Hong Kong, 1 June 1971
742. Secret
China/ Austria/ Australia
Our 7281 (underlined) (not to all).
The formula used in the PRC/Austria communiqué whereby Austria recognized the PRC as ‘the sole legal government of China’ without any reference to Taiwan is the same as that used with Kuwait (our telegram 489)2 and represents the maximum that the PRC has been prepared to concede to date. On the face of it this formula can be interpreted as not committing Austria on the status of Taiwan, though in practice Austria will have diplomatic representation in Peking and none in Taipei. The PRC has made its own position clear in a ‘People’s Daily’ editorial on 29th May welcoming relations with Austria which claimed: ‘The Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China. Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China. U.S. imperialism’s armed occupation of China’s Taiwan and energetic pursuance of the policy of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan” are doomed to end in ignominious failure’.
2. Austria is the tenth country to negotiate relations with the PRC since Canada announced in October last year. None of these countries had previously established embassies in Taipei but where relevant the PRC satisfied itself that Taipei’s diplomatic missions in the countries concerned would close down before committing itself. It seems very likely that the PRC’s verbal price for diplomatic relations with Australia, or other countries maintaining diplomatic missions in Taipei as well as an explicit two China position on UN representation would be higher than the price it has required of Austria and perhaps higher than that obtained from Canada. Apart from demanding a more explicit verbal formula it is inconceivable in the present situation that the PRC would agree to establish diplomatic relations with any country which intended to maintain diplomatic relations with the ROC, as this would be giving its blessing to a Two China policy. As you know the PRC has let the British know that the existence of a British Consulate on Taiwan is a principal bar to the establishment of full ambassadorial relations between the two countries.
3. Should Australia wish to establish some form of official relations with the PRC over the next few years the only area of possible compromise we can see, given the stated positions of the two countries, is a deal in which we were able to negotiate establishment of a sub-diplomatic mission in Peking, e.g. some sort of trade office, in return for a major scaling down of our representation in Taipei, perhaps also to sub-diplomatic level. In view of the fact that events have been running very much in favour of the PRC over the last six months, the chances of pulling off even this sort of compromise must now be considered slim. The only ground for slight optimism from an Australian point of view is that the PRC might be willing to pay a fairly high price for the advantages which she might see in isolating to a degree the ROC and the United States from a former firm ally. She might also be concerned about the recently announced gestures to the USSR.
4. In view of recent policy statements by both sides, however, it seems very likely that any dialogue between Australia and the PRC directed at the establishment of relations would break down at an early stage. You will be aware of a report from Peking that talks between the PRC and Belgium, which has adopted a rather more pro-PRC policy than Australia, have been broken off because the Chinese believe that the Belgium position makes talks impossible. Nevertheless there would appear to be value in exploring the Chinese attitude on the possibility of a compromise on the lines set out above.
5. In the event that it proved impossible to achieve any negotiated solution on the lines set out above, the only alternative courses of action which we can identify at this stage, within our present policy framework, are:
(a) a unilateral declaration of recognition of the PRC within its present borders. (Belgium for instance takes the position that it has accorded de facto (underline two) recognition to the PRC). This could be presented as a recognition of current realities though it would have the disadvantage that both the PRC and the ROC would probably feel obliged to express their dissatisfaction with it;
(b) securing entry into China of an official twice a year at the time of the Canton trade fairs. Again Belgium has been doing this for some time. While this could probably be achieved without much difficulty, in practical terms it would not add up to much.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18/2]
1 31 May. It conveyed the text of the PRC–Austria communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations.
2 1 April. It reported the release of a joint China–Kuwait communique dated 1 April on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The communique referred to Kuwait’s stand ‘in recognizing the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China’ but made no reference to Taiwan.