Washington, 10 May 1971
2508. Secret Eclipse Priority
China Policy
Your telegram 2168.1
United States policy towards Chinese recognition and seating in the United Nations is being considered by President Nixon personally and no one knows what decision he will take. Kissinger and his staff and also officers in the State Department are continuing to mull over various aspects but no one can really say how Mr. Nixon is going to decide. On the evolution of American thinking below the President himself, Australia is I believe better informed than any other country.
2. We know, as I have reported earlier, that before taking any new position on the Chinese question the President wants to be quite sure that he will be able to follow through and will not have to retreat under domestic or other pressure. During the past month or so some of the public statements by him and by the Secretary of State and others have constituted a preparation of domestic and public opinion and is providing him some guide as to how far the Administration can go. The American public is being made accustomed to the idea of a new American relationship with Peking and of various possibilities including dual representation. The public discussion here has had the further consequence of opening the way to discussion inside Taiwan of a hitherto forbidden topic. This will make it more practicable though still difficult for other governments to canvas dual representation with the Government of the Republic of China.
3. The President may be delaying a decision simply because he cannot make up his mind what to do. On the other hand he may be wanting to see what is going to happen in the next few weeks in Taiwan particularly but also in other countries that could affect the chances of a new approach being successful. He may even be trying to assess what receptivity might exist in Peking itself, remote as it might seem, for an outcome that would open the way to improved Chinese/ American relations that might be seen by Peking to be in its own interests. No doubt the United States will be taking advantage of any possibilities that arise for third parties to put out or respond to feelers.
4. The Secretary of State, when he saw Mr. Bury two weeks ago, was pursuing the idea of universality.2 This is an approach which despite its difficulties has more attractions for me than for you in Canberra, not because there is any legal obligation under the Charter but for international political reasons. Even if Chinese representation is not pursued under this cover (and it may well be too late for that) I believe that we have strong reason to try to seat at least West Germany and South Korea in the United Nations as soon as possible because though the Soviet Union would probably agree to both Germanies and both Koreas being seated we cannot be sure that Peking would agree. Once Peking has taken a seat in the Security Council it might well veto any subsequent application for membership from Bonn or Seoul.
I have not, however, expressed that view to the Americans because of your opposition to the idea of universality (see for example Mr. McMahon’s sharp reaction to Winthrop Brown reported in paragraph 33 of the record of conversation of 26 February).3 See also my telegram No. 4443 of 31 July 19704 and subsequent telegrams and also Sir Laurence Mcintyre’s Savingram 42 of 1 December 1970.5
It might be feasible to talk to the Government of the Republic of Korea after the forthcoming elections for the legislature there. The recommendations of Cabot Lodge’s Committee6 would provide a jumping off board.
5. The answers to the specific questions in your paragraph 3 are—
(a) It would be misleading to say that the United States Administration is moving in the direction you state because the Administration consists of so many separate sections and on this question it is at present, before the President has made his decision, difficult to ascribe any view or any trend to the Administration as such. But the President himself might well act to produce the result you mention either by decision or by failure to take a decision. It is not possible for anyone to make a confident prediction.
(b) The United States would say it has already been engaging in effective consultation with Australia on the United Nations representation issue for example through the Embassy here and through Winthrop Brown’s visit to Canberra.
Plimsoll.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18, ix]
1 Document 177.
2 Cablegram 2163 (22 April) reported Bury’s discussions with Rogers on the morning of 22 April. Rogers indicated a preference for an approach in the United Nations based on the desirability of universality of UN membership. Bury objected that such an approach would be opposed by West Germany, South Korea and South Vietnam.
3 McMahon had, in fact, reacted to a query from Ambassador Rice. See paragraph 33 of attachment to Document 161.
4 Plimsoll argued that ‘the best outcome in Korea for the foreseeable future would be the recognition of both South and North Korea as separate independent states and the simultaneous admission of each of them to the United Nations’.
5 McIntyre suggested a ‘package deal’ with Peking’s supporters whereby all the divided countries could be admitted simultaneously. He indicated that he had broached the idea with the United Kingdom and ‘two or three’ other countries, none of which had offered objections.
6 On 9 July 1970, Nixon established by executive order the President’s Commission for the Observance of the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the United Nations. Chaired by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., a Republican politician and former diplomat, the Commission was charged with proposing initiatives that would be of primary importance to the effectiveness of both the United Nations and the US role within the Organization. In April 1971, the Commission submitted a report to the White House which contained almost 100 recommendations.