Canberra, 13 May 1971
2256. Secret Priority
For Ambassador
China Policy
Please take earliest opportunity to transmit the following self-explanatory message from the Prime Minister to President Nixon:
Begins:—
Dear Mr President,
In continuation of the valuable consultations we have had with your Administration about the problems we both face in respect of China, my Ministers and I are anxious to know your feelings about the recent trend of events.
In February, we had very useful discussions with Ambassador Winthrop Brown about the problem as it then presented itself, giving particular attention to the United Nations aspects. Discussion of various possible United Nations moves was followed up in detail by officials.1 Later, I arranged for our Embassy in Washington to convey to Dr Kissinger a preliminary analysis of the Chinese representation question which had been prepared by our Department of Foreign Affairs.2
In more recent weeks, a number of things have occurred, which have led us to wonder whether time is not running against the courses we then discussed. First, you will no doubt be aware that the China question has become a matter of urgent public debate in this country. This has been in part a reaction to Peking’s recent exercises in person-to-person diplomacy. Additional popular feeling has been generated by the PRC’s failure so far to purchase any Australian wheat this year. The Chinese have let it be known that they have two reasons: they have had a series of good harvests and their need for grain imports has declined. And they have told various people including journalists that their decision was also a political one, in that they prefer to trade with countries with whom their political relations are satisfactory. Most recently, as a result of a telegram sent to Chou En-lai by the Australian Labor Party, the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs has invited the ALP to send a delegation to China to discuss problems of diplomatic relations.
At the same time, there has been a rather strong movement against Taiwan’s interests on the United Nations front. Since the Canadian decision to establish diplomatic relations with Peking last October, seven other countries have recognized the PRC. At least two more have opened talks to this end, and others appear to be inclining that way. It seems to us that if an attractive alternative to the Albanian resolution is not soon floated, the question of maintaining a place for Taiwan in the United Nations will go by default.
I can summarise our attitude very simply as follows. First, we accept that the admission of the PRC to the United Nations, either this year or next, is a virtual certainty. It seems to us axiomatic that it will succeed to the Security Council seat now held by the Republic of China. Any alternative approach seeking to avoid this will be regarded as an unrealistic device by those whose support will be vital, and will fail. Secondly, we have attached considerable importance to the protection of the rights of Taiwan, including its rights to representation in the United Nations if it so wishes. Thirdly, we acknowledge that a range of questions require the co-operation of the PRC if settlements are to be achieved, and we have as our long-term goal the normalization of relations with Peking. To this end, we have made some gestures towards Peking and are indicating our readiness to make more. On 11 May, I announced that we had decided to explore the possibilities of establishing a dialogue with the Chinese People’s Government. 3
I appreciate the difficulties and heavy responsibility you face in reaching a decision on the courses of action to be taken on the China problem. For our part, however, the passage of time is creating increasing problems in reconciling the second and third points above. An indication of your present thinking would be of the greatest value.
Ends.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18, x]
- 1 See Document 161 and attachment.
- 2 See Document 170.
- 3 McMahon spoke along similar lines to the draft prepared by Foreign Affairs (see footnote 2, Document 180), though the tenor of his statement, in omitting reference to Communist propaganda and doubts about China’s sincerity, was more positive toward the PRC. At the same time, the Prime Minister included the remark that China’s support for subversion and insurgency had been an obstacle to the establishment of formal relations and added that for this reason negotiations with Peking would proceed on a quid pro quo basis. McMahon substituted reference to trade for a comment that there were no restrictions, subject to security requirements, on Australians wishing to visit the PRC. See Current Notes , vol. 42, 1971, p. 269.