Taipei, 15 July 1969
Secret
Thank you for your personal letter of 12th June in which you discuss various aspects of our China policy.1 I welcome what I assume may be taken as a summary of Departmental thinking on this question because I am sure you will agree that it is essential that our policy should be based on accurate premises.
So far as the possibility of an accommodation between Taiwan and Mainland China is concerned, all I want to say on that score is that, contrary to what is implied in paragraph 2 of your letter, I have never suggested that Taiwan could contemplate reunification with a ‘doctrinaire Maoist state’. Clearly neither the West nor the Nationalists can do business with the Government in Peking in its present mood and as presently constituted. Rather, I was looking ahead to the time when some form of co-existence might prove to be practical politics. I wanted to point out that the present situation on Taiwan could not be regarded as a permanent solution and that there were indications that Taiwan might reach some form of accommodation with Peking in the future. I wanted this possibility to be appreciated by the Department as a real factor in the situation but I did not suggest that.it should necessarily be made a goal of our China policy.
Your letter does, however, reveal that the Department still entertains some serious misconceptions about Taiwan, and this is a subject about which I and my staff can at least speak with some first-hand knowledge and experience, which, incidentally, is not shared by any officer in Canberra. You accuse me of drawing too sharp a distinction between the interests of the Mainlanders on Taiwan and the Taiwanese, and you go on to suggest that the next generation of Mainlanders will come to regard their interests as being identical with those of the Taiwanese in maintaining an independent Taiwan. If this is meant to suggest that the gulf between the two communities is narrowing with the passage of time, I can only say that this is quite contrary to our experience here. It would be reasonable to assume that after twenty years the distinction between Mainlander and Taiwanese is becoming blurred, but this is not happening. As we have pointed out many times in our reporting, there are still today no Taiwanese of any significance in the central Government, the police, or the upper echelons of the armed forces. Moreover, the social and cultural gap is still much in evidence and there is very little inter-marriage between the two communities. There is not even a common language. Furthermore, the children of Mainlanders who have grown up in Taiwan are thoroughly indoctrinated by their parents against any tendency to think of Taiwan as ‘home’. Home is where their parents came from even if they themselves were born in Taiwan. These are political and social facts which, to anyone who has lived in Taiwan for any length of time, are self evident.
It is, of course, true that in present circumstances there is a certain identity of interest between the two communities in that both appreciate that materially they are better off than their compatriots on the Mainland. But this is not to say that the Taiwanese enjoy their inferior political and social status. What the Taiwanese want is to be ruled by the Taiwanese. Unfortunately this is the least likely of the various possibilities confronting them. It is conceivable that if Taiwan could eventually secure recognition as an independent state, the Nationalists would be obliged to pay more regard to economic realities and give the Taiwanese some say in the Government, but this is still a long way off.
In my view, another Departmental misconception is in the role played by the ‘technocrats’ in Nationalist affairs. I agree that people like C.K. Yen2 and K.T. Li and the newly appointed Economic Affairs Minister S.Y. Dao do take pride in their accomplishments on Taiwan, and the President is sufficient of a realist to appreciate that such men are essential to the country’s successful economic development. But in order to assess the character of the G.R.C. it is misleading to look at the composition of the Executive Yuan or Cabinet. The President still has absolute control over major policy decisions and next to him, Chiang Ching-kuo supervises and guides the work of all Government agencies. It is only within the policy framework laid down by the President that ‘technocrats’ can function. K. T. Li has himself confided to me that discussion over the scale of military spending is not a matter for determination or even debate in the Cabinet. Apart from the President himself, who retains absolute control over the Government, residual power is exercised by the Central Standing Committee of the K.M.T. rather than the Cabinet. Of the twenty-one members of the Central Standing Committee, I would regard only four as progressive or technocrats (C.K. Yen, Y.S. Tsiang,3 Y.S. Sun4 and K.T. Li). The essential character of the regime is a military one, and this is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, particularly if Chiang Ching-kuo succeeds his father in power.
I was interested in your suggestion that if countries like the United States, Australia and Japan were prepared to give Taiwan their ‘protection’ this would offset the shaky legal basis of any future Taiwan Government. It may be that the United States is prepared to extend its protection to Taiwan indefinitely (although personally I doubt it) but I am confident that Japan would not undertake such a provocative commitment. Still less is Australia in any position to ‘protect’ Taiwan. After the recent Five Power Conference5 one wonders whether we are even in a position to protect Malaysia/Singapore!
To my mind the most controversial statement in your letter is the suggestion that Peking might forego its claim to Taiwan for the sake of improved relations with the United States. Maybe it is a question of geography, but to those of us here who have lived under the shadow of China for a few years, it seems to us no more conceivable that Peking would abandon its claim to Taiwan than it would give up its rights in Hong Kong. If we persist in pretending otherwise then any hopes that we and the Americans may entertain for an eventual accommodation with Peking are dim indeed. Several statements emanating from the State Department (and, of course, Senator Fulbright) have included the suggestion that the question of Taiwan is one to be settled by the respective Governments and peoples on the China Mainland and on Taiwan. This is no less than what President Chiang has himself said on numerous occasions. I would have interpreted this approach as meaning that in the course of an improvement of relations between China and the United States, the position of Taiwan would have to be adjusted to give at least some degree of accommodation to Peking’s claim.
Finally, I do not think that it is quite true to dismiss as irrelevant the suggestion that the Americans have made some pretty big blunders in their China policy. It is, I suggest, this very realisation which disturbs many influential people in the United States today, and there can be little doubt that the pressures for a more flexible approach will grow.
So far as Australia’s policy is concerned, it is implicit in your letter that we could not (or perhaps even should not) contemplate any change in advance of the Americans. It is, however, at least conceivable that we might have to. If the Canadian move towards recognition of Peking succeeds,6 this could be at the expense of our China trade—in favour of Canada—at present worth over $100 million a year. In these circumstances I wonder whether our continued support for the R.O.C. would survive the pressure on the Government to do something to protect our trade with our fifth largest customer.
[NAA: A1838, 519/3/1, x]
1 Document 131.
2 Yen Chia-kan, Prime Minister and Vice President of the ROC.
3 Y.S. Tsiang, ROC Minister for Education.
4 Sun Yun-suan, ROC Minister for Communications.
5 On 19 and 20 June, Five Power talks (Australia, Britain, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore) on the defence of Malaysia/Singapore were held in Canberra.
6 Talks on recognition between Canada and China began in February 1969. Mutual recognition occurred on 13 October 1970.