Canberra, 21 April 1971
Secret
China Policy—Recent Developments
This submission supplements and brings up-to-date material in your Cabinet Submission of 15 April2 on China Policy. In addition to recent domestic developments, such as the Prime Minister’s statements on China policy to the National Press Club and in the House,3 and the current visit to China by an Australian table tennis team, recent international developments give added weight to the recommendations made in that submission and in Mr McMahon’s previous submission of 9 February.4
International Developments
2. Peking has continued to make progress in securing wider international recognition, thereby enhancing its prospects for admission to the UN. The continuing movement in Peking’s favour is reflected in changes in our UN Branch’s technical assessment of possible voting in the General Assembly on a formulation which would seek to retain UN membership for the ROC while seating the PRC. At the end of March, the Branch assessed that such a formulation would be adopted, in the best case, by a vote of 72 in favour, 48 against and 7 abstentions; if foreseeable waverers defected, the vote would be 65 in favour, 50 against and 12 abstentions. More recent developments (including the recognition of the PRC by Cameroon and Kuwait and uncertainty about the positions of Bolivia, Peru, Turkey, Austria, Netherlands, Greece, Sierra Leone and Lebanon) have already led the more optimistic assessment to be revised downwards to 70 in favour, 50 against and 7 abstentions, and the more pessimistic to 57 in favour, 51 against and 19 abstentions.
3. As pointed out in paragraph 16 of your Cabinet Submission, it is very likely that new political pressures will lead to further erosion of this voting position. For instance, the position of Iran, taken as a firm supporter in both calculations, has also become rather uncertain. The Shah’s sister is visiting China, and he has said that Iran is studying the recognition of Communist China as it does all international problems. However, the Iranian Foreign Ministry has since stated that the rights of Taiwan must also be considered. There have been reports that Austria has now begun negotiating with the PRC on recognition.5
Position of our Closest Associates
4. There has been no significant development in New Zealand’s position. With regard, however, to Japan and the United States, recent events tend to confirm the impression (conveyed in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of your Cabinet Submission) that both Governments are moving very cautiously on the UN representation issue, striving to preserve the maximum scope for manoeuvre. The Japanese position may not become fully clear for some time. Although Japan seems lately to have moved more firmly in support of Taiwan, it is apparently rather skeptical about the prospects of success for new formulations based on dual representation. There are strong and vocal pressures in Japan for movement towards accommodation with Peking, and while the Government has given every indication of keeping these under control, the movement in the PRC’s favour internationally and recent developments in Sino-US relations will make this course harder to sustain.
5. The two major developments in Sino-US relations have been the visit to China by the US table tennis team and accompanying journalists, and President Nixon’s announcement on 14 April of further relaxation of restrictions on trade and travel. The visits of the US sportsmen and journalists were the first of their kind since the establishment of the PRC in 1949. The Chinese gave the visitors a warm welcome, and Chou En-lai declared that the visit ‘opened a new page’ in relations between the Chinese and American peoples.
6. It would be more accurate to describe the visits as ‘a new page’ in Chinese tactics. US officials have noted that there has been no manifestation of a Chinese desire to make contact with the US Government and specifically no hint of readiness to resume discussions between the two Embassies in Warsaw. The US has assessed that the new Chinese tactics are designed to win support for the PRC’s position in the US, to exacerbate the already tense relations between Taipei and Washington, and to improve its prospects for admission to the UN. The Chinese may also hope that waverers on the UN representation issue will be studying developments in Sino-US relations and be led to believe that the US commitment to Taiwan’s position in the UN is weakening.
7. After President Nixon’s announcement of 14 April, the State Department advised us that it considered there was unlikely to be any further significant US ‘liberalisation’ for some time ahead. On 16 April, the President told the American Society of Newspaper editors that the long-range goal of the Administration was the normalisation of relations with Peking and the ending of the PRC’s isolation from the world community. At the same time, he said that it would be premature to talk now about recognition or admission to the UN. He hoped that he and his daughters could visit China at some time, but he was not sure that this was going to happen while he was in office. The US wished to proceed in the fields of exchange of persons and trade. This would open the way for other moves that would be made at an appropriate time.
