Washington, 17 March 1971
1407. Secret
China Policy
On 17 March, Winthrop Brown called in the New Zealanders and ourselves to outline results of his discussions in Taipei and Tokyo. Feldman was also present. Brown’s summary did not differ in substance from reports already forwarded by our embassies in Taipei and Tokyo.
2. Brown said he had been surprised by open-minded attitude displayed by officials in Taipei. They had not disagreed with United States assessment of facts of case and voting prospects. Brown said he had the impression that most senior GRC figures had been well briefed on issue. Vice Minister Yang in particular had given impression that, if matter were left to officials, some kind of dual representation formula, which avoided issue of extent of authority of respective governments, would be acceptable.
3. There had been no indication of Chiang’s own attitude. It was probably reflected by well-worn view, put to Brown in Taipei, that IQ resolution was not necessarily lost, if only U.S. and Japan, with their friends, would work hard enough on it. Brown said he had responded that
(a) He did not agree with arithmetic and
(b) View was based on unrealistic assessment of United States capabilities.
He had argued that U.N. member countries were tending increasingly to divide on basis of their own interests, and that to rely any longer on IQ resolution was extremely risky. Even if line were held by a vote or two this year, this would only reduce possibility of advantageous manoeuvring later. Brown said that he had been candid with officials on Security Council issue. He had stated that as a matter of commonsense, and a ‘fact of life’, GRC could not expect to hold on to permanent seat. Officials had not contradicted him. Brown said he had told Chinese officials that, on his return to Washington, he would be recommending change of policy. They had not appeared unduly perturbed.
4. Brown stressed delicacy with which GRC and specifically Chiang needed to be handled. It was quite likely that Chiang would not make up his mind till last minute and it would be unfortunate if he were driven to dig in his heels too soon. Brown had therefore adopted low key approach, based on desire to ascertain thinking at official level. Brown said that he had emphasised strongly support for ROC expressed by Australia and New Zealand and that this had been well received. He believed proposed Australian approach in Taiwan (which we outlined to him) including possible conversations by a Minister visiting Taiwan for food talks would be ‘ideal’.
5. Brown said that Japanese had also agreed with United States assessment of facts of case and that dual Representation approach seemed most promising. However, they gave strong impression that what they would really like most of all was stalemate in which nothing happened in 1971. Brown and Feldman believed—and indeed Japanese had virtually admitted—that this was because of conservative inhibitions imposed on Japanese actions by Sato. His departure from office around June 1972, would render matter much easier to handle. They were therefore inclined to hanker after one more effort to hold IQ resolution though they also realised that failure of an IQ resolution still supported by Japan would be likely to bring down Government. No doubt for reasons of domestic politics, they had displayed extreme anxiety that nature of Brown’s talks should not become public knowledge.
6. Brown said that his own assessment was that Japanese now preferred to keep a pace behind United States on issue. However, if United States decision was made to change existing policies, they would no doubt follow. At that point, Japanese could help considerably by sending figure like Kishi1 to talk directly to Chiang.
7. Turning to other considerations, Brown expressed view that British position on IQ resolution posed considerable problem. British believed that there was now a real possibility of improving their relations with PRC, including exchange of Ambassadors. However, they feared that their prospects would be inhibited unless they opposed IQ resolution. To United States officials, the British had expressed skepticism on dual representation formula, because, Brown suspected, they believed it to be a gimmick. He had nonetheless proposed to Secretary Rogers that an approach be made to them, along the lines that United States was concerned to preserve GRC participation in United Nations while opening door to PRC participation on reasonable terms. Decision as to whether approach should be made had not yet been taken.
8. Brown confirmed account of United States intentions contained in our memorandum 470 of 5 March.2 He regarded it as important to move ahead as soon as possible, and hoped that clearance would be obtained within about two weeks to enable him to widen consultations to include some other countries, including Belgium. If it proved worthwhile to explore issue in depth with Belgians he believed that it would be best to do so in Brussels, where their only real expert on issue was located.
9. Brown expressed hope that a change of policy would receive good public support in United States, though there would no doubt be some ‘kickbacks’ (however, we have heard less optimistic assessments elsewhere in State Department).
10. Every effort would be made to talk to Congressmen and other relevant public figures.
11. Immediate problem was to damp down official public comment until decision on United States policy had been taken.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18, v]
1 Kishi Nobusuke, Japanese Prime Minister, 1957–60.
2 It reported that US intentions were to ’sieve out from the possible alternative courses those which appeared least attractive, and then to take up the more promising with a range of other countries, such as Belgium, whose position the State Department would be watching with particular interest’.