Canberra, 12 June 1969
Secret Personal
I am writing now to reply to your letter of 11th March, 1969,1 in which you raise a number of questions in relation to the indefinite maintenance of a ‘two Chinas’ policy. I have noted, too, that your despatch No. 3 of 19th November, 19682 examines this question in more detail. What I say now in relation to your letter may therefore be considered as applying to that despatch.
I think you draw too sharp a distinction between the interests of the mainlanders on Taiwan and the Taiwanese. We doubt that either of these groups would see advantage for itself in reunification with Communist China on terms conceivably acceptable to Peking. As the older generation of mainlanders passes from the scene we would expect that the next generation would more and more regard its interests as being identical with those of the Taiwanese in the maintenance of an independent Taiwan. We think this is already happening. Although many mainlanders may continue to hope for a return to the mainland, most of them do not seem to expect that this will take place and, contrary to the view expressed in paragraph 4 of your despatch, our impression is that a great many of the mainlanders, especially the ‘technocrats’ who are increasing in relative numbers, do take great pride in their accomplishment on Taiwan. Only if Peking ceased to be a doctrinaire Maoist state do we believe that the ruling elite on Taiwan would be prepared to contemplate reunification with a Communist mainland. But that is a very distant prospect at present. Even if Peking were prepared to give to a handful of mainlanders privileged treatment of the kind now accorded to Madame Sun Yat-sen,3 and the present leaders of Taiwan were prepared to come to an arrangement on this basis, we consider that such an offer would be rejected by the mainlanders as a whole. And as for the Taiwanese we have no evidence that they would prefer to be ruled from Peking.
You argue in the third paragraph of your letter that the Republic of China cannot afford to abandon its claim to be the government of the whole of China because once it does so it will have no legal status at all. While this may be an argument that carries great weight with the present ruling generation, it would not necessarily be influential with any successor group which recognized that its future lay in maintaining the independence of Taiwan. If, for example, countries like the United States, Australia and Japan recognized an independent state of Taiwan and were prepared to give it their protection, the basis of establishment of the legal claim of that government would be of secondary importance.
I would not agree that our present policy is primarily intended as a lever to induce Peking to abandon its claim to Taiwan. Rather, it is seen as a means to bring about a situation in which Peking acquiesces in, or at least decides as a matter of policy to refrain from the forcible annexation of, an independent Taiwan. It does not seem to us wildly optimistic to expect that a realistic and pragmatic government in Peking would not be prepared to accept this degree of self-denial for the sake of improved relations with the United States. That is why we consider that a general détente is more likely to emerge when both Peking and Taipei are prepared to acquiesce in a two Chinas solution rather than in circumstances in which we acquiesce in Peking’s claim to Taiwan.
I do not disagree with the view expressed in your paragraph 4 that ultimately Taiwan may become part of China. I think most people would agree that Taiwan is not going to be re-united with Peking in say the next 5 years. Equally, few would be prepared to assert dogmatically that the present division will still exist in 100 years time. But the question we need to ask is how relevant this possibility is to our current objective of ‘containing’ China. If China ceased to be a doctrinaire Communist state we would surely not be opposed to reunification, nor might the mainlanders on Taiwan or the Taiwanese themselves. However, if in present circumstances Taiwan was re-united with the mainland this would be likely to strengthen extremist tendencies in Peking.
We do not, therefore, consider that we need to be considering alternatives to our present policy which, as you say, has worked well enough. The status quo suits Australian interests best. What we should do, of course, is to assess continually developments in American policy so that we will be in a position to adjust in a timely way to any important changes that might develop in that policy. Even if it is true, as you say, that America’s China policy represents ‘the biggest blunder they have ever made’, it is irrelevant. The policy exists. It sets the framework in which we have to operate. While the possibility of change in American policy certainly does exist, we do not consider that it has yet reached a point where we have ourselves to consider whether the time has not come for a change in Australian policy.
[NAA: A1838, 519/3/1, x]
1 Document 130.
2 Document 125.
3 Formerly, Soong Chin‘g-ling, widow of Sun Yat-sen (see footnote 4, Document 90). She held a number of important positions in the PRC in spite of her connections with the KMT —her sister, for example, was the wife of Chiang Kai-shek.