8. Our Embassy in Washington has advised that President Nixon has not yet taken a decision on the choice of tactics for the preservation of Taiwan’s position in the UN (paragraph 11 of the Cabinet Submission). The State Department has told us that there will be further consultations with friendly countries on tactics after the President’s decision is taken. There seems no doubt that the US will continue to seek to support Taiwan’s position. Nevertheless, the prolonged delay in reaching decisions on tactics and the failure to launch further consultations since Ambassador Winthrop Brown’s return to the United States in early March have had damaging consequences. There seems to have been little attempt to exert serious pressure on countries wavering in their support of Taiwan, and every week has seen some further erosion. The continuing lack of a clear lead from the senior levels of the Administration could even be interpreted as indicating that the US may not be prepared to go so far in supporting the ROC as to risk—in the event of failure—weakening its influence in the UN, or prejudicing its future dealings with the People’s Republic of China.
Australian Interest
9. Given the rigidity of the PRC’s opposition to any dual representation or two Chinas approach and the unlikelihood that they will now compromise (paragraph 16 of the Cabinet Submission), it is suggested that our main concerns in this issue are:
(i) to act in concert, so far as possible, with our main security ally, the US, and with friendly countries such as New Zealand and Japan;
(ii) not to appear to be abandoning the ROC, although our real interests there are relatively small;
(iii) at the same time to minimise, both domestically and internationally, the effect on our standing of probable diplomatic defeat on the China representation issue within the next few years; and
(iv) most importantly, to minimise the risks of jeopardizing our long-term interest in achieving on acceptable terms an accommodation with the PRC.
Recommendation
10. In view of these considerations, we recommend that in future public statements by Ministers emphasis should be given to the positive aspects of our Cabinet submissions of 9 February and 15 April. We consider that, while we should continue to consult with the US, Japan and New Zealand (and other friendly countries as necessary) on the best means of seeking to preserve the ROC’s position in the UN, we should avoid too prominent a role in support of the ROC.
11. As regards the more positive aspects of policy, we recommend in particular that:—
(i) an early opportunity should be taken to make known publicly the Government’s long-term interest in normalisation of bilateral relations with the PRC, without prejudice to a peaceful resolution of the problems between the PRC and ROC.
(ii) In public reference to the PRC, Australia should
(a) make a practice of referring to it as the People’s Republic of China (this has already been done on occasion),
(b) cease hostile references to the PRC, but, in line with our policy towards the USSR, criticize frankly specific major actions which affect us,
(c) avoid excessively warm references to the ROC, or references or activities that suggest a close relationship,
(d) stress Australia’s readiness to welcome the PRC back into the international community in accordance with the terms of the UN Charter,
(e) underline Taiwan’s evident desire for a separate status and the responsible role it has played in the international community.
H.D. Anderson
First Assistant Secretary
Asia Division
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38118, viii]
1 Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.
2 See footnote 1, Document 172.
3 Speaking to the National Press Club in mid-April, McMahon had said that Australia no longer sought to oppose international recognition of Peking but that it required three conditions to be met if the Government were to recognise: China should disavow the achievement of political objectives by force of arms; it should stop insurgency and subversive activities in neighbouring countries; and it should allow these countries to determine their own futures. On the United Nations, the Prime Minister stated that retention of a seat for the ROC was the ‘paramount goal’ and that Australia would continue to help Taiwan for as long as such assistance was desired. McMahon also asserted that while Australia wanted to cooperate with the United States on China policy, he ‘in no circumstances’ believed that this should be dictated by US actions or desires. In parliament, McMahon made a number of statements on China from, 21–22 April. Among various remarks, he said that Australia was, like the United States, not prepared to move quickly on the question of recognition and admission of the PRC to the United Nations—and he placed particular emphasis on the need to protect the interests of Taiwan.
4 McMahon’s submission is Document 157.
5 One sentence has been expunged here.