Canberra, 23 February 1971
Note on Cabinet Submission No. 6782 —
Australia’s Policy Towards China
This submission is a tightly drafted analysis of the international position and policies of Communist China. Sections I to VI are not essential to consideration of the implications for Australian policy if it is accepted that the international recognition so far awarded is such as to make admission to the United Nations inevitable.
2. We accept this conclusion but would draw attention to paragraph 136 where it is said that admission might possibly be put off for another year, though it is too early yet to calculate the voting arithmetic some nine months ahead. In our view the key to consideration is that we have time to consider our policy step by step and do not have to opt for a complete action programme now.
3. We know that the Japanese are reluctant to take major initiatives. Japan is looking to others including Australia to make a move. They are anxious to know our intentions and we may influence their course. The submission unfortunately does not recognise that Australia is therefore a possible catalyst capable of setting in train swift international reactions.
4. We accept that the United States is feeling its way to a new relationship with the People’s Republic of China and has already gone some distance. We need to recognise the earlier greater obduracy of the American position and long refusal to engage in trade with Peking. Paragraph 72 has an important guideline. It mentions that, ‘There is little chance that Peking’s diplomacy will evolve quickly and flexibly, but should it do so we cannot expect the Americans to keep us fully briefed on every detail of change in their position’.
5. We agree with the recommendation at Paragraph 203 (1) and (2) that urgent consultations should be opened with, Japan, the U.S.A., the R.O.C. and New Zealand. We would add the rider however that, lest we precipitate or accelerate or drift towards change during the next session of the General Assembly, we should begin our consultations by a very frank exchange with the United States and New Zealand. It is important that Washington should realise that our confidence in having access to the Administration’s thinking is an essential condition to the constancy of our position. We may then need to consider our interests in the light of the American view of any proposed move ahead of them. Only after this exchange is concluded should we consult the Japanese.
6. We accept the need expressed in Paragraph 203 (3) to seek to induce the Republic of China to adopt a more flexible attitude. However, we do not quite see how we can ‘declare’, as Paragraph 203 ( 4) recommends, that we are prepared to deal with ‘… both the Government of the P.R. C. and the Government on Taiwan … in the territories under their respective control’. 3 This could be interpreted as withdrawal of de jure recognition from the Republic of China if made under formal circumstances. We think this may need further consideration.
7. We see no objection to the proposals in Paragraph 203 (5) for an expression of interest in opening relations, to be made to Peking provided that the approach is private and not made in an Asian capital. Nor do we see too great a concession in Paragraph 203 (6) and (7). It should be noted that a visit by Australian Naval vessels to Keelung is currently scheduled.
8. As stated we have no serious objections to any of the steps proposed however we would see considerable danger in endorsing the whole package now. It should in our view be a step by step process
Discussions with N.Z. and U.S.A.
Discussions with Japan
Discussions with R.O.C.
Feelers to P.R.C.
with Cabinet reviewing the progress after each round of consultations.
9. We would wish to re-emphasise the need for absolute privacy of any such consultations lest we set off the avalanche.
[NAA: A5619, C855]
1 D.J. Munro, Deputy Secretary, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet.
2 Document 157.
3 Ellipses in source text.