Taipei, 10 March 1971
170. Secret Priority
China Policy
Your 202 (Para 1).1
Winthrop Brown leaves on 10 March, one day earlier than planned. Discussions with Japanese will be on 11 and 12 March. Reason for shortening visit appears to be paucity of value in discussions with ROC.
2. On evening of 9 March, Brown told me he had had one private meeting with Vice-Minister Yang,2 and one group meeting with Yang, Chien (Director of North American Affairs Bureau), Che and Fang (Director and Deputy-Director of International Organizations Bureau) and some junior analysts. No other major talks were apparently scheduled before his departure. U.S. cables have been repeated to Canberra, where Rice had undertaken to keep the Prime Minister informed of developments.
3. Brown obviously had found the group discussion unfruitful. He had pointed out the unlikelihood of the IQ resolution passing again and stressed the need for a new approach, making it clear that the U.S. had made no decisions and that these talks were a part of the process of consultations which the U.S. had promised the ROC. He had mentioned current adverse trends, the possibility of there being a ‘landslide’ against the ROC if, as seemed likely, the UK joined Canada and Italy in opposing past tactics, and the fact that there would be little support for new ‘gimmicks’ at this stage. He asked the ROC for its ideas, and left the way open for it to make later suggestions after these talks. In these talks he had mentioned the possibility of a ‘third’ (dual representation) resolution, without referring to the Security Council seat, but had ‘got nowhere’.
4. Chinese officials in group meetings had taken the stock line that IQ resolution could win majority again this year, if the U.S. (underline one) worked hard enough for it. Countries which had long voted that the question was important should not in logic now say it was not. (Brown had commented that the logic of this view was impeccable but the politics were not.) The Chinese had pointed to the reasonable majority which had existed for the IQ resolution last year and to the Albanian resolution having had a majority of only two (Jenkins had responded that the swing last year had been seven votes), and that the ROC had recovered from the 1965 tide vote (Jenkins had referred to the alienation of international support for the PRC during the cultural revolution). At the time we spoke Jenkins and Feldham3 were having another session estimating likely voting with Foreign Ministry officials. Brown did not expect them to be sufficiently persuaded to express views other than those they had at the meeting (no matter what they privately thought).
5. Brown’s private talk with Yang had gone better. Brown and McConaughy stressed that Yang’s confidence should be respected and that he should be protected absolutely. (Underline one). Yang had made it clear that he personally agreed with much of Brown’s assessment of the prospects. He had indicated that a stock line would be taken at the group meeting but that he personally would do what he could. Brown obviously did not give me full details of this talk, but one phrase strongly suggested that he had touched on the possible necessity for the Security Council seat being offered to the PRC if a new approach were to seem genuine.
6. Brown said he had not of course spoken of the Australian views he had heard in Canberra. However, bearing in mind the emphasis we had placed on not seeing the ROC expelled, he hoped we would not mind his having said that ‘the ROC had good friends in Australia’. He had also obviously implied that we shared the U.S. assessment of the prospects for the IQ resolution.
7. Brown’s present inclination was to recommend, after consultations with the Japanese, that tactics based on the discussions in Canberra be adopted, and that preliminary drafting of possible resolutions begin quite soon. He had in mind a dual succession resolution and some resolution concerning continuing membership for the ROC. (It was not clear whether he was thinking of an amended IQ resolution or a declaratory resolution.) He appreciated that once we began on one course we would have to stick to it, but thought it important to start selling the idea fairly early rather than spend too much time on sounding. We would be in a good defensible moral position whatever happened.
8. I asked what Brown had in mind in regard to U.S. approaches to or persuasion of President Chiang. He thought a head of state to head of state message would eventually be called for, but did not expect Chiang to give ground early.
9. I asked what would happen if both the ROC and PRC opposed some dual representation formula. Would it not be difficult for the U.S. to work very actively for a proposal which would give the Security Council seat to the PRC? Brown said that in those circumstances the resolution might well be defeated, but we would still be in a completely defensible position. He agreed that it would be best if the ROC could accept the situation at least tacitly. I said that, if it were to accept it, presentation here and its wording would be very important. With an eye to what might realistically be possible here, it could be valuable, if there were time, to let the ROC get used to the position of dual representation before having to face up to the loss of the Security Council seat also. Brown and McConaughy said that others were unlikely to be kind enough to ignore the problem of the Security Council seat even if we sought to do so. The question would be raised by Peking’s supporters if no-one else, and had to be faced.
10. Comment (underline one): ROC stonewalling in group discussion was to be expected. Possible tacit acquiescence in heretical tactics is too delicate a matter here for anyone other than very senior officials yet to have word of. At the same time it is hard, though not impossible, to believe that fairly widespread indications of such possible acquiescence (by Wei,4 Yang and Shen5 to me, and ROC Ambassadors to U.S.6 and UN7 to Americans) would have been given without some sort of clearance from President Chiang.
11. If you agree that ROC’s tacit acquiescence is desirable (if not essential to win sufficient votes, see para 9 above), I suggest we need to put official views fairly soon to the ROC at ministerial level (and of course to Foreign Affairs ViceMinisters) so as to build up, over a period, a wider body of opinion conditioned to accept change in tactics if necessary. Soon after Brown’s talks in Tokyo, you might for example authorise me to call on Wei and see Yang and Shen again, and to speak as opportunity offers to other Ministers, including Chiang C[h]ing-Kuo (who gives me the impression that he wants to talk, or at least to listen).
12. I have in mind that the points in Para 1 of your AP.32,8 (if not those in your 202), should be put to the ROC as official Australian view. (From my talks to date, ROC may affect to believe that such points are my personal opinions.) You will also no doubt consider whether, if trade talks are held here, a Minister will visit Taipei and if so, whether he should see President Chiang and convey a written or oral message on the subject. Timing of such a visit would presumably depend on later decisions about UN tactics.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18, vi]
1 3 March. It requested information from Dunn on Winthrop Brown’s talks with the Government of the Republic of China in Taipei.
2 Yang His-kun, ROC Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs.
3 Presumably a reference to Harvey J. Feldman, Officer-in-Charge, Dependent Areas, Office of United Nations Political and SecurityAffairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, US State Department.
4 Wei Tao-ming.
5 James C.H. Shen, ROC Vice Foreign Minister.
6 Chow Shu-kai.
7 Liu Chieh.
8 3 March. It advised all diplomatic posts that ministerial consideration of China policy was still in progress, that no decisions had been made, and that three considerations were seen as basic to further consideration. The first was a recognition that an Important Question resolution was unlikely to succeed for much longer. The second was that ‘every effort must be made to preserve the interests of Taiwan as a separate entity and as a United Nations member as long as the ROC desires’. The third was that ‘any alternative formula which might be forthcoming from our side would have to be presented as a genuine attempt to solve the problem and not appear as a gimmick’.