Canberra, 8 May 1971
2168. Secret Eclipse Priority
China Policy
Paragraph 2 of Washington’s telegram 2445 1 has reinforced our growing doubts about US intentions on the UN representation issue. Hitherto, consistent State Department advice has supported the belief that, however laboriously, the US Administration has been working towards decisions about a new UN approach which would preserve a seat for Taiwan at the same time as admitting the PRC (i.e. some form of dual representation). Albeit with an increasing degree of qualification, this has been the burden of our advice to Ministers.
2. In addition to Holdridge’s obscure remarks about seeking a ‘one China’ solution which did not exclude Taiwan, there are four main pointers:—
(a) Winthrop Brown’s observation to Mr McMahon (para 39 of the record)2 that in terms of USIPRC relations a case could be made for simply maintaining the present tactics.
(b) The State Department’s prolonged delay in convening the proposed quadrilateral ‘expert’ talks on UN tactics. The last estimate we seem to have about when they might convene was mid-April. We note from Tokyo telegram 817 that the US Embassy there has been without new instructions on representation question for seven weeks.
(c) The Secretary of State’s vagueness when discussing UN tactics with the Minister, including his reversion to the ‘universality’ approach, in which we had understood the Americans to see nearly as many difficulties as we do.
(d) The apparent failure of the United States to take steps to prevent further erosion of potential support for a DR approach by exercising pressure on countries plainly moving towards recognition of Peking.3
3. Grateful your comments on the following tentative Departmental conclusions:—
(a) Notwithstanding the thrust of all official-level advice to us, there are increasing grounds for suspecting that the Administration is in process of deciding against taking any serious steps in support of a new UN approach. Although there is as yet no evidence, they could have in mind presenting for form’s sake the old or an amended IQ resolution and, although voting against the Albanian resolution, seeing the latter adopted with relative equanimity.
(b) It is at least doubtful whether we can expect the United States to engage in effective consultation with us on the UN representation issue.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18, ix]
1 6 May. It reported a comment by J.D. Holdridge, member of the US National Security Council Operations Staff/East Asia, that Nixonwas considering ’several’ options regarding the Chinese representation issue, although these did not include a dual succession arrangement; this, Holdridge said, had been eliminated on the grounds that successor states were by nature new entities as compared to the original state. Instead, a ‘one China’ solution was needed; one which did not exclude Taiwan. Holdridge refused to elaborate his remark further and the Embassy in Washington was ‘unable to say with any certainty’ what he meant.
2 Paragraph 38 of attachment to Document 161.
3 One sentence has been expunged here.