Canberra, 2 October 1970
Confidential
Chinese Representation and Australian Relations with Peking
The Australian Government’s long-standing positions on recognition of Communist China and Chinese representation at the U.N. could be called in question in the near future by the following possible developments:
(a) Canadian recognition of Peking;
(b) following (a), recognition of Peking by Italy, Belgium and others;
(c) passage of the Albanian resolution at this year’s General Assembly leading to abandonment or defeat of the Important Question and/or similar devices next year;
(d) changes in United States policy. (Fundamental change will probably take place only over the long term but significant changes could be accelerated by (a), (b) and/or (c).)
2. The Prime Minister’s instructions for dealing with questions about possible Canadian recognition of Peking appear to rule out any change in Australian policy in the immediate future.
3. If Canada were to reach an agreement with Communist China which did not involve recognition of the latter’s sovereignty over Taiwan, the way would be open to a ‘Two Chinas’ solution which we could explore and—in the long term—adopt. There is small prospect, however, of such an agreement being reached. We are therefore likely to have the problem of maintaining our present policies for some time to come, while preparing the ground carefully and gradually for eventual disengagement from them. This would involve gradual movement towards a ‘Two Chinas’ position, not because a solution on that basis is likely to be accepted by Peking, but because it would provide an intermediate position from which an ultimate reversal of our present policy could be least painfully effected.
4. The following possible lines of action could facilitate disengagement from our present rigid positions. Courses (d) to (h) would need Ministerial approval:
(a) we should confine to an essential minimum public statements condemning or strongly criticizing Communist China;
(b) we should say no more in public about recognition of the Republic of China than we need to do, and we should then justify our policy not by legal argument or by reference to the sins of the Communists, but by the need for preserving the independence of the 14 million people of Taiwan;
(c) we should maintain the line affirmed by the Minister in his 19th March statement3 when he recognized that Mainland China could not ‘remain forever on the periphery of the international community’ and added that we would welcome evidence of Chinese readiness to comply with ‘the broad rules of international behaviour’;
(d) at a suitable opportunity we should again recommend to Ministers that the propositions in (c) above be extended by stating that if Peking complied with the rules of international behaviour, Australia would be prepared to review the scope of its relations with Mainland China and to reconsider the question of representation at the U.N.;
(e) at A.N.Z.U.S., the Minister subscribed to the proposition that ‘current efforts to maintain and enlarge constructive dialogues with Peking should be continued’. The Japanese Prime Minister said in a television interview last weekend that ‘while dialogue (with Mainland China) appeared impossible now, Japan should seize the first opportunity for this which presented itself’. Occasion might be found for re-affirming interest in the Warsaw (or other) dialogues for welcoming any evidence of progress and for hinting at eventual readiness to take up a dialogue of our own;
(f) we might [begin]4 referring in suitable public contexts to the ‘People’s Republic of China’. The Minister subscribed to this term in the A.N.Z.U.S. communiqué,5 but we have otherwise referred only to Communist China, Mainland China or Continental China. The Americans already seem to use the term PRC fairly freely in much the same way as they refer to the ‘Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam’. Our own use of the term PRC would probably provoke queries and perhaps protests from the Nationalists as would (d) and (e) above. But the Nationalists are bound to see what we are up to at some stage in the process.
(g) Prior to the Cultural Revolution, there was some two-way movement of journalists, academics, scientists, businessmen and/or trade officials between Australia and Communist China. Now that the Cultural Revolution is subsiding and the Chinese are again showing interest in the outside world, we might begin to give discreet encouragement to Australians interested in renewing such contacts. (But we could not go far in this direction until the Francis James affair was resolved.)6
(h) We might discuss with the Trade Department the possibility of seeking ministerial approval for a visit to Mainland China by the Trade Commissioner in Hong Kong. (I understand the last such visit was made in 1956.) This could be followed up, if the climate were favourable, by proposals for an exchange of trade missions, and by some eventual relaxation of export controls.
5. Whatever courses we adopt, we shall in any case, need to maintain the closest possible contact with the United States on new or projected developments in their China policy.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38118, i]
1 H.D. Anderson, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Division 1, Department of External Affairs.
2 Sir Keith Waller had succeeded Plimsoll as Secretary of the Department of External Affairs on 6 April.
3 On 19 March, McMahon made a statement on international affairs. Part of the statement reads: ‘We have long recognised that the mainland of China, with more than 700 million people, cannot remain forever on the periphery of the international community. We would therefore welcome evidence that the Communist Chinese are prepared to comply with the broad rules of international behaviour and forego their largely self-inflicted isolation. Regrettably there are few genuine signs of this and consequently we still regard Communist China and other Communist regimes as a central obstacle to peace, stability and ordered progress throughout Asia’
4 Text in parenthesis was a handwritten correction in the original.
5 26 September. The text is given in Current Notes, vol. 41, 1970, pp. 481–3.
6 Australian Francis James, an Anglican journalist, was arrested by Chinese security agents in November 1969 for allegedly spying on secret Chinese nuclear installations for the Soviet Union. He was to be imprisoned for over three years.