Canberra, 9 March 1971
Confidential
China Policy: Representation in the United Nations
Following are comments on the New Zealand arguments set out in paragraphs 4 and 5 of Mr Robertson’s record of 4th March, 1971.3
Broad Objectives
2. In seeking a new approach, Australia started from the following propositions:
(a) it is possible that the I.Q. resolution will not obtain a simple majority at the 26th Session;
(b) in any event the PRC’s admission to the U.N. and to the Security Council seat is inevitable;
(c) the ROC will be expelled unless a new formula is found.
3. Our first objective was to find a formulation that could be acceptable to at least some supporters of the Albanian resolution. We would offer to drop the I.Q. resolution and accept the PRC in the U.N. in return for their support for our own formulation. If we did not obtain their support we would at least gain the support of those countries which wish to see the PRC join the U.N.—but not at the expense of the ROC. We would introduce a package: a resolution which would simply invite the PRC to take its U.N. and Security Council seats, and an amended I.Q. resolution which would not seek a two-thirds majority requirement for the PRC’s entry (but would simply protect the presence in the U.N. of the ROC—which is our sole objective).
Amended I. Q. Formula and the Albanian Resolution
4. The New Zealanders are worried that our amended I.Q. resolution might not be strictly applicable to the Albanian resolution (if tabled) i.e. that the UNGA President (probably Adam Malik)4 might rule that our amended I.Q. resolution merely covered expulsion of members whereas the Albanian resolution called for (a) a change in the representation of China and (b) the expulsion of the ‘representatives of Chiang Kai-shek’ (and not the expulsion of the ROC).
5. In the first place our formulation does not seek to place any hurdle in the way of the PRC’s entry, that is, it is not intended to challenge the first operative paragraph of the Albanian resolution.5 (After all, our substantive resolution gives the China seat in the Security Council to the PRC.)
6. We have purposely avoided the representation issue because—
(a) it would then mean that the entry of the PRC would require a two-thirds majority (and we would be back on the old line); and
(b) it would link the PRC’s entry with the question of the ROC’s continuing membership (and this we have sought strenuously to avoid).
7. The entire emphasis is thus on the expulsion aspect. On this, the New Zealanders have introduced a highly legalistic objection. They have pointed out that the Albanian resolution does not call specifically for the expulsion of the ROC. The drafters of the Albanian resolution have used the words ‘expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek’.6 They could hardly have used the words ‘Republic of China’; in their view there is only one China. The clear intention is however to expel the ROC and on this point there is general agreement by the ROC’s friends and opponents alike (the statements in the China debate bear this out).
The Legal Problem of Two Chinas
8. The New Zealanders have also raised the objection that the ROC could only be a member of the U.N. if it retained the China seat, which our concurrent substantive resolution would allot to the PRC. The substantive resolution would invite the PRC to take its seat (it would not mention the China seat). Moreover the procedural resolution would state that ‘ … the provisions of this resolution relate to all members of the United Nations including the Republic of China whose government is resident in Taipei’. This would ensure that the ROC was recognised as a full member in its own right. The problem of finding places for two Chinas is the age-old problem; that is why we have sought to avoid a head-on confrontation with the issue and have tried instead to blur it. Our implicit two Chinas formula is by no means perfect; but the General Assembly has turned a blind eye to complex legal issues in other cases, and this may be the only way out.
Possible Challenge to Part of Our I. Q. Resolution
9. Concerning the amended I.Q. resolution, the New Zealanders have stated that the opposition would rightly see the second declaratory paragraph of this resolution as the crux of our tactics. (This reads: ‘and decides that the provisions of this resolution relate to all members of the United Nations including the Republic of China whose Government is resident in Taipei’.) The New Zealanders believe that if the opposition, and Peking, concentrated their entire fire and lobbying on that paragraph, or even just on the words ‘including the ROC, whose Government is resident in Taipei’, they would have a fair prospect of securing deletion by either amendment or a separate vote. If this happened the New Zealanders consider that our position would collapse.
10. From the start we have said that we would proceed with the new formulation provided we were sure of majority support derived largely from—
(a) those countries which would like the PRC to join the U.N., but not at the expense of Taiwan (this would include most of the 25 countries which abstained on the Albanian resolution in 1970);
(b) the group of regular supporters of the ROC.
11. If, after intensive lobbying and soundings (which would be essential), we were assured in advance of majority support for our package in its entirety, it is highly unlikely that a separate vote on the latter part of the resolution would succeed. However, if our promises of support evaporated at the time of the vote and the words ‘including the ROC, whose Government is resident in Taipei’ were deleted by a separate vote or amendment, all would not be lost. We would argue that any move to expel the ROC would still require, under the terms of Article 18 of the Charter, a two-thirds majority (although it must be acknowledged that we could not be sure of success).
12. The New Zealanders believe that the downgrading of the ROC’s status and pretentions implicit in the words ‘whose Government is resident in Taipei’ could be regarded as our giving away something for nothing. Our view is that the ROC’s status will be downgraded in any event. Our objective is to salvage a U.N. seat for the ROC and in this exercise only an entirely new—and perhaps audacious—approach has any chance of success.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18, v]
1 M.J. Dan, Acting Head, UN Political Section, Department of Foreign Affairs.
2 J.D. Petherbridge, Assistant Secretary, UN Branch, Department of Foreign Affairs.
3 Robertson and Petherbridge had discussed on a personal basis possible formulae and tactics which might be used in UN discussions on China with members of the New Zealand delegation to the ANZUS talks in Canberra on 4 March. The Australian officers had suggested an amended Important Question resolution declaring that the expulsion of any UN member including the Republic of China with its Government on Taiwan was an important question requiring a two-thirds majority together with a resolution along Zambian lines of a dual succession formula. The New Zealand officers doubted whether these proposed tactics would be successful.
4 Adam Malik, Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs and President of the UN General Assembly.
5 The first operative paragraph of the Albanian resolution read: ‘to restore all its rights to the People’s Republic of China and to recognize the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations’.
6 The second operative paragraph of the resolution read in full: ‘to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all organizations affiliated to it’.