Paris, 27 May 1971
2486. Secret Priority
Dialogue No 31
I saw the P.R.C. Ambassador2 27th May. The only others present were the Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy, who, apart from listening intently, did no more than applaud his Ambassador, and an interpreter who the Ambassador had note everything I said.
2. I began by asking that the fact that these conversations were going on in Paris and their substance should be kept secret. The Ambassador agreed.
3. I then said:—
(a) The long-term objective of the Australian Government was to normalize relations with the Government of the P.R. C.
(b) In order to work towards the progressive normalization of relations, Australia wanted to open conversations in Paris beginning with some matters of mutual interest etc. (As in your telegram 2354).3
(c) Australia and the P.R.C. had had a substantial trading relation for a number of years. Australia was happy for this to continue and wanted to see it expand in both directions.
(d) Examples of other matters which could usefully be discussed were cultural and sporting exchanges and the presence of Australian nationals in the P.R.C.
(e) The Australian Government had for some time looked forward to the day when the P.R.C. would play its proper role in the international community. If it were now the wish of the P.R. C. and of the U.N. that the P.R. C. should enter the U.N., Australia would certainly not oppose this.
4. The Ambassador replied that the P.R.C. was ready to establish diplomatic relations with all countries in the world on the basis of the five principles of peaceful co-existence: this included Australia. In the case of Australia, however, there were obstacles of Australia’s own making. These obstacles were that Australia ‘followed the United States’, Australia participated in ‘the aggressive war’ in Vietnam, Australia had diplomatic relations with Taiwan, Australia advocated the ‘two-China’ or ‘one China, one Taiwan’ formula and Australia acted in a hostile way towards the P.R.C. Australia’s relations with the P.R.C. could not (repeat not) be normalized until these obstacles were removed and as they were of Australia’s making, it was up to Australia to remove them.
5. I replied that:—
(a) Australia did have extremely close relations with the United States and placed great value on them. These were natural (and China too should remember what the U.S. had done for her in the Second World War). These relations would continue.
(b) There was ‘an aggressive war’ in Vietnam but Australia’s allies were not the aggressors. In any event, the war there was dying away: the situation was such that Australian forces were gradually being withdrawn.
(c) I did not understand the assertion that Australia acted in a hostile way towards the P.R.C. and would like an explanation.
I also said that surely Australia’s relations with the United States and the Vietnam question could not be regarded as obstacles to the normalization of relations.
5. 4The Ambassador agreed that these two latter questions should not be allowed to block the normalization of relations. He went on that Australia’s hostility towards the P.R.C. lay simply in the obstacles he had stated—namely, Australia’s relations with Taiwan and her advocacy of the ‘two-China’ or ‘one China, one Taiwan’ formula. The P.R.C. believed in the development of diplomatic relations with all countries, including Australia, on the basis of the five principles of peaceful co-existence but in the case of Australia, there were these twin obstacles and they had first to be removed by Australia. Taiwan, he continued, was a part of China: the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations5 said so and even Truman had said so before the Korean War.
6. I commented that as regards Taiwan, Australia hoped that a mutually satisfactory solution to all concerned could be arranged (all three Chinese present showed great interest in this remark and made me repeat it three times). We did not regard Taiwan’s claim to be the government of all China as having any validity.
7. The Ambassador said that he did not want to argue about Taiwan: it simply belonged to the P.R.C. I retorted that the Ambassador overlooked the facts—no matter who Taiwan belonged to legally, there was a Government there not that of the P.R.C. which was exercising authority and control over the island and its 14 and a half million people. This fact could not be disputed and Australia could not ignore it.
8. As over an hour had already gone by, I said that I would like to try to sum up the conversation and see where matters now stood. On behalf of the Australian Government, I had proposed that conversations be opened in Paris between the Ambassador and myself looking to the progressive normalization of relations and beginning with the matters of mutual interest I had mentioned. If I had understood correctly, the Ambassador’s reply was that the conversations should be concerned with the question of the establishment of diplomatic relations and he had stated the P.R.C.’s position on this. I gathered, in other words, that the Ambassador had rejected Australia’s proposal and substituted another for it. Was this correct, I asked?
9. The Ambassador replied that I could draw whatever conclusions I liked from what he had said: he had been clear enough. I responded that if this was where the conversation was to end, I would be somewhat at a loss upon how to advise the Australian Government. Could the Ambassador not give me a plain answer to my plain question?
10. The Ambassador then reiterated his standard piece about the establishment of diplomatic relations with all countries, including Australia etc. He then referred again to the obstacles in Australia’s case, notably, our attitude to Taiwan: he did not see how relations could be normalized while these obstacles remained: it was up to Australia first to break off diplomatic relations with Taiwan and recognize the P.R.C. as the government of all China. The United States had ten years ago taken the same step as Australia had today: the P.R.C. had gone into discussions with them and these had gotten nowhere because the U.S. refused to withdraw its forces from Taiwan. The result in the Warsaw talks was an impasse: what Australia proposed today amounted to talks which could only have the same result. Just the same he would report what I had said to Peking but after all, the P.R.C. had already waited 21 years for recognition by Australia: it could well wait longer.
11. I said I would report to Canberra and the meeting ended on the note that a further talk would be held if and when either side wanted it.
Comment
12. As you will see, the going was pretty rough. Although elderly (he is a veteran of the Long March)6 the Ambassador is intelligent and tough. He was also, clearly, well prepared. Whether today’s approach will lead to anything remains to be seen but the indications so far are not (repeat not) promising.
Renouf.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18/2]
1 In a cablegram of 25 May, Shann informed Renouf that the ‘matter needs to be closely held’. To ensure appropriate distribution, he asked that all cablegrams on the issue be prefaced with the word ‘dialogue’ and numbered in series.
2 Huang Chen, Ambassador of the PRC to France.
3 Document 185.
4 There are two paragraphs numbered ‘5’ in the original.
5 See footnote 4, Document 19 and footnote 4, Document 27.
6 A reference to a gruelling tactical withdrawal of some 9650 kilometres in 1934–35 by the Chinese Communists from southeast China to Yenan, capital of the northern province of Shensi.