Canberra, 21 June 1971
Secret
Australian Policy: Chinese Representation in the United Nations
This submission summarises recent developments on the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations, explores possible alternative courses open to Australia and recommends the lines of the response which we might now make to the United States and Japan.
Background
2. At the beginning of this year we concluded that the Important Question resolution could be defeated at the 26th Session and that the PRC’s unobstructed entry to the United Nations at this session was virtually assured; new tactics would therefore be needed if the ROC’s expulsion was to be prevented.
3. In February this year (when Ambassador Winthrop Brown visited Canberra) we saw some value in floating a resolution which would seek to retain UN membership for the ROC, and seat the PRC. (This would be achieved through a so-called dual representation (DR) formulation—a ‘One China, two seats’ proposal which Australia was inclined to favour.) We ourselves devised a DR formulation without commitment to the Government, and communicated its main elements to the United States on that basis.
4. However, the situation has continued to change. Since the end of February four countries have established diplomatic relations with the PRC; two others are known to be currently negotiating with Peking. The PRC is working hard to win support in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, and many countries are showing interest in closer relations. This could affect their votes at the UN. Our counts on possible voting on a DR formulation (showing the worst outcome) were 65 in favour, 50 against with 12 abstentions at the end of March, 57–51–19 in mid-April and 55–53–19 in mid-May. If a vote were taken now it could be lost. We have acknowledged, however, that if the Americans work energetically in favour of a DR formulation, this could have an important effect on the outcome.
5. On 2nd June, the Americans advised us that they had decided to make some soundings among selected allies on the prospects of a draft DR resolution. This was not to be regarded as a decision by the US to support such a resolution. President Nixon would make a final decision on US policy only after these soundings had been completed. (The text of the US draft is contained in Annex A.)1 On 4th June, the Japanese also came forward with alternative draft DR resolutions (texts in Annex A);2 they did not represent firm proposals but were being put forward for discussion with friendly countries. On 5th June, the Japanese Prime Minister, Mr Sato, wrote to the Prime Minister on the subject of Chinese representation in the United Nations (a copy of this letter is attached at Annex B).3
6. Both countries have asked for Australia’s comments on their respective proposals. We now have to decide how to respond.
Policy Considerations
7. The question of Australian tactics at the UN needs to be considered in the light of overall Australian policy goals. In this regard, successive Australian submissions have tended to change emphasis as the situation changed, that is, as the prospects for PRC admission to the UN increased and as those for dual representation weakened. Nevertheless, our submissions have shown that the balance of advantage to our national interest lay in movement towards normalisation of relations with the PRC. Ministers have publicly declared that normalisation is our long-term goal. At the same time, importance has been attached to the interests of the ROC on Taiwan.
8. Proposals for the normalisation of relations with the PRC (the logical conclusion of which is recognition and full diplomatic relations) while maintaining the present position of the ROC, are essentially contradictory: both the PRC and the ROC have indicated that such proposals would be unacceptable to them. However, our formulations have been in deliberately loose terms and have enabled us to keep our options open. We have so far maintained sufficient flexibility to move either towards normalisation or towards seeking to shore up the position of the ROC in the UN. But at this stage to move decisively in one direction would severely inhibit our prospects of moving in the other. We may consider whether we should have our cake or eat it; but we cannot expect to do both.
9. A further consideration is that the international position of the ROC has weakened considerably. It seems inevitable that the PRC will become a member of the UN, either this year or next. In such circumstances, conspicuous association with attempts to shore up the position of the ROC would result in our prominent involvement in a diplomatic defeat. It would then become all the harder to achieve our goal of normalisation of relations with a PRC which would have triumphed despite our association with attempts to defeat it. For these reasons, our policy should be geared, not to the past, but to what will occur in the next year or so.
10. A number of alternative courses are open to us, and three are examined below.
Alternative A
11. Australia would take an active part in efforts to retain a UN seat for the ROC and would become identified as a leading defender of it. We would co-sponsor a resolution seeking to protect the ROC. (At the same time we would not oppose the PRC’s entry, but we would certainly not advocate it.)
Alternative B
12. We would decline to become involved in efforts to retain a UN seat for the ROC. Ours would be a passive role; we would seek to attract as little attention as possible. We would not co-sponsor any resolution nor become identified with it. Consistent with this approach our voting on resolutions (if they were put forward) might be as follows: Albanian—abstain; simple resolution calling for seating of PRC—in favour; amended IQ safeguarding ROC from expulsion—abstain (perhaps in favour); a DR (single resolution)—abstain.
Alternative C
13. We would take what steps were open to us—without attracting attention—to assist in efforts to retain a place for the ROC. At the same time we would support the PRC’s entry. We would vote in favour of resolutions aimed at this, but we would not co-sponsor and we would avoid becoming identified as a leading supporter of the ROC.
