New York, 1 December 1970
SAV. 42. Confidential
Future Representation of China in the United Nations
Now that the China representation item has been concluded in this year’s General Assembly, and particularly in the light of the outcome of it, the time will soon arrive, if it has not arrived already, when we shall need to begin considering how we are to tackle the problem at next year’s Assembly.
2. The result of the voting this year only serves to confirm what an increasing number of delegations were already beginning to believe before the matter came under consideration—that this was the last year in which the standard exercise could be gone through with any sure prospect of success. Everything seems to point to the fact that the United States authorities, for .example, have come to acknowledge this. In fact I have not found a single supporter of the Government of the Republic of China who would disagree with the proposition that beginning early next year there must be consultations aimed at reconsideration of past tactics and attitudes.
3. The objective, as I see it, is to try to devise a procedure, and the tactics to put it into effect, that would open the door for the entry of the People’s Republic of China into the United Nations (and to the China seat on the Security Council) while preserving separate membership, under whatever name, for the GRC and Taiwan.
4. In addition to those member states which have so far stood firm against any change of representation—and even including some of them—there are a significant number which would now like to have Peking admitted but do not want to see the GRC lose its seat. These states include some, like Malaysia, that voted against the ‘Important Question’ resolution.
5. A move towards acceptance of the need for any change will inevitably involve a confrontation with President Chiang Kai-shek and his administration. But this is a necessity that had better be faced sooner rather than later if a position for the GRC in the United Nations is to be preserved. I recall Ambassador Phillips1 of the United States suggesting to me early in the present Assembly session that it looked as if we could no longer wait for Chiang Kai-shek to die.
6. It is to be supposed that whatever might be done by the General Assembly towards admitting Peking, the GRC alone could theoretically continue to keep Peking out by exercising its veto in the Security Council. But this, like continuing the vain struggle to maintain a majority for the ‘Important Question’, would represent an increasingly intolerable ‘frustration of the will of the majority’ (in the words of the Canadian delegate this year). It would surely invite irresistible pressure for amendment of the Charter (if that is to be necessary) and would facilitate the unseating of the GRC by infuriating its opponents and exasperating its supporters.
7. I have not made any study of the legal and constitutional obstacles in the way of admitting Peking to the China seat and keeping Taiwan in a seat. No doubt Sir Kenneth Bailey will have given thought to these. Even assuming that they can be overcome, the political difficulties are formidable. On present appearances the GRC itself will do nothing to help, and there is little present hope of Soviet acquiescence, let alone positive co-operation. The belated Soviet intervention in the debate this year,2 however perfunctory it may have been as a boost to Peking’s claim to the China seat, suggests that the Soviet Government may well be losing some of its past misgivings about Communist Chinese membership.
8. Sir James Plimsoll has canvassed all the difficulties in his memorandum No. 1688 of 15th October last3 recording his discussion with Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. In the same memorandum he has revived an idea of some years past for a possible draft resolution designed to preserve the GRC seat while admitting the People’s Republic. No doubt suggestions along this line will be floated before the next General Assembly, and they could well attract support. We may well end up by having to rest our hopes and our efforts on some such formulation.
9. But I have been wondering whether we might not try a somewhat bolder approach. What I have in mind is a possible package deal with the supporters of Peking, and particularly the Russians. It would need to be a large package, expanded well beyond the China question. It would, in short, be a proposal to admit all the divided countries simultaneously—North and South Korea, West and East Germany, North and South Viet-Nam and West and East China (or China and Taiwan).
10. This might seem unthinkable at first sight, on grounds of acceptability or practicability. But first on the question of whether it is acceptable: assuming that a place is going to have to be found for Communist China, would it make matters so much more difficult in the United Nations to have to put up with three more communist countries? It might well be worth accepting a net proportionate increase of one in Communist membership as a price of settling the China problem, at least for the time being.
11. Assuming its acceptability as an objective, is it a practical proposition? It would need to be put forward as a pragmatic arrangement to meet an existing situation not only in respect of China but throughout the world, and not necessarily as intended to be permanent. There are precedents—for a package deal on new membership, and for amalgamation and separation of membership. As regards nomenclature, the United Nations already has two Congos and two Yemens.4
12. As a proposition it would seem to offer certain positive attractions. Procedurally, it would seem to be relatively simple—unless there are serious legal difficulties that escape me. Furthermore, it would be hard for a very large proportion of the membership of the United Nations to argue against it without appearing to weaken their case in support of their sacred principle of universality of membership. Above all, it would restore the initiative to our side of the house.
13. There is of course the initial problem of the getting the GRC, the Federal Republic of Germany, the ROK and the RVN to fall in with it. The GRC will have to be told firmly the facts of life and urged to co-operate. If of course it is the case that the government in Taipeh is really convinced that it can if necessary carry on quite satisfactorily without membership of the United Nations, as some officials seem to have been saying to our Ambassador in Taipeh, then there seems not much point in going to great lengths in trying to preserve membership for it. But I wonder if it really is the case. As regards Germany, it is surely not inconceivable that by April or May next the FRG may have made enough progress towards détente with the GDR to be reconciled with the prospect of two Germanies in the United Nations. The ROK could well offer stubborn resistance to the idea of two Koreas. I imagine the GVN might well be more amenable. But I have to admit that all this [is]5 largely speculative.
14. It will be argued, and not only by supporters of Peking, that the proposition is too much of a gimmick, and that it would fail in its purpose because Peking, and probably Hanoi also, would not accept membership offered to them if the GRC and the GVN should be offered separate representation and should accept it. But is this in itself a deterrent? It is surely a tenable if not a cogent argument that the United Nations would no longer be on the defensive, as it has been for the past twenty years, if the onus of refusing membership is shifted to individual countries themselves. Even the Soviet Union might accept this.
15. I have tried out this idea on the Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom and two or three other countries, and none of them have blenched at the thought. Sir Colin Crowe,6 after a moment’s rumination, agreed that it ought to be kept in mind and looked at seriously early next year.
16. It would be useful to have your preliminary reactions to the foregoing tentative calculations.7
McIntyre.
[NAA: Al838, 3107/38/18, i]
1 C. Phillips, US Deputy Representative to the United Nations with rank of Ambassador.
2 The USSR had argued in the latter part of the debate that the United Nations should not depart from the principle of universality.
3 Document 139.
4 The two Congos were the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the People’s Republic of the Congo; the two Yemens were the Yemen Arab Republic and the Democratic Republic of Yemen.
5 Text in parenthesis is an editorial addition.
6 United Kingdom Permanent Representative to the United Nations.
7 In a marginal note, McMahon wrote: ‘We have a submission corning up. Keep this in mind’.