Ottawa, 27 November 1964
The Canadian Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Martin, who was acting as Prime Minister in the absence of Mr. Pearson from Ottawa, was present for a few minutes at the beginning of the meeting, but then excused himself to attend to a parliamentary situation which precluded his participating in the discussions. He was able to rejoin the group for a short time during part of the discussion on attitudes to Communist China.
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Admission of Communist China to the U.N.
13. Mr. Martin said that the question of the admission of Communist China to the U.N. was now almost Canada’s number one foreign problem. He thought this question would be resolved at the corning General Assembly. Canada has for a considerable number of years felt that they should proceed to recognition of Communist China but Canada’s proximity to the U.S. imposed restraints on Canada. At the coming Assembly, Canada was anticipating that a vote against China’s admission would leave Canada amongst a minority in opposition and Canada had been trying to convince the U.S. that admission will inevitably occur. Mr. Martin expressed the opinion that the United States position was changing and that United States officials acknowledged that China must be recognised ‘in the next while’. Indeed, recent talks in Ottawa with Harlan Cleveland had given the impression to Canadian officials that the U.S. attitude was moving in that direction.
14. Mr. Hasluck said that the U.S. administration had acknowledged that the position was eroding year after year. Mr. Hasluck felt strongly, however, that Communist China must comply with the same requirements that other members abide by before being admitted to the U.N. He felt that Communist China should not, in effect, be rewarded for her aggression against India and for her failure to sign the Nuclear Test Ban. Moreover, the West must work hard to establish their view that the position of Formosa in the U.N. must be safeguarded. Mr. Martin was in full agreement with the latter comment.
15. Mr. Arnold Smith2 said that a U.S. official told him that, after the U.S. elections, there would be a ‘confrontation’ with China, perhaps even on the same scale as that between the U.S. and the Soviet Union over Cuba. Mr. Smith wondered whether this sort of development was likely—should such a ‘confrontation’ occur in the near future, or was it better to postpone it?
16. Mr. Hasluck thought that it was a bad year to take the decision on China. China’s admission to the U.N. at this time could be interpreted by China as a reward for being intransigent, since China had not modified her policies in any way. Mr. Hasluck said that, in his talks in Washington, he could draw no inference that the U.S. was looking for a confrontation. In fact, he had the impression that there was no real wrestling by the U.S. administration with the problem of how to contain China.
17. Mr. Cadieux said Canada had received a different impression. Some U.S. officials were saying that ‘the moment of truth was approaching’. He wondered whether China was persisting in a course which would bring them into confrontation with the U.S.
18. Mr. Hasluck said he thought the West should hang on for a short while since this was a bad moment to give in to China. If the harsh policies of the Chinese were condoned, this would have an adverse effect on other nations which have to resist China’s encroachment. India would be greatly disturbed by such a development and so would other countries in Southeast Asia. Mr. Hasluck had gained the impression from his discussions in Moscow that the Soviet Union thought that China might not be admitted this year.
19. Mr. Smith said that the Canadian view was that the Western powers would suffer a self-inflicted diplomatic defeat if they continued to resist rigidly China’s admission. Many Canadians thought that if Canada voted against China’s admission this year, the shambles would be greater next year. He added that the Canadian people did not believe in trying to isolate any country and to cut it off from other contacts in the world. Canada traded freely with Communist China and, in addition to trade, also recognised Cuba. People in Canada were well aware that the Canadian Government was holding to a rigid position on the admission of Communist China, in circumstances where the Government is actually known to favour China’s admission. On the other hand, Canada must have regard for her allies in NATO and take their views into account.
Formosa
20. In response to a question by Mr. Hasluck on how to deal with the position of Formosa, Mr. Smith said Canada was considering the possibility of tabling a declaratory resolution recognising two Chinas. This resolution would demonstrate at least Canada’s view that Formosa’s membership in the United Nations should be safeguarded.
21. Mr. Hasluck said that this move might satisfy Canada’s conscience but that it would not help Formosa. After admission, China would insist that it was the successor to ‘China’ on the Security Council and then it would insist that Formosa should not be recognised in the General Assembly. The passing of the Canadian resolution would clear the way for the passing of a resolution admitting China. Mr. Smith then said that Canada did not expect its resolution to be carried and Mr. Hasluck asked whether Canada, having moved it to satisfy its own conscience, would then campaign to have its own resolution defeated.
22. Mr. Hasluck said that the question of Formosa’s membership in the United Nations must obviously be settled before Communist China is admitted, and settled in a way that made clear to China the terms on which it was being admitted.
23. Mr. Cadieux said that Canada was trying to move towards the principle of universality. Mr. Hasluck asked what new countries the application of the principle of universality would bring in. Mr. Hasluck added that Canada would in effect be using their resolution to escape the effects of the application of the principle of universality to the people of Formosa. He went on to say that, if the vote in the U.N. was not carried this year, the proposition of the admission of China could be restated next year on certain terms, even though Communist China would probably reject such terms. Mr. Hasluck mentioned that, in terms of Australian politics, an Australian Government which did not oppose the admission of Communist China would lose votes and might even go out of office at the following elections. He recognised the basic difference in the political situation of a Canadian and an Australian Government.
