa would be absorbed in Communist China. Australia was concerned about the fate of Formosa. Its population of 11 million wished to be separate from Mainland China and no one should compel them to be absorbed by another nation. Australia happened also to be a country of 11 million and we would consider it an intolerable situation if our existence could be abolished by a United Nations resolution. The same consideration applied to Formosa.
8. Mr Gromyko said that there was no analogy between Australia and Taiwan. Taiwan was Chinese Territory. The Soviet Union categorically opposed the socalled two China concept. The concept was unrealistic, incorrect and harmful to the interests of China and her people. Taiwan was part of China and the Soviet Union would reject all efforts to create two Chinas.
9. The Minister asked whether Mr. Gromyko felt that the principle of self determination should apply to Formosa. Mr. Gromyko replied, ‘absolutely no’. Such a suggestion was a distortion of the concept of self-determination. If for example Sydney or a street in Sydney was to declare itself independent of Australia, could this be regarded as an application of the principle of self-determination? Taiwan was factually, historically and geographically a part of China. This was so self-evident that the question was not even deserving of discussion.
10. Mr. Hasluck asked whether Mr. Gromyko would concede that the Chinese had a right to any territory which they claimed to be a part of China e.g. maritime provinces2 or Sinkiang. Mr. Gromyko replied that all Chinese Territories, including Sinkiang, were indeed part of China. The same applied to Taiwan. The Minister pointed out that the people in Taiwan said that they did not want to be part of China. Were China’s demands to prevail over the wishes of the population and could this be the basis on which United Nations’ resolutions were to be taken? Mr. Gromyko replied that the Minister’s basic premise was wrong. It was contrary to historical fact. A.lawful demand, such as that made by China, was part and parcel of the principle of territorial integrity. Taiwan was an inseparable part of China. Mr. Gromyko added that the views of both sides on this question were so distant and opposed that he doubted whether the question was worthwhile discussing.
11. The Minister said, just to round off the discussion, he would like to mention that he had seen a map published in China, apparently official, which indicated all the territories that the Chinese considered should belong to them. This map included Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, Indian territory, part of the Soviet territory and even a small part of the Philippines as being within China. The Chinese apparently claimed that these areas were an integral part of China. He asked if Mr. Gromyko would agree that these countries should be permitted the principle of self determination or whether China could have them simply because it claimed them. Mr. Gromyko said that he did not consider that all Chinese statements were the truth but that he did consider Taiwan was part of Chinese territory and belonged to China.
[ matter omitted] ]
Communist China
13. The Minister said that he would like to set out the Australian view on one or two further questions, but he did not expect Mr. Gromyko to reply on each point.
14. Mr. Hasluck went on to explain that Australia’s anxieties in South East Asia were mainly connected with the threat of Chinese aggression in this area. Australia lived near to S.E. Asia: its closest neighbours were in South East Asia. He himself had recently concluded a visit to South East Asian countries. Australia was represented throughout the area and had close contact with event[s] there. His own view, which was also the view of the Australian Government, was that the fear of Chinese aggression represented the greatest threat to the peace of the region and the political stability of countries in South East Asia. The small, recently liberated, countries of the area had a real fear of China. The leaders of these countries had read the aggressive statements by Chinese leaders and had seen the actions of the Chinese in Tibet3 and against India.4 This fear of China threatened the territorial integrity of all the newly independent countries, and prevented stability in South East Asia.
15. From the narrower and national point of view of self interest, Australia would not like to see a situation where one power was dominating the whole of Asia. Asian countries should be free to develop freely their economies and societies, and Australia wanted to see independent national states develop without being subjected to pressure from one dominant power.
16. Mr. Hasluck continued that he was not talking about a dominant power simply in the ideological field. The question of ideological domination was less prominent in his mind that the question of the new imperialism of China—the questions of power and nationalism. The emergence of a dominant power in Asia such as China represented a threat to the rest of the world.
17. The Minister went on to discuss the position of India in relation to China. Australia was aware of Soviet interest in and support for India. For India’s sake and the sake of progress in Asia, India should be free from the threat of Chinese imperialism. China could not be allowed to dominate and exert pressure on her neighbours. There was no other question on which the Australian Government felt greater concern. Australia herself did not so much fear direct invasion from China. What she feared was the threat presented by the emergence of a single great dominant power in Asia. Although Indian and Australian views did not always coincide, yet on this question they did coincide. By virtue of links within the Commonwealth, Australia was able to know the great concern felt by the Indian Government at present on the question of China.
18. In reply Mr. Gromkyo began by saying that the Minister had used many strong words against China—‘aggressive’, ‘imperialist’ and so on. He wished to dissociate himself from these expressions. He went on to say that the Soviet Union wanted to see the independent development of South East Asian countries. They should be able to decide their own affairs and to develop freely without interference from outside. The Soviet view on this question was contained in statements which had been made in connection with Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon and other countries. The Soviet Union wanted to see the strengthening of the independence of these states so that they would be in a position to decide their own affairs. The Soviet Union would not be the last to condemn violations of the peace and aggressive actions in South East Asia.5 A good example of the Soviet attitude was her policy towards Laos, whose neutrality and independence the Soviet Union supported. Mr. Kosygin6 had met Souvanna Phouma7 earlier in the day and had confirmed Soviet policy towards Laos. If Australia wished to see the independence of South East Asian countries then it shared a common position with the Soviet Union.
