Washington, 8 June 1971
3037. Secret Austeo
Chinese Representation
Our 2940.1
On 7 June, Holdridge (White House Staff) told Lavett that proposed course outlined to Ambassador by Marshall Green on 2 June represented a distinctively State Department line which had not repeat not been approved, even tentatively, by President Nixon. Holdridge said specifically that up to this time, proposed course had not repeat not been designated a ‘preferred course’ by President.
2. Holdridge said that he believed (and he implied this was also President’s position, presumably expressed privately) that United States would not repeat not now agree to any General Assembly resolution which referred specifically to Security Council seat, since this was not a matter on which General Assembly could properly rule. Any move to seat PRC in Security Council would need to be made from within UN Security Council itself. He implied that he thought such a move unlikely.
3. Holdridge also said it should not be taken for granted either that, in the event, President would agree to support any resolution which mentioned the PRC as such. The whole issue of PRC representation was something on which only President could pronounce, and care needed to be taken to avoid hasty conclusions which did not take this fundamental fact into account.
4. Asked about President’s statement to his press conference on 1 June that he would reach his decision in ‘approximately six weeks’, Holdridge said that it had at first seemed possible that President’s timetable might give rise to problem arising out of formal need to inscribe new items on United Nations agenda by 23 or 24 July, but he now had little doubt that that date would be met. Asked whether enough time would remain for effective lobbying, Holdridge said that he believed it would, especially given possibility of United States bringing its whole weight to bear on issue.
5. Asked about press reports that Vice President Agnew might be visiting Taipei early in July ‘to discuss with President Chiang Kai-shek the issue of China’s admission to the United Nations’, Holdridge said that ‘his side’ (that is, presumably, National Security Council staff) knew nothing of any such proposal, though he cautioned that it might nevertheless have been ‘tossed around’ in Vice President’s office. He agreed that it had earlier been suggested that some senior figure should visit Taipei for this purpose and that it had also been objected that Chiang Kai-shek would probably take umbrage if any apparent attempt were made to browbeat him, but would offer no further comment.
6. We reiterated to Holdridge importance for Australia of notification as early as possible of President’s decision, especially if it involved some course other than dual representation. He said he fully understood point and that, as he had said before, we could be assured that Australia would be notified very early of any decision.
7. In subsequent discussion on 7 June with Feldman (UN Political Affairs, State Department), Starbird (ROC desk officer)2 also being present, we asked him whether proposal outlined by Marshall Green was President’s ‘preferred course’.
Feldman stated categorically that President had told Secretary of State to try it out, and that it was indeed therefore his ‘preferred course’.
8. While it is obviously not possible to reconcile Feldman’s statement with Holdridge’s (para 1 above), we believe it possible that, faced with the argument that some action needed to be taken now if all power of initiative were not to be lost, President had agreed that State Department might try out the suggested course so that he could decide the final United States position in the light of the results of those soundings (see para 5 of our telegram 2940). Where Holdridge does seem clearly to cut across Green’s approach is his implication that the President had not yet indicated any disposition to be favourable to the resolution. However we are inclined to accept that he has not given a commitment that he would accept proposal if soundings indicated it had good prospects.
9. It is apparent that United States Administration is in some disarray over issue.3
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/19, i]
1 Document 191.
2 L. Starbird, Desk Officer for ROC, US State Department.
3 Cablegram 3038 (8 June) from Washington reported Feldman’s explanation that reference to the Security Council had been omitted from the US draft resolution ‘because ROC would not have it and Japan was not keen on it and because some other member could introduce it subsequently in any case’. Feldman added his personal view that ‘United States would vote against addition, but would not lobby against it’.