24. Mr. Shaw asked what were the advantages of having Communist China in the United Nations. Mr. Smith thought that exposure to the United Nations environment would probably result over a period in a gradual mellowing of Chinese attitudes. Initially, of course, there would be difficulties but it was hoped that, in time, Communist China would develop into a neighbour with which other countries could live. Mr. Smith went on to suggest that the main danger of postponement would probably be greater Chinese isolation and a deeper hatred of the West. Mr. Cadieux added that China would have to stand up and be counted in the United Nations and there would be certain political consequences for China in adopting certain policies. Mr. Smith went on to say that the Soviet Union became more tolerant after a period of exposure in international forums and the real question was whether it is in the interests of humanity to have the Chinese in.
25. Mr. Shaw expressed the view that, in the short term, China would be impervious to outside influence. Mr. Cadieux commented that many non-aligned countries were moving to bring Communist China into the United Nations. They would claim that the imperialist countries were trying to keep China out and this would give the non-aligned countries an anti-Western propaganda theme. He said that a Canadian declaratory resolution would put the onus squarely on Communist China if it rejected the notion of a separate Formosa. Mr. Smith made the point that, when France recognised Communist China, Canada successfully convinced the United States towards influencing Formosa not to break off relations with the French. This move did not succeed and, in the circumstances in which Formosa broke off relations with France, it was not possible to attach to Peking any onus in the situation.
26. Mr. Hasluck said that originally he was of the view that the best approach to the problem would be by way of individual recognition of Communist China preceding a proposal for admission to the United Nations, but he recognised that political facts today made that process impracticable.
27. Sir Kenneth Bailey thought it desirable to get something from Peking in exchange for admission. He wondered whether there was not a possibility of China accepting admission on better terms for the West then the current Cambodian resolution.3 Perhaps a condition of admission should be the recognition by Peking of a separate Formosa. Mr. Hasluck agreed that it would be desirable for Peking to pay an admission price and this should be insisted upon before admission to the United Nations.
28. Mr. Smith commented that Canada was not wedded to the idea of a declaratory resolution, and agreed that it had certain disadvantages. He said that, from the Canadian point of view, such a procedure would probably carry more advantage then disadvantage. Mr. Cadieux then emphasised that Canada had refrained so far from recognising Peking only because of Canadian-United States relations and these relations have important domestic political implications. In terms of domestic politics, it was mandatory that Canada should not appear as a satellite of the United States. If the United States unexpectedly switched its policy on Peking’s admission without Canada’s prior knowledge, the Canadian Government would be in an intolerable situation.
29. Mr. Smith said that United States officials did not like the idea of a declaratory resolution as a tactical measure, since they claimed it would blur the issue and encourage the non-aligned countries to press for an Albaniatype resolution. Mr. Cadieux commented that Canada had gone along with United States views against its better judgment for too long. The longer Canada waited, the more difficult it would be for her to take a decision on Peking’s admission and the domestic political situation in Canada would become increasingly difficult.
30. Mr. Smith said that the United States use of the non-recognition technique stemmed from its relations many years ago with Latin America when the act of recognition or non-recognition could often influence changes in government in Latin American countries. This technique was not effective now, but the Americans continue to place great reliance in it.
31. Reverting to Mr. Cadieux’s earlier comments on the prospect of a more decisive Western confrontation with China, Mr. Hasluck questioned whether the nuclear deterrent would be as significant in the case of China as it had been in the case of the Soviet Union. He could not readily envisage a situation in which the United States could use nuclear weapons against China except in reply to China or in a major war where the danger of defeat was extreme and where China could be clearly seen to be in the wrong. In the next ten years China would be unlikely to take the initiative in using nuclear weapons. The nuclear deterrent could be counted on only as something that existed and not something that would be used. Moreover the practical military tasks in Asia today called for the use of conventional weapons and the atomic bomb was not applicable to existing situations. In this case what were the practicable military steps open to the United States if it were planning a major military confrontation of China?
32. Mr. Cadieux commented that the situation in South Vietnam was deteriorating for the United States and an alternative course of action would be to extend operations to North Vietnam. Mr. Cadieux thought that the United States was getting close to confrontation with China. The United States might then want to attack targets in China and there was a strong risk of escalation in such a situation.
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[NAA: A1838, 3107/33/1/1, xv]
1 Marcel Cadieux, Canadian Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.
2 Canadian Assistant Under-Secretary for External Affairs.
3 On 20 October 1964, Cambodia, which had with Albania co-sponsored a pro-PRC resolution in 1963 (see footnote 1, Document 103), requested the inscription on the General Assembly’s agenda of an item which was clearly geared to submission of a similar resolution. However, the Assembly was not able to have a specific discussion of the item during the Session.