Taipei, 22 January 1971
Secret
China Policy
Memoranda from Washington and New Zealand’s interest in the ’successor states’ approach to the China question1 have prompted the following comments on the possible reaction here to this approach. Earlier references to it are in my memoranda 176 of 3 April 19702 and 697 of 23 October 1970 (paragraph 8);3 in the latter memorandum I said that it ‘did not appear likely to be very productive, in the short term at least’. On reflection I have modified that view to some degree, though not to the point of excessive optimism.
2. It seems reasonably clear that an explicit ‘two-Chinas’ policy will do us little or no good with either the PRC or ROC. This comment would apply not only to bilateral relations but also in the UN. There would be no point in advocating a resolution, no matter how commonsensical, for which a majority could not be obtained, and the prospects seem forbidding for mustering and maintaining such a majority against arguments that UN resolutions are pointless unless they have the acquiescence of the countries concerned, or some realistic hope of eventual acquiescence. Moreover, however morally sound it is to argue that the people on Taiwan should have the right to choose their future, the day has presumably long passed, if it ever existed, when the UN would attempt to impose partition on an unwilling state or states. New Zealand’s belief that it is in our interests that Taiwan should remain separate is, I think, well-founded. However, the point seems rather academic. The present realities are likely to persist, and the passage of time is more likely to keep Taiwan and the mainland apart than to bring them together unless Peking is put in a position where it can take over the island, or unless changes in Peking’s attitudes make rapprochement possible. In the latter case, we might still see some disadvantages in union, but our objections might not be so strong.
3. It seems from here that the prospects might be somewhat brighter if we maintained the firm position that our policy should not be characterized simplistically as that of ‘one-China’, ‘two-Chinas’, or ‘one China, one Taiwan’. We know that all Chinese, whether on the mainland or on Taiwan, say that China is one. The problem is that there are two governing authorities with effective sovereignty over separate territories. (I do not, incidentally, see any possible argument, or event, short of a Peking/Taipei accord, by which the ROC could be persuaded to give up the offshore islands in order to make them more separate.) We could express willingness to accept the present reality and deal with these separate sovereign authorities. The UN might be well advised to do so also for so long as this situation exists, but need not necessarily express any view as to whether the separation is temporary or permanent. (While expressed hopes of an eventual peaceful settlement in accordance with the Chinese people’s wishes may be ‘pious eyewash’, they could nevertheless be useful as a matter of presentation, in that they would form a face-saving cover over our impious hope that the two territories would remain separate.)
4. It may be thought to be splitting very fine hairs to say that advocacy of the view that the territory of China now has two well-established sovereign authorities in it is something different from advocating ‘two Chinas’ or ‘one China, one Taiwan’. However, in the present exercise, presentation could prove critical. If, for example, President Chiang could be persuaded, or would affect to be persuaded, that a successor states approach was simply an acknowledgement that China is at present divided he might be much more willing to accept consequential action in the UN as a matter of tactics (cf. para 6 of my memo 840).4 Once it were accepted as a question of tactics rather than high policy, as the President made clear in his recent talk with me, decisions on tactical details would, at least to some degree, be matters for the Foreign Ministry rather than the President himself.
5. One could perhaps carry this line of thought one step further. In endeavouring to persuade President Chiang to accept continued UN membership with some reduction in the ROC’s status, it would be helpful to speak to him as a statesman about the future. (Whether he really believed what we said, or believed that we believed it, could be immaterial. One important thing could be to give him a public and private line which he could take in regard to a shift in policy.) It could be put to him that the net result of a successor states approach would be that there would be two seats for China, as there were now in effect three for the USSR (we might need to study whether the Ukraine and Byelorussia are theoretically sovereign states). In low key it could be implied that, if the Chinese people asserted their right to freedom and changed their government, and if Taiwan and the mainland were eventually reunited peacefully for the good of the Chinese people, this position might well continue. In some ways it would be a tribute to China’s greatness that two China seats existed.
