Canberra, 4 March 1971
Secret
Australia’s Policy Towards China
In accordance with the decision on Submission No. 2401 I discussed the China problem on 26 February with Ambassador Winthrop C. Brown,2 the Leader of the United States Delegation to the meeting of ANZUS officials and Mr A.L. Jenkins, Director of the State Department Office of Asian Communist Affairs. A copy of the record of our conversation is annexed.
2. At a subsequent meeting of officials, at which New Zealand officials were also present, Ambassador Brown made a similar, though less detailed, presentation. At that meeting he raised the question of the method to be used for sounding out the acceptability of whatever formula is agreed between the inner group of Governments, including Japan, with which the United States is engaged in consultations. He anticipated that a direct initiative by close friends of the Republic of China might be regarded by some marginal governments as merely further delaying tactics. He suggested that for this reason the Belgian Government which adumbrated a ‘dual succession’ formula in 1970 might, if agreeable, be the most suitable agent for initial soundings.
3. Ambassador Brown is now proceeding to Tokyo and Taipei and I have sent instructions to our Ambassadors to keep in touch with him.
4. The American Administration will be taking stock of the position following the current consultations and is likely to suggest further talks in Washington next month.
WILLIAM McMAHON
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Attachment
RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN BROWN, JENKINS, RICE,3 MCMAHON,
WALLER, HARRY AND ANDERSON
Canberra, 26 February 1971
Secret
Ambassador Brown welcomed the opportunity for consultations and said that he hoped this discussion would help towards formulating a common approach. He asked if they could have our views.
2. Mr McMahon said that the President’s ‘State of the World’4 message had opened the door wide to both recognition and admission of the PRC to the U.N. The Australian Government’s political situation had made it necessary for it to adopt a careful approach to these questions. Recently a comprehensive study had been made by the Department of Foreign Affairs. This had been examined by the Cabinet but no decisions had been taken.
3. Cabinet had examined the problems associated with recognition but it had not considered it necessary to make any decision at this stage. As regards the United Nations, two questions were posed relating to the admission of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to the U.N.:
(a) Was it possible to maintain the important question resolution; and
(b) If such a resolution were likely to be lost what steps should be taken.
It seemed inevitable that there would be a favourable vote for admission of the PRC to the General Assembly with the Permanent Seat in the Security Council this year or, at the latest, next year. Before the General Assembly we should have to consider, in co-operation with our friends:
(a) the prospects for the important question resolution;
(b) what to do if it were lost;
(c) any pre-emptive moves that should be taken.
The overriding consideration seen by Australian Ministers was that under no circumstances should anything be accepted which would deprive the Republic of China of its seat in the United Nations.
4. He was glad to see that President Nixon had recognised this necessity. Of course the situation could change. Only in the last few days there had been signs that the Japanese position had been hardened. However, whether it came this year or next year it seemed inevitable that the PRC would get into the United Nations. We must divorce ideology from the facts of life. Communist China now had an important position in Asia. It had an important position with the less developed countries, and there were some signs that it now wanted to join the international community.
5. Mr McMahon said that he wished to know at first hand what the President and the United States Administration thought about this problem.
6. Australian Ministers wanted to explore all the alternatives. Of the five main possibilities it seemed that the best might be either along the lines of the Zambian formula (admission of PRC without reference to expulsion of the ROC) or a dual succession formula along the lines of a declaratory statement recognising the de facto control of certain territories by both the PRC and the ROC.
7. It was important however that there should be also an amended important question resolution based on Article 18 (2) of the Charter declaring that the expulsion of any member, including the Republic of China with its Government on Taiwan was an important question requiring a two thirds majority.
8. Mr McMahon said that the Japanese had talked about keeping one step, but not two steps, ahead of the United States. Australia might have liked to keep one and a half steps ahead. This had now been overtaken by the President’s statement.
9. Ambassador Brown questioned whether President Nixon had gone so far out ahead. He did not think Mr Nixon had opened the door to both recognition and United Nations membership although he agreed that President Nixon had accepted that the time had come to recognise the realities of life and to be sensible about them. (The Minister interjected that the public media had already interpreted the President’s statement in the way he had mentioned. Ambassador Brown said he hoped not.) If the PRC came into the United Nations it might be an infernal nuisance. But somehow or other, without sacrificing national interest or principle, the United States had to get to a position where they and the other people of the free world would work on a de facto basis with China. As President Nixon had said this was one of the challenges of the decade.
10. Mr Brown agreed that the PRC would get into the United Nations, if not this year next year. The existing procedure could not be continued since the important question resolution would be lost, probably this year. The vote on the Albanian resolution last year would affect attitudes towards the important question resolution if only because many members, including the British as was known, feel that the important question had become just a gimmick.
