Canberra, 7 June 1950
Secret
The High Commissioner for Canada presents his compliments to the Minister for External Affairs and, with reference to the Minister’s telegram No. 18 of May 25,2 has the honour to transmit below the text of a reply to the Minister from the Secretary of State for External Affairs:
‘Thank you for your telegram No. 75 (sic) of May 25 concerning recognition of the Peking regime. We decided not to move as early as suggested in my message of February 24,3 transmitted to you by Mr. Forde.4 Nevertheless, we are still of the opinion that recognition will have to be accorded before long and we are giving careful thought to the question of timing.
2. Since my last message to you on this subject, we have been considering two additional factors:
(i) the easy capture of Hainan and abandonment of the Chusan Island by Nationalists seems to confirm intelligence reports that Formosa may be expected to fall soon, making the Nationalist Government a “government in exile” if it remains a coherent entity. The Peking Government would then presumably be more difficult to deal with.
(ii) the situation in the United Nations has deteriorated as a result of the deadlock over Chinese representation and the subsequent Soviet withdrawal. It would be most desirable if a solution could be achieved before the General Assembly meets in September’.
The High Commissioner for Canada takes this occasion to reiterate to the Minister for External Affairs assurances of his highest consideration.
[NAA: A1838, 494/2/10, iv]
WAR ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA
The Korean War began on 25 June 1950 when the communist forces of the northern Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) crossed the 38th parallel, invading territory in the south controlled by the Western–aligned Republic of Korea (ROK). A subsequent UN Security Council resolution, made possible by the absence of the Soviet delegate, who was protesting the PRC’s exclusion from the world organisation, provided for what was in effect an Allied military response to the DPRK under the auspices of the United Nations. Meanwhile, President Truman associated the issue of Taiwan with Korea by stating that the situation in Korea meant that ‘the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area’.1 He had therefore ordered the US Seventh Fleet to prevent an attack on Formosa, while also asking that it be used to ensure the compliance of the Nationalists with a request to cease air and sea operations against the mainland.
1 Major General Léo Richer LaFlèche, Canadian High Commissioner in Australia.
2 Document 16.
3 Apparently, that summarised in Document 14.
4 F.M. Forde, Australian High Commissioner in Canada.
1 See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, vol. VII, pp. 202—3.