Canberra, 25 June 1971
Confidential priority
China Dialogue
On 18 June you agreed that Mr Renouf should be instructed, as he had recommended, to contact the PRC Ambassador in Paris on 28 June to seek a second meeting.1 At that meeting he would ask the Ambassador whether he had had a reaction from Peking to the Australian Government’s proposal of 27 May that a dialogue be opened in order to work towards a progressive normalization of relations, beginning with discussions on matters such as trade, visits, scientific and cultural exchanges.
2. We have just received from the Department of Trade a memorandum2 containing detailed suggestions for possible discussion with the Chinese should they be prepared to discuss questions of substance in the near future. This will make it possible to draft supplementary instructions for Renouf.
3. At the same time we have been giving further thought to the timing of our second approach to the Chinese, bearing in mind that the ALP delegation will be entering China on 2 July. On the one hand:—
(a) a new approach to the Chinese at this time would have the advantage of underlining to them the Government’s continuing interest in maintaining a dialogue, and
(b) the Government would be in a position to demonstrate, if the need arose, that it had followed through [reasonably]3 quickly on its initial approach to the Chinese.
4. On the other hand the Chinese might exploit the coincidence of a second approach in Paris with the ALP visit by trying to play the Government and the ALP delegation off against each other. They could, for instance, tell the ALP delegation that Renouf had tried twice to raise matters like trade and cultural exchanges while evading the issue of diplomatic recognition, and that they had firmly rejected this approach. (But they could just as easily say that we had made only one approach and had not bothered to follow it up.)
5. The advantages of deferring a second approach in Paris would be as follows:
(a) the outcome of the ALP delegation’s visit could be useful in helping us decide how we should approach a second meeting with the Chinese;
(b) by the second half of July we shall be approaching the time at which President Nixon is expected to make decisions on the handling of Chinese representation at the UN. The making of these decisions will clarify the major uncertainty in the present situation and facilitate resolution of our own policy;
(c) if the Chinese reject our ‘progressive normalization’ approach and insist that any further talks be based solely on recognition and diplomatic relations, we shall be hard put to it to spin out any kind of dialogue with them for very long. It may be easier to do this if we space our approaches at longer intervals than one month.
6. The main disadvantage of postponement is that, if there is any disposition on the Chinese side to accept our ‘progressive normalization’ approach, we run the risk of seeing the contact that has been established wither on the vine if we are too slow in enquiring about their reaction.
7. On balance, I am inclined to favour having Renouf go ahead as planned, but instructing him that he is at all costs to avoid letting a situation develop at the next meeting at which the dialogue would be broken off or terminated.4
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18/2]
1 See Document 196.
2 Not published.
3 Text in parenthesis was handwritten on the original.
4 On the same day, Renouf was informed of Bury’s decision that he should again approach Huang Chen. Renouf subsequently advised that he had made an appointment with Huang for 2 July.