Canberra, 3 December 1970
China Policy
I refer to your minute of 3rd December.1
2. In view of the growing international trend in favour of Peking and the indication that the United States, in particular, is making a fundamental reappraisal of its policy, my own feeling is that the primary aim of our study should be to re-examine the whole of our China policy in the light of our overall interests.
3. Our ‘overall interests’ would include both:—
(a) our national and international interests—the implications which alternative attitude may have for any advantageous bilateral dealings with Peking and/or Taiwan, for our relations with other countries (particularly in Asia) and for our general strategic and other interests in our region; and
(b) the Government’s domestic political interests in terms of any strong feelings held within its own parties or within other political groups on whose support it relies.
4. In the consideration of (a) above we would have to take careful account of any movement in the attitudes of other countries which are of importance in the regional context e.g. the United States, Japan and the countries of South East Asia. (Regardless of any finer considerations it would be to our disadvantage to lag significantly behind the more important of these.)
5. Subsidiary questions, which should be decided only on the basis of this primary review are:—
(a) our future voting attitude in the United Nations;
(b) any part which we may wish to play in any efforts to protect the interests of ROC or the people of Taiwan;
(c) for reasons including international ‘face’ and likely domestic reactions, how far we should go, how soon and in what terms in future reformulations of our attitude.
6. My first reaction is that the McIntyre proposals, which are focussed largely on 5(a) and (b), tend to pre-judge, if not to by-pass, the primary review suggested above.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18, i]
1 Robertson wrote that McIntyre’s ideas (Document 145), among others, had raised ‘the basic question [of] whether our immediate objective is to conduct an overall review of our China . policy or, rather, by essentially tactical expedients, to salvage as much as we can of established policy, including Taiwan’s position at the UN’. He continued that there was no necessary conflict between the two but that the immediate pursuit of the second could prejudge the outcome of the first—‘and could prejudice the chances of developing an overall policy according with our fundamental national interests’.