11. Since the present procedures would not work we had to consider alternative courses of action. The United States did not want the ROC expelled. This would be neither right nor in anybody’s interests. The United States would therefore object to and obstruct expulsion of the ROC. But the time had come when it was inevitable that the PRC would be admitted and we would have to find a strategy which would involve the least chance of the ROC being kicked out. This seemed to be some form of dual representation. It was important however to avoid a situation in which people considered this also to be just a gimmick to buy time. Dual representation would appeal to many countries. The ROC had been a useful member with constructive attitudes and its people did not want to be absorbed by the PRC. The commitment of the United States to the ROC to prevent its being absorbed by force was totally unchanged.
12. Mr Brown stressed that the United States Administration had not yet made up its mind as to the best method of approach. They wanted to get the ideas of Australia and Japan. The latter was anxious to stay in step with the United States and perhaps a little ahead. The United States would not mind this.
13. The Minister suggested that the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of State should exchange their alternative propositions and the analyses of the arguments. Ambassador Brown agreed.
14. Mr Brown said the United Kingdom which had supported the important question resolution out of friendship for the United States was now seeking to warm up its relationship with Peking and if possible to exchange Ambassadors. It was likely to follow its own interest cold bloodedly. It had told the United States it would find it difficult to support an important question resolution any longer or even any dual representation formula which would look like a gimmick to keep the PRC out.
15. As regards the attitude of Chiang Kai Shek, it had to be recognised that if a dual representation resolution was adopted there was a good chance that the ROC would walk out. The United States thought this would be to his disadvantage and would do everything possible to persuade him to stay in the United Nations. It was, after all, quite possible that the PRC would not take its seat in the United Nations for some time.
16. Mr Brown said that there were some signs of flexibility in Taiwan. Talks there and with the ROC Ambassador in Washington indicated that even at the Foreign Minister level the ROC leaders at least did not say: ‘No it’s unthinkable’. However, there was no sign of flexibility in the one man who really counted.
17. Ambassador Brown said some people thought that the United States should not let policy be determined by a reactionary old man on a little island off the coast of Asia.
18. Mr Jenkins said that soundings amongst other delegations in New York, on a very tentative basis, suggested that delegations had not yet decided their position but there was a trend towards some type of dual representation. It would be essential, however, to ‘price out’ the various alternatives. There must be a prospect not only of securing passage of a resolution but also of holding the position in future years. In New York the great majority felt that whatever was done this year must be a genuine attempt to reach a permanent solution and not just a gimmick to buy time.
19. An important factor to be weighed was whether the Security Council seat should go to Peking. ROC leaders had said to the U.S. that it would be ‘difficult’ to swallow losing the Security Council’s seat. Many delegations in New York thought that a resolution which did not give a seat to Peking would be just a gimmick.
20. Ambassador Brown said ROC had mentioned two difficulties:
(1) Any resolution must not negate the ROC claim to be the Government of all China.
(2) It must not give Peking the seat in the Security Council. He commented that first difficulty could be ducked by referring to the de facto situation. The second proviso was more difficult.
21. Mr McMahon said that in the opinion of the Australian Government the resolution must be genuine and avoid the appearance of being a gimmick. The attitude of the Australian Government could be presented on strong moral and presentational grounds. The 14 1/2 million people on Taiwan should not be excluded from the United Nations. They should have the right to determine whether they wanted to be members of the United Nations or not. A resolution would not seem to be genuine unless the PRC became a permanent member of the Security Council. Any other proposition would be merely fantasy. The answer had to be based on reality and what could be done. The Australian Ambassador in Taiwan had spoken to both Chiang Kai Shek and the Foreign Minister.5 ROC Ministers did not want to lose the achievements of 20 years. No response had been made by Chiang other than a benign smile. Sir Keith Holyoake thought that Chiang might be a little flexible but we did not know why he thought this. The Japanese position was important and he had talked to Sato a few months ago. Sato had been looking at the question very carefully.
22. He thought the British Prime Minister Mr Heath would take the same hard, practical approach as he had to the Simonstown Agreement, 6 concerning himself with realities and British interests. Once a common approach had been agreed Australia would be glad to use its influence with the United Kingdom, and wherever else it could.
23. Mr McMahon said that for presentational reasons he preferred to speak of ‘dual succession’ rather than ‘dual representation’. However, it was important to get an amended important question resolution adopted first.
24. Mr McMahon asked whether the United States had given any consideration to the possibility of making some move towards recognition before the General Assembly. If such an effort were rebuffed it might conceivably strengthen the position of the free world in maintaining the ROC’s present position in the United Nations.
25. Mr Brown said the U.S. had not thought of recognition at all. This was not in the President’s mind except as an ultimate step. The possibility of early recognition had not been discussed within the United States Government at all. Recognition of the PRC would under existing circumstances involve de-recognition of the ROC in its most acute form. This was an insuperable obstacle.
26. Sir Keith Waller asked whether the Japanese might not simply adopt a low posture acquiescing in the admittance of Peking to the United Nations and then adopting the attitude that it recognised all United Nations members, without necessarily exchanging Ambassadors.
27. Mr Jenkins said that he thought that the man in the street in Japan did not distinguish between acceptance of Peking into the United Nations and recognition. However, he thought the Japanese Government would take a stiffer attitude. Jenkins wondered what should be done if Chiang Kai Shek were completely obstructive.