6. The most that could be said for this line of approach might be that the odds against it succeeding here might, with careful preparation, be somewhat less than against many other approaches. In whatever approach is decided, however, a most important element seems to be to try to present it here largely as a matter of tactics, so that some decisions can be made or plausibly advocated by Ministers rather than the President himself.
7. In regard to the question of UN representation generally, it seems from here that clear definition of our aims for 1971 will be needed. As New York has said, the question of leadership in securing votes for an agreed approach will be most important; if a strong lead is not given, many countries could well take refuge in abstentions. Will Australia’s primary purpose at the UN this year be to work hard to prevent the ROC’s expulsion, while looking towards some more significant development in, say, 1972? Or are the prospects such that we must acquiesce fairly passively in a way being opened to Peking’s entry this year, while preserving ROC membership if we can?
8. A further question (raised in para 6 of my memorandum 697/70)5 is how active Australia should be in all this. This question has come back to mind as a result of recent remarks by Yoshida6 of the Japanese Embassy to Godfrey-Smith.7 (Yoshida, though a junior officer, accompanied Ambassador Itagaki8 to the Gaimusho9 meeting in Hong Kong in mid-December. He seems well-informed and is cooperative and forthcoming. His remarks may of course have been entirely personal.) For what they were worth, these remarks were to the effect that, given the immense complications in China policy from Japan’s point of view, it would be very helpful if some other respected country or countries gave a lead which Japan could reasonably follow. He did not suggest that we should do so, but obviously had us in mind. The same considerations could apply to the US also; I know you have taken this possibility into account. One major question is, of course, how far we would get in winning support for any approach with only passive rather than active support from the US and Japan.
9. Looking at this aspect more specifically from the point of view of what we might achieve in Taiwan, it could be said that we probably already have much more freedom of manoeuvre than either the US or Japan. We are regarded as consistent friends, but are not too close; our record of assistance in Asia in many fields is known to be good, but we are probably thought of as fairly pragmatic; we are economically useful to Taiwan and could be more so in the future, but possibly their future need for raw materials from us is greater than our need to sustain growing trade here (though this is desirable). All in all, we are probably better placed than most to speak pretty frankly here, if we decided to do so, without excessive regard for some deterioration in relations. But, as I have said before, it would be unrealistic to expect the ROC to move too far too quickly. We should shape our approach to take account of as much of the ROC’s position, policies and prejudices as we can. Only then would we be fully justified in using a refusal by the ROC to shift ground, even tactically, as a reason for reducing, or ending, our support. The ’successor states’ approach seems considerably more suited to our purposes than most yet adumbrated, and has the added advantage of being fairly easily reconcilable with past policies, actions and public statements. It also seems reasonably compatible, if necessary, with use of the ‘universality’ line (for which the acquiescence of the ROC, South Vietnam and West Germany would presumably be desirable, if not essential).
10. Copies of this memorandum are being sent to Washington, Tokyo, UN New York, Wellington and Hong Kong.
[NAA: Al838, 3107/38/18, iii]
1 Memoranda from Washington of 31 December 1970 and 16 January 1971 informed Canberra of discussions with US officials on various scenarios concerning the China question. Plimsoll had, for example, raised with Green the notion of a UN resolution which would acknowledge both that territory formerly under the control of the ROC was now controlled by China, and that the ROC was an original and permanent member of the United Nations. It would then declare the ROC and PRC to be members of the United Nations. In connection with New Zealand, P.G. Millen, the New Zealand Deputy High Commissioner in Australia, told Eastman on 7 January that of the ‘possible variations on [the two-Chinas formula] it seemed to Wellington that the dual succession idea held the most prospect’.
2 See footnote 2, Document 141.
3 Document 141.
4 24 December 1970. Dunn wrote that he could see no prospect of Chiang agreeing to say openly that the ROC would become simply the Republic of Taiwan—the most that could conceivably be hoped was that he would reluctantly accept publicly that China was divided and was likely to remain so indefinitely, with two governing authorities.
5 See Document 141.
6 Yoshida Shigenobu.
7 A.P. Godfrey-Smith, Second Secretary, Australian Embassy, Taipei.
8 ltagaki Osamu, Japanese Ambassador to the ROC.
9 That is, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.