Canberra, 20 May 1971
Secret
Initiation of Dialogue with People’s Republic of China
Attached for your consideration is a draft telegram to the Australian Ambassador to France instructing him to approach the PRC Embassy in Paris with a view to initiating a dialogue. 1 In drafting this message we have had the following considerations in mind.
Timing
2. It is nine days since the Prime Minister announced that the Government would study the possibilities of opening a dialogue with Peking. There has so far been no Chinese reaction by way of comment in the Chinese press and radio. It would be desirable, however, to give the Chinese a reasonably early indication that we are serious in wanting to establish a dialogue. If there were no follow up contact within the first few weeks of the announcement, they might draw the wrong conclusions and accuse the Australian Government of ‘insincerity’.
Proposed Method of Approach
3. Most Governments seeking to approach the Chinese have acted through their Embassies in third countries where the PRC is also represented. This enables contact to be made discreetly and without publicity. In the recent case of Peru, progress has been made towards normalization through visits to Peru or to Peruvians in Hong Kong by Chinese trade officials and through the subsequent despatch of a Peruvian trade delegation to China. In our case, however, the Chinese have emphasized to visiting Australian journalists that they prefer to buy [wheat] from ‘friendly’ countries like Canada and it is unlikely that they would be receptive to approaches at the commercial level.2 (It is now two weeks since our Trade Commissioner in Hong Kong applied for a visa for the Mainland and there has been no reaction yet.) An approach through diplomatic channels would be more likely to elicit a Chinese response.
Proposed Venue
4. Paris combines—as no other likely site does—the advantages of size (contact can be made and maintained inconspicuously), good communications, freedom from possible political complications, an Ambassador whose experience and ability would make him a good negotiator and enough staff and resources to cope with the additional workload. The French authorities would inevitably come to know of the contact but we could expect them to be discreet and helpful if we informed them of our intentions in general terms.
Substance of Approach
5. The Canadian experience shows that the Chinese are very unlikely to respond to an approach confined to proposals for the discussion of questions like trade, travel and cultural exchanges. The Chinese made it plain to the Canadians that they were interested only in discussing recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations. We are not yet in a position to discuss these matters, or to discuss them in terms and from a stand-point acceptable to the Chinese. But if we are to avoid a rebuff at the outset, we should make it clear to the Chinese that our ultimate objective in seeking a dialogue is, as the Prime Minister has announced, to establish normal bilateral relations with them, working step-by-step to that end. We could then present our immediate interest in discussing questions of trade, travel, the welfare of Australian citizens, cultural relations and similar matters as directed towards the progressive normalization of relations.
Prospects
6. It is quite possible that the Chinese, who now have a much stronger position than when they negotiated with the Canadians, will reject even this relatively forthcoming approach. It took the Canadians 20 months to negotiate their agreement on recognition and diplomatic relations, and at one stage the Chinese allowed six months to elapse between meetings. It nevertheless seems important that we take early action to seek contact on the basis proposed, which we believe is the most promising course open to us in present circumstances. At the least we will have demonstrated—in advance of Peking’s admission to the United Nations—a desire for normal bilateral relations.
Future Action
7. Although the pace in Paris is likely to be very slow, we shall need to prepare briefing papers on the various subjects we hope to raise with the Chinese. The most substantial of these is of course trade and we propose to take this up very shortly with the Department of Trade and Industry. Proposals which might be put to the Chinese under this head include an exchange of trade delegations and the possible opening of a permanent trade office in China.
Although the Chinese would probably turn down a proposal for an Australian trade office on the ground that recognition and diplomatic relations must come first, a proposal of this kind would underline our interest in moving towards recognition on a step-by-step basis.
8. Extra copies of this submission and the attached draft telegram are enclosed in case you wish to discuss them with the Prime Minister. 3
Keith Waller
Secretary
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18/2]
1 See footnote 2, Document 185.
2 Although formally addressed to Bury, the submission was annotated ‘Prime Minister to see’. In a marginal note on this and the next two sentences, McMahon commented that ‘This does not square with the facts. Sales through the Canton trade fair [count?]’.
3 In relation to paragraph 8, McMahon wrote that ‘we must not forget our attitude to Taiwan and the U.N. this year ’, and he asked whether Australia’s ‘attitude to Taiwan and the Mainland’ should be mentioned in the cablegram.