Seoul, 13 June 1966
159. Secret
For the Prime Minister and Acting Minister1 from Hasluck.
Visit to Taiwan
Following are some general impressions of my visit to Taipei.
2. My strongest impression is that the Chinese Nationalist leaders are as insistent as ever on their objective of returning to the mainland. In fact recent developments in Peking appear to have given them new hope of making a successful landing on the mainland. Suggestions that I made that we must look to a future in which the rest of the world would have to live with Communist China met with little response. Both the President and the Foreign Minister were emphatic that there could be no permanent security in Asia until the Communist regime had been overthrown and the legitimate government of China restored. The idea of a two-China solution was characterised as appeasement. They were clearly worried at the extent to which such ideas seemed to be gaining ground in the United States and other Western countries.
3. I had a talk of nearly two hours with Chiang Kai-shek in which he expounded this point of view with impressive clarity and force. His main argument was that the Chinese Communists would not agree to a settlement in Vietnam because their objective was to wear down the United States and undermine their morale in a war of attrition. Even if some compromise were reached the Communists would open another campaign with the same object in mind. Their real aim was to recover Taiwan and they would continue their indirect aggression until they could achieve this. Once they had recovered Taiwan they would be able to consolidate their hold over the mainland and then proceed with their expansion throughout Asia.
4. Chiang Kai-shek argued that the United States could not itself contain Communist China because Peking could confront the Americans at so many different points. It was only the forces of the Republic of China that could deal with the problem. Moreover, they could deal with it without the risk of a third world war. If the Chinese Nationalist forces attacked the mainland it would be merely a resumption of the civil war. This would not invoke the Sino-Soviet Pact2 and in any case the Russians would now welcome the destruction of the Peking regime. He emphasised that it would be a disadvantage for any American troops to be involved. All that the Republic of China needed was material help to the extent of about one-tenth of what the Americans were at present providing in South Vietnam. He was convinced that once bridge-heads had been established in south China the people would rally to the support of the legitimate government and cooperate in overthrowing the rebel Communist regime. He clearly regarded recent reports of dissensions in Peking as confirming this.
5. In my discussions with the President and his Ministers, they described in some detail the actual means whereby their return to the mainland would be brought about. A fuller report will be prepared on this. I understand that they have in fact attempted to draw the Americans into detailed planning for an invasion but that the Americans have refused this. Chiang Kai-shek spoke of our own influence in Washington, and he seemed to hope that we might help encourage the Americans to unleash the Nationalist forces.
6. For my part I acknowledged the force of the argument that there can be no security in Asia until the problem of Communist China’s expansionism is solved, but I drew attention to the practical realities in terms of military capabilities and of what was politically possible for Nationalist China’s friends and allies. I sought to remind them of the limitations imposed by the state of world opinion. I raised such questions as the degree of reliance which could be placed upon the Taiwanese people and the Taiwanese members of the armed forces in any invasion of China and the extent to which people of China might be expected to welcome and support the invading forces. I told them that we supported the independence of Free China without qualification and that we regarded the subjection of Taiwan by the Communists as unthinkable. But I gave no encouragement to any idea that Australia might be prepared to support an invasion of the mainland.
7. For the rest my visit seems to have been a success. There were many expressions of appreciation of the role that Australia is now playing in Asian affairs. Our decision to reappoint an Ambassador was warmly received. The new Foreign Minister Wei Tao-ming seems a man of sense and moderation and I would expect that it will be possible to develop useful degree of cooperation with him.
[NAA: A4940, C4370]
1 John Gorton. Hasluck was abroad from 8–19 June, and was in Taipei in an official capacity on 11 June. He made a joint statement with the ROC Foreign Minister, Dr Wei Tao-ming, part of which referred to discussions on the reappointment of an Australian Ambassador to the Republic. Hasluck, it was noted, had informed Wei that Australia would now proceed with arrangements to make an appointment to the vacancy. Regarding the PRC, Hasluck and Wei were said to have discussed ‘the effects of the policies and actions of the Chinese Communist regime on the peace and security of Asia and their danger to the peace of the world’. They had agreed that ‘these policies and actions must be resisted and made to fail’. Australia, it was said, would continue to oppose PRC representation in the United Nations because of that country’s ‘expressed defiance’ of the United Nations and because it had ‘treated the Charter and the rights of others with contempt’.
2 China and the Soviet Union had signed a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance on 14 August 1945. Consequent to the Communist victory over the Kuomintang Government, this treaty had been replaced by one between the Chinese People’s Republic and the Soviet Union on 14 February 1950.