Comment on the Alternative Courses
14. Alternative A accords with our past role in the China debate in the United Nations. It is also consistent with earlier Government statements that Australia would work to retain a place for the ROC in the UN. But this activist role would jeopardise efforts by Australia to develop a dialogue with the PRC with the declared objective of establishing normal relations with Peking. It would also lead to our going out on a limb that is about to fall, either this year or next. Such a diplomatic defeat would have adverse consequences.
15. Alternative B would enhance prospects for a dialogue with the PRC and place no hurdle in the way of any future discussions with the PRC on diplomatic relations. On the other hand it would leave the Government open to the charge of reneging on its promise to seek ways to retain UN membership for the ROC. If the US and Japan were to continue to look to ways to retain membership for the ROC, the adoption by Australia of this approach might be regarded unfavourably by those countries. However, neither the US nor Japan has taken any adverse action in respect of countries that have recently normalised their relations with the PRC or taken action to improve these relations. Indeed, both the US and Japan give every indication of wishing to normalise their own relations with the PRC, were it not for the fact that they may be temporarily confined by the rigidity of their own past positions.
16. Alternative C would enable us to honour our promise to help the ROC, but unless handled with considerable skill, this approach could give offence to both the ROC and the PRC and set back our relations with both.
17. If we accept this approach we would have to alter our current priorities (at least for public presentation): our first objective would be the entry of the PRC, and the second the retention of the ROC’s seat—not the other way around. We would make it clear publicly that we supported a resolution calling for the PRC’s entry because we were convinced of the desirability of having the PRC a member—not because we accepted philosophically but grudgingly, the inevitability of the PRC’s entry. We would omit in future public statements any qualifications concerning our support for the PRC’s entry, for example, a call to the PRC to respect the UN Charter.
18. In a statement explaining our vote we might say that we interpret the DR approach as ‘One China, two seats’—a concept that might just be acceptable to the PRC, especially if it assessed that at some future time it, the PRC, would have two votes in the General Assembly. We would explain our vote in favour of a resolution (or part of it) designed to protect the ROC from expulsion on the ground that this was simply a reaffirmation of Article 18(2) of the Charter.
Conclusion
19. The US and Japan have not taken a final decision on the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations. Indeed, Washington has reported that a White House official has said that the US’s DR formulation represented a distinctly State Department line which had not been approved, even tentatively, by President Nixon. Our Embassy has commented that the US Administration is in some disarray over the issue. We would not exclude the possibility that President Nixon might, in the end, decide in favour of a different approach—for example, an approach similar to the USSR’s Ukraine/Byelorussia arrangements. Given this uncertainty it would be unwise for Australia to make a final decision on any particular approach. While we should try to be as constructive as possible in discussing this subject with our allies, our approach should be cautious—and flexible.
Recommendation
20. It is recommended that:—
(a) we should not take a final decision on our approach to this question in the United Nations;
(b) we should have discussions now with US and Japanese officials, without commitment to the Government, and that we should advise both Governments that:
(i) our examination of the matter is proceeding in the light of our long-term goal of the normalisation of relations with the PRC, while hoping that a mutually satisfactory solution for all concerned can be found for the ROC on Taiwan;
(ii) we consider that the passage of time has eroded international support for a DR resolution. The absence of reference to allocation of a Security Council seat to the PRC would weaken support for the resolution;
(iii) we do not agree with the US assessment that the traditional Albanian Resolution, calling for the seating of the PRC and expulsion of the ROC, will fail if a DR resolution preceded it. The Albanian Resolution already has the support of a simple majority;
(iv) strong US lobbying (and loss of influence by the PRC) would be necessary to win support for a DR resolution;
(v) we will consider the matter further when we know the extent to which international support for a DR resolution, including support from the US, will be forthcoming;
(vi) on a purely technical basis, and without any commitment, we should make comments based on the attached paper on the US and Japanese drafts.4
Keith Waller
Secretary
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18, xiii]
1 See Documents 191 and 193.
2 The Japanese resolutions were, with the US formulation, assessed in the annex to be ‘like our own’ in that they constituted a ‘One China, two seats’ approach. Nevertheless, Australia was said to differ in favouring the transfer of the Security Council seat to the PRC; the Japanese and US preference was to avoid mention of the subject.
3 Document 192.
4 In a note of21 June, Bury wrote at the end of the document: ‘Until U.S. make up their mind what they want to do and press for it very hard it is almost impossible for us to decide what it will be sensible to do. Time has almost eroded the position which the President may yet let slide by default. He may be counting on U.S. public opinion moving still further along current lines. Meanwhile I approve your recommendations’.