Rangoon, 28 December 1970
Secret
Australia’s Policy Towards China
(Your file 62511 0/6)
I have read the Policy Planning Group’s paper2 on Australia’s policy towards China with considerable interest.
2. Whatever happens in respect of Australia’s China policy, it is bound to be difficult and possibly painful. This is so even if current policies remain unchanged. In essence there is a .dilemma: either to stay with policies which are on the wane internationally and which carry the threat of serious political isolation or to move towards a rapprochement with Peking and to accept that the minimum price for forwarding such an objective is bound to involve important compromises and difficulties in our relations with the Government led by President Chiang Kai-shek. Unfortunately there is no middle or other way and meanwhile the international political trend is clearly running strongly in Peking’s favour. Even to try publicly to influence the trend has serious pitfalls, pitfalls that will be the greater unless a review of policy had been carried out.
3. In any review of Australia’s policy towards China critical questions to be answered include firstly, the extent to which Australia would find itself isolated if it chose not to take positive steps to reach an understanding with Peking and, secondly, whether Australia could live with such a situation in the years immediately ahead. The question cannot be posed without awareness of other Australian policies, some of which fail to attract full and sympathetic understanding in Asian countries (Eg. New Guinea and immigration policy).
4. If the decision of the Australian Government is that an effort should be made to get Australia into a more favourable relationship with Peking, there is no time to be lost. This is simply because there is a distinct possibility that Peking might succeed in achieving acceptance in the United Nations at the next General Assembly. To wait until the eve of the China representation debate in the General Assembly would be a serious tactical mistake and would invite a Chinese rebuff.
5. I would also suggest that this is not a matter which is going to provide a fruitful ground for consultations in the usual sense with the United States. The latter is anxious to achieve its own break-through and would do so in a flash if Peking gave the green light. For the official record, however, it would be less keen to see one of its allies moving ahead in advance. If the Government decides to begin soundings with Peking (and if begun, I believe those should be strictly private, at least in the initial stages) the decision will need to recognize the limits of consultation. This is not to say, however, that there should not be some discussions with the United States.
6. I hope these comments might be of some assistance. The issue of China is fraught with difficulty, not lessened by the history that has gone before. The time seems to be on us, however, when a re-assessment of policy cannot be postponed.
[NAA: A1838, 625/10/2, i]
1 W.P.J. Handmer, Australian Ambassador to Burma.
2 Document 149.