28. The Minister said that on the probabilities Chiang would be counting heads. If he found when the time for decision came that the numbers were against him it was possible that he would then be looking for some kind of accommodation. This timing would be unfortunate for all of us.
29. Mr Brown said there was a danger that if a dual representation resolution with proper safeguards for the ROC were put forward and carried, and if the ROC stuck it out in the U.N., the PRC might react by attacking the resolution as a ‘dirty imperialist trick’ and would have no part of it. This might lead to a situation where the PRC would still be outside the United Nations and the ROC still in. The result could be that we would be confronted with a new deadlock involving a direct choice between the two and so favouring the PRC.
30. Mr Brown said his view was that this could happen but that it was not inevitable. A dual representation was a reasonable solution and it might work out. We should not accept the above argument as a compelling argument against going ahead.
31. Mr McMahon said that ‘dual succession’ without a protecting resolution could have the effect of driving the ROC out, but he thought that a dual succession resolution plus the resolution on the important question referring specially to Taiwan provided the best procedure for protecting the ROC. It was true that the PRC might not come in if Taiwan remained in the U.N. In his opinion whilst a growing number of countries wanted the PRC in the United Nations an equally large number would like to protect the position of Taiwan in the Assembly if they could. What we had to establish was a strong moral and philosophical position which could be justified in the eyes of the world. We should take our stand on this position initially even if we had to fight on another position on another day.
32. Mr Brown said that he agreed completely with the Minister’s formulation. Whether it worked or not if we had a reasonable and moral defensible position it should be tried.
UNIVERSALITY
33. Ambassador Rice asked the Minister whether he did not think the idea of universality was a good one to canvass. Mr McMahon said quite sharply that universality was not a principle written into the Charter. It would be preferable to emphasise the principles that were in it. The possibility of a package deal had been thoroughly considered by us but we had come to the conclusions that there were too many difficulties associated with it. There was the problem of West Berlin and of a divided Germany which could not be resolved until a settlement had been reached at Berlin. The Republic of Korea would not favour universality. And there would almost certainly be problems as to who should be recognised as the government of South Vietnam. It was likely that if such a proposal were introduced in the difficult atmosphere in New York it would in all probability so muddy the water that it would be extremely difficult to concentrate on the critical issue and achieve a solution satisfactory to us. Consequently we had not pursued this possibility.
34. Mr Brown said that this was not a principle specifically laid down in the Charter but it had been put forward as a principle which could provide a setting for a dual succession formula. However, universality raised many problems for the West Germans, and for the South Koreans it was a problem of the first magnitude. They regarded themselves as honourable citizens and saw no reasons why they should let those disreputable characters from the North into the United Nations. More fundamentally, if both Koreans were attracted to the U.N. this would perpetuate the division of the country. Similar considerations applied to North and South Vietnam although the latter might see some advantages.
35. In reply to a question by Ambassador Rice about the attitude of the PRC to universality Mr McMahon said he thought that Peking was not likely to be greatly influenced by the desire to get seats for the North Koreans and North Vietnamese. The PRC would not want universality if the price was keeping Taiwan in the United Nations.
36. Mr McMahon stressed again that the political realities in Australia made it essential to support the position of the ROC.
37. Mr Brown said that the U.S. had a deep seated legal and moral obligation to the ROC. If anything was done which seemed to jeopardise their legitimate interests it would be opposed by a large segment of public opinion.
38. Mr Brown repeated in conclusion that the points that he had made were highly tentative and that no decisions had been taken in Washington. Indeed an argument could be made for simply maintaining the present tactics. President Nixon’s primary objective was a detente with Peking to reduce tensions and to open a dialogue. If the U.S. proposed dual representation this would infuriate the Chinese because it would seem to snatch victory from their grasp. On the other hand to maintain the present policy might not worry the Chinese so much as they were used to the Americans putting forward the important question resolution etc. and were now confident that it would not work.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/20, i]
1 McMahon presumably meant to refer to the decision on Submission No. 678 (Document 160).
2 United States Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
3 US Ambassador to Australia.
4 A broad-ranging report to Congress on 25 February. On China, Nixon said, inter alia, that the United States sought ‘to establish a dialogue’ with the PRC, and that it was ‘prepared to see [the PRC] play a constructive role in the family of nations’. In the context of comments on ‘normalisation’, he added: ‘For the United States the development of a relationship with Peking embodies precisely the challenges of this decade: to deal with, and resolve, the vestiges of the post-war period that continue to influence our relationship, and to create a balanced international structure in which all nations will have a stake’. See Current Notes , vol. 42, 1971, pp. 86–8.
5 Wei Tao-ming.
6 Presumably a reference to the British decision to continue to sell arms to South Africa under the Simonstown Agreement of 1955, whereby South Africa would receive armaments from Britain to defend shipping lanes, while the United Kingdom would have access to the Simonstown naval base near Capetown.