19. Australia was aware of the Soviet attitude towards South Vietnam where it condemned external interference. However, even if Australia was to condemn the interference in Vietnam there would be still a difference between the positions of the two countries, since the Soviet Union also condemned the existence of military blocs. Pakistan, Thailand and other South East Asian countries were members of one or another bloc which by their very nature were aggressive. Mr. Gromyko concluded that Australia was aware of the Soviet point of view on this question.
Chinese Nuclear Explosion
20. The Minister said that it might be recalled that at the San Francisco conference in 19458 Australia had taken a particular position on the question of great and small powers. The Minister’s view, as well as that of the present Australian Government of today, was somewhat different. He recognized that on certain major questions only the great powers were able to take effective action. The Minister added that he wanted to make this point since it differed somewhat from the views expressed by the former Australian Government at San Francisco. Australia was a small power which could assist in consultations on world problems, but the basic decisions had to be made by the great powers.
21. Australia hoped that these powers would address themselves to the situation created by the Chinese explosion of a nuclear device and also hoped that the number of nuclear powers could be restricted to a minimum. The Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom already had nuclear weapons and France and China were in the process of developing them. The Minister noted that France and China had not signed the partial Test Ban Treaty.9 He would be interested to know whether there was any possibility of talks between the great powers on restricting the dispersion of nuclear weapons and their use. The peace of the world was influenced by the fact that two of the nuclear powers had not signed the partial Test Ban Treaty.
22. Mr. Gromyko replied saying that Soviet proposals on disarmament and the Soviet draft for a disarmament treaty included provision for the banning of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union, as was known, wanted to see a ban on the testing of nuclear weapons. Methods now existed for detecting nuclear tests anywhere throughout the world and no one country was able to detonate a nuclear device without detection. In concluding the partial Test Ban Treaty the Soviets had made it clear they wanted an agreement on the complete banning of nuclear testing, including underground tests. The Soviet Union was ready to sign such an agreement tomorrow, if necessary.
23. In reply to a question by the Minister about China and the banning of nuclear tests, Mr. Gromyko said that he was only speaking for the Soviet Union and could not speak for the Chinese. The Americans had for a long time refused to speak with the Chinese. The Minister pointed out that a situation now existed in which China had a nuclear device. Mr. Gromyko said that the West had made many mistakes with regard to China. Certain Western countries should not have infringed on China’s lawful interests. China should not have been ignored as the Americans had done. Such an approach was erroneous. However it was often better to correct a mistake later than never. This was the reason why the Soviet Union continued to insist on China’s participation in the United Nations.
24. In later conversations Mr. Hasluck told Mr. Gromyko that he was able to accept the fact that the U.S.S.R. and other countries were Communist and he said that how such countries chose to plan their internal development was their own concern. They could live in peace with their neighbours which had different ideas. He himself considered that ideological differences were less important than conflicts of power interests between countries. Adjustment of different interests between countries or blocs was a delicate matter, as there was rarely, if ever, a complete identity of interests. There had been some adjustment between the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. Now the balance between these two great powers was upset by the emergence of a third power bloc centred on Peking.
25. Mr. Hasluck observed that the U.S.S.R. had a policy of helping India. He doubted whether Russian aid to India was given to help the Indians to protect themselves from a threat e.g. from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Burma or Nepal. The Indians had learned by experience and he was sure that the Russians understood that the threat for India came from Communist China.
26. Mr. Gromyko said that the help being given to India by Russia was given to protect it from aggression from any country whatsoever. Nothing that he had said should be taken as supporting the contentions of Mr. Hasluck concerning the nature of the threat from China.
27. Mr. Gromyko remarked that Australia would have more influence among the non-committed countries of the world if Australia had not identified itself with armed blocs. Mr. Hasluck said that Australia was certainly not non-aligned. We had taken sides. We had made up our minds where our security lay and we would not alter our choice of allies. This did not prevent Australia from trying to see world affairs objectively. If countries could understand one another’s viewpoints they could see more clearly where their interests lay. Good relations depended not on abandoning one’s own needs and interests or refusing to see the needs and interests of others but by trying to find a composition 10 between them.
[ matter omitted ]
[NAA: A1838, 3107/33/1/1, xiii]
1 In the Department of External Affairs Statements of Service, Clark is listed as Second Secretary.
2 A footnote at the end of the cable, referring to this phrase, reads: ‘The interpreter translated maritime provinces as “waters surrounding China’”.
3 See footnote 2, Document 77.
4 See footnote 3, Document 100.
5 A footnote in the original reads: ‘The interpreter originally translated this sentence, “The Soviet Union will not be the last to come to the support of those whose peace was violated by aggressive actions in S.E. Asia”, but was specifically corrected by Mr. Gromyko’.
6 Alexei Nikolayevich Kosygin, Soviet Premier.
7 Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of Laos, 1962–75.
8 That is, the conference which resulted in the formation of the United Nations.
9 See footnote 1, Document 102.
10 The word ‘composition’ may have been intended to read ‘compromise’.