London, 7 November 1964
7580. Confidential
Following are notes of conversation between Australian Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Hasluck, and the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Couve de Murville1 on 4th November, 1964. Also present were the Australian Ambassador, Sir Ronald Walker, Mr. P. Shaw and M. Lucet.2 Record prepared by Sir Ronald Walker and Mr. Shaw.
M. Couve de Murville said that no one in Europe now expected there to be war. The conditions existing at the time of the North Atlantic Treaty had now changed. There was a balance of force between the Western and the Soviet Bloc resting on the nuclear deterrent and a fear of retaliation. He also referred in later conversation to the ‘bourgeois’ element in the Soviet Union today and said that today the Soviet Union was a ‘conservative’ country. It did not want war.
[matter omitted]
5. On the question of Communist China Couve said that it would be quite wrong, as some were suggesting in the use3 to endeavour to use the Russians as some sort of counter to the threat of Communist China. The U.S.S.R. had already been the reality of a great power. Communist China was only potentially a great power. It was the U.S.S.R. which could threaten Europe and not China. He saw no profit in endeavouring to play one off against the other.
6. In the Pacific Couve maintained that a balance of power already existed. The Americans were already installed in Korea, Japan, Okinawa and the Philippines, and they would not be dislodged. When he spoke of the Pacific he said that he meant the whole of the Pacific area including the United States and Australia and New Zealand. He believed that the Communists accepted this balance in the Pacific and the Americans could not be dislodged from their positions.
7. However, Couve argued that the Chinese could not and would not accept American established positions on the Mainland of Asia. For example, the American bases in South VietNam were regarded as a threat which could not be tolerated. In speaking of South-East Asia Couve made it clear that he meant the Indo-Chinese peninsula and he put to one side the problem of Indonesia and Malaysia as quite a different matter. He argued that in VietNam the Americans were not winning the war and could not win the war unless they took the war into North VietNam and China. This, he said, they had the capacity to do, although such a war would be condemned by the majority of mankind. Couve expressed the opinion simply that there was no government in South VietNam or in Laos. He said, however, that the government in Cambodia represented the people there and did stand for something. He could see no solution for the Viet situation except the negotiation of an agreement between the United States and China under which both would refrain from having forces in a neutral VietNam, Laos and Cambodia. The Indo-Chinese states used to be a Chinese colony before they became a French colony. They had no desire to become a Chinese colony again and that withdrawal of American forces, by reducing Chinese pressure, would strengthen both their prospects of being independent of China and their determination to be neutral.
8. Later Couve agreed that neutrality, not ‘neutralism’ which is a word we had been using, should be a ‘guaranteed’ neutrality, otherwise it had no meaning.
9. Mr. Hasluck agreed with Couve’s starting point that the struggle in the world reflected conflicts of power between national groups of power and not conflicts of ideologies. Mr. Hasluck pointed out that M. Couve had accepted the reality of the detente based on a balance of power between the United States and U.S.S.R. and that M. Couve had also drawn attention to the growing strength of China. He did not think he had dealt as clearly with the problem of a balance of power with China. This was an Asian not a Pacific Ocean problem. It was only a Pacific problem in the period between the two wars when the conflict was between the United States and Japan. The power conflict concerning China was in the whole of Asia and not simply across the Pacific. Mr. Hasluck said that from the Australian point of view, we had to think in terms of a China which was aggressive as revealed by its declared intentions, its past history and its recent actions. It was exerting pressure through fear on its weaker neighbours. Just as France would not wish to have Russia on its Rhineland borders, so Australia would not wish to see China dominate the whole of the Asian Mainland.
10. Couve denied the parallel. He said that the countries of Europe all had governments which represented the people and which stood for something and the same could not be said for the countries of South-East Asia. Couve said the S.E.A.T.O. was quite unlike N.A.T.O. in that the majority of S.E.A.T.O. members lived outside the area and it was really concerned with what might be called colonial problems, that is to control the destinies of South-East Asian countries that were not capable of playing any active role in the region. In any case South-East Asia was thousands (Mr. Hasluck corrected this to hundreds) of miles away from the continent of Australia. (Later he remarked that Australia was fortunate to have Indonesia lying between her continent and the Mainland of Asia. For Indonesia and Malaysia were both as concerned as Australia to check Chinese expansion. Mr. Hasluck said it was all the more deplorable that Indonesia should pick a quarrel with Malaysia at this time.)
11. Mr. Hasluck referred to India’s fear of China’s aggressive attitude and said that was also the problem of Japan’s future reactions to Chinese expansion. Couve did not think that China had any intention of conquering India and adding millions of poverty stricken people to her own problems. He agreed that China wished to humiliate India. (Mr. Hasluck referred to China’s success in weakening India’s standing in Africa.) Mr. Couve de Murville said that Communist China had three aims, to protect herself from external aggression, to achieve international acceptability, and to develop its resources.
12. Mr. Hasluck said that it was in Australia’s interests as well as in those of the United States and the West as a whole to resist China’s aggression as manifested in South VietNam. If the United States effort did not succeed, VietNam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Burma would all fall under Chinese domination. The United States effort was an essential part of the means for achieving the balance of power in Asia which Couve had previously admitted was necessary. Negotiation for a settlement between the United States and China could not succeed until the deterrent had been effective and until the unity and stability of the countries of South-East Asia had been achieved, just as in Europe the tension with Russia would not be relieved unless Western Europe had unity and stability and the deterrent force was maintained. (In later conversation Couve admitted in theory the need to ‘negotiate from ’strength’. He added that although they had limited information from Peking such information as they had suggested that the Chinese would be eager for a settlement with the United States.)
13. Couve replied that what Australia did in South Viet Nam would not have much effect on the issues there. However he said that, if the United States proved that they could win a victory in VietNam, he would be glad to see it. So far as his information was concerned however, the political and military situations were both deteriorating weekly, and the danger was the Americans would in time get tired and pull out without having achieved any agreement to check Chinese expansion. One could only wait to see the results of the differing policies which we were pursuing.
14. Later conversation4 Couve said that such information as they had from Hanoi was that although North Vietnam was receiving help from China, if peace were achieved by a process of neutrality, North Vietnam would be resistant to China. At present North Vietnam was very much afraid of the United States and this fear was the main element in its policy. (In general Couve appeared to place fear of the United States as a major cause of conflicts in Asia.)
[ matter omitted ]
20. M. Couve held formally to the view that the concept of two Chinas or oneChina and one-Formosa was and would remain an impossible one to all Chinese whether on the mainland or on Formosa. This he said had been proved by French experience following their recognition of Peking and the breaking off by the Chinese Nationalists of relations in circumstances in which the French had been prepared to maintain them. (M. Couve remarked that some of the former French African territories had continued to maintain relations with Taipeh and that France was subsidising the cost of a common representative for them for Taipeh in that capital.)
M. Couve de Murville asked why Formosa should not continue to exist as a separate country and as a non-member of the United Nations such as Western Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland or Western Samoa.
21. Couve said that he was unconcerned about the possible effects of the addition of a Chinese Communist veto in the Security Council.
[ matter omitted ]
24. Couve said that if there were a simple majority to seat Peking, then Peking would be seated. The new African members plus Dahomey, Tanganyika and perhaps Senegal would vote for Peking. France would vote that the question requires only a simple majority and of course also vote in favour of seating Peking. Couve expressed the view that it would be undesirable for Peking to be seated against the opposition of the United States and thought it probable that there would still be a small majority against Peking this year. The implication seemed to be that the situation would change next year.
[ matter omitted ]
[NAA: A1838, 3107/33/1/1, xiii]
1 Maurice Couve de Murville.
2 Charles Lucet, Director of Political Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
3 The word ‘use’ should presumably read ‘USA’.
4 The words ‘Later conversation’ should presumably read ‘Later in